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ABSTRACT
Chapter 1: Introduction
This project is about power and sexual desire. The chapter explains the different
ways in which ‘power’ is used: as a relational concept for dynamics between
individuals, and as a structural societal concept. Power is understood as having a
capacity for producing subordination, but also pleasure. The chapter comments
upon the feminist debate on power and sexuality. The ambition of the present
project is to contribute to this debate, and the analytical approach is sketched out:
to investigate lesbian negotiations of power issues known from the feminist
critique of heterosexuality.
Chapter 2: Sexuality – where inner and outer worlds meet
Here I seek to establish a notion of ‘sexuality’ that contains aspects of sexual
practice, individual psyche, historical changing cultures and the continuous
negotiations between the three. Sexuality will be seen as flexible both in the life of
an individual and in the history of a society. We create ourselves as sexual and
erotic persons, but are also created by the cultures of which we are members and
their sexual institutions. ‘Heteronormativity’, a central term in so-called ‘queer
theory’, is most important to my understanding of cultural imperatives. Embedded
in this term is recognition of heterosexuality as crucial in becoming intelligible
men and women, and consequently, heterosexuality as crucial in the process of
being understood as human. Linked to heteronormativity is also that the major
symbol for active desire, the phallus (or masculinity), is impossible to avoid for
any member of the culture. The chapter presents important reworkings of
psychoanalytical theory to establish the connection between lesbian desire and
masculinity, since this will be a central issue in the first two empirical chapters.
Chapter 3: Reflections on methodology, methods and desire
The project is rooted in political debates about sexuality and power that have been
on the feminist agenda the last decades. The aim for the project is to contribute to
the debate politically as well as theoretically. In some sense, the aim is to restart a
debate within the Norwegian feminist academia. The most controversial feature of
the project might be the way heterosexuality is represented, not by narratives about
a variety of heterosexual practices, but by its power aspects, pointed to by
feminists. I use my interviews with lesbians to argue for a specificity of lesbian
socio-erotic practice related to this. The representation of heterosexuality and the
question of a general specificity to lesbian desire are central issues in the project,
and are also complicated issues. This chapter is first of all meant to expose, as
many sides of the research process as are considered relevant for the evaluation of
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my reasoning. I describe the early start, where I invited a group of lesbians to
discuss the coming fieldwork, respond to topics for the interviews, try different
kinds of methods and discuss analytical issues. The reasoning behind recruiting 20
informants (17 lesbians, one transsexual becoming a man, one heterosexual woman
and one bi-sexual woman) by ‘snowballing’, the composition of the sample of
informants (age, social situation, erotic preferences), how I experienced fieldwork
and ethical challenges are also described. In this project the interviews are
understood both as a ‘report from reality’, and also as the informants construction
of this reality. My own story, based on these interviews, is understood as a
suggestion of a way of understanding aspects of contemporary sexual culture. I
want to argue that my story is a good suggestion, and pay in this chapter direct
attention to reliability, validity and the potential for generalization. My concern
about these issues, is also the main reason why the research process is described as
detailed as it is.
As a spring-board to the chapters that present the analysis of the interview
material, I outline the main analytical approach; that is, to analyze lesbian sexuality
as a reworking of the power domains of heterosexuality. Since the compulsion to
heterosexuality is understood as culturally pervasive, no one can escape its creating
force. Heterosexuality is thus exploited as a deliverer of premises for the analysis
of lesbian practices. In the two analytical chapters that come first, it is the symbolic
aspect of heterosexuality and power that is focused. These are the two analytical
chapters where I have found it useful to draw on a psychoanalytical perspective,
since psychoanalytical theory relates, not only to sexual practices, but also to the
imaginary aspects of sexuality.
Chapter 4: When women take
The verb to take someone sexually turned up on several occasions in the
interviews. What do women do when they take each other? The word is easily
associated with heterosexuality and more specifically in a Norwegian context, men
penetrating women. It is not commonly used as a description of heterosexuality,
other than in pornography. The reason is probably that it is not compatible with the
equality strive in the Norwegian society, also in sexual matters. Why would
women use it about what they do to other women? The conclusion of the analysis
is that the phallic significance of the word is retained in the sense that ‘taking’
means to be actively desiring. To use the word adds eroticism to the story; to take
is really to desire. However, the performance of ‘taking’ is ‘giving’, since it is the
taken part that is pleasured with an orgasm. This represents a distinct difference
from most heterosexual ‘taking’, represented as it is mostly in porn, where the
penetrator is the one (the man) to reach climax. Lesbian porn is compared with
heterosexual porn on this issue, and used in the argumentation.
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Chapter 5: Masculinity in erotic play
Men in gray suits are often seen as signaling authority, strength and power. A
woman who goes to a meeting and wants to be recognized for her intellectual and
management skills, are usually advised to avoid the outfits that exposes her body
too much. Appearance is linked to authority, and it has something to do with
masculinity and femininity. In my interviews appearance was an issue, and signs of
masculinity in particular. Is it an attempt to reproduce masculine power? How does
that relate to the sexual dynamics between women? In this chapter, as in the
previous, it is demonstrated how the phallic is represented in erotic dynamics
between women. Clothes, postures and ways of initializing sex contain masculine
signs of crucial importance. The theorizing of the erotic significance of masculinity
for lesbians is based on notions of the lesbian phallus (Judith Butler) and
masculinity as a lesbian fetish (Teresa de Lauretis). The conclusion is that power is
in play between lesbians, and power is seen in the light of a theorization of the
phallus as non-paternal, which in this case implies the flexibility and transferability
of masculinity.
Chapter 6: ‘Hire a woman! What woman would?’
Meeting a lesbian, who had been selling her sexual services to other women, was a
surprise to me during the fieldwork. I first considered this as rare and the exception
that proves the rule that women do not buy sex (from other women), but decided
that it was worth investigating and analyzing on its own. I use a more exploratory
approach than in the two previous empirical chapters, and start with an
investigation of the cultural blindness towards women who buy and sell sex
between them. It is a case that very distinctly breaks with several discourses in the
field of sexuality, especially the romantic discourse that ascribes the mixture of sex
and love to women, and a more technically oriented sexuality to men. The second
part of the chapter is an analysis of the activities of one of my informants, and also
a few other stories about women buying sex from other women. There were not
many stories to find. I compare my cases with the rather rich field of research on
heterosexual prostitution. The classic feminist critique of prostitution focuses on
the objectification of women, the emotional damages and the exploitation in
general. The lesbian who serves another woman seems to become less objectified
than a woman who serves a man. This may be due to the technical skills that
usually are needed to make a woman climax. Other women appreciate these skills.
One factor is also that in the lesbian subculture promiscuity may add to the social
status of a (butch and competent) lesbian, in a way that does not count to a
woman’s benefit in a heterosexual context. The promiscuous butch is not easily
understood as a fallen woman. One could say that masculinity is part of the
protection. The conclusion is that the sex sales between women have a sociality
that, to a greater degree than when women sell their services to men, protects the
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vwoman who is engaged in the sex-work. The classic feminist critique of
prostitution is not automatically apt.
Chapter 7: ‘Usually, I will start with her’ – equality issues in the production
of an orgasm
The starting-point for the analysis is to suggest that it is common fairness in
Norway, that both women and men have rights to enjoy orgasms, and also that men
are simpler than women, who usually need more time. The feminist critique, that in
this case could be formulated as an advise, is that 1) men should be more
considerate, 2) women should know more about their own bodies and not leave the
responsibility to men, 3) the position coitus has as ‘real sex’ (the coitus imperative)
should be challenged, since intercourse tends to result in a male orgasm, but not a
female one.1 How is the equality issue connected to orgasm handled when women
have sex with women? Again I start the investigation with an explorative strategy.
I analyze statements like ’I had sex with her. She did not have sex with me’ and ‘If
she’s aroused, then she’ll get’. The practice of taking turns in giving each other
orgasm is also analyzed. I find that my interviewees were service oriented and
reliable in producing orgasms, and that orgasm is usually a matter of reciprocity.
There are, however, some cases in the interviews where I find the service
orientation problematic, in the sense that ‘the provider’ gets no orgasmic pleasure
in return. What is striking in these cases is that the provider is the more sexually
dominant in the relation. That is, my investigation shows that ‘masculine’ lesbians
more than ‘feminine’ lesbians are in risk of becoming service oriented to an extent
that raises feminist concern about equality. The chapter also contains an analysis of
penetration in lesbian relations. It is common to ascribe symbolic power to the
penetrator. In the interview material I have, this is more likely when penetration is
executed with tools, than when it is executed with hands. It is argued that
penetration with hands in most cases, not always, has less of symbolic power
attached. In any case, penetration is separated from the production of an orgasm,
which is achieved with other or additional techniques. The first point of feminist
critique was that men should be more considerate. I conclude that if the more
masculine (butch) is in risk of anything, it is being too considerate. Regarding the
second point, that women should know themselves better: double knowledge about
the female body probably helps. Three, to challenge the coitus imperative: lesbians
negotiate the coitus imperative actively and in a variety of ways (by rejecting,
copying or playing on it), but it does not stand in the way of the production of
orgasms on both sides.
1 These advises coincides with those from sexologists.
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Chapter 8: Lesbian specificity
The analyses in the four foregoing chapters are brought together here. The term
‘lesbian specificity’, searched for as part of the analytical approach, is now
exploited as the synthesizing term. Theoretically, the study is based on
assumptions that do not ascribe an inner lesbian essence to individuals with lesbian
desire. This is already made clear in the chapter about the term ‘sexuality’.
However, ‘specificity’ here becomes central to such an extent, that I have found it
necessary to convey a discussion about essentialism connected to ‘specificity’ in
particular. I base the discussion mainly on the ideas of Teresa de Lauretis and
Dorte Marie Søndergaard. I use a notion of essentialism that makes is possible to
delimit and talk about a lesbian existence, a lesbian specificity, in a dominantly
heterosexual culture. However, this is a specificity that constantly undergoes
changes, a specificity interwoven with the main socio-erotic culture.
The analytical approach is to work the issue of specificity through two terms:
‘modalities’ and ‘effects’ of reworking heterosexual power domains. I conclude
that eroticism in the mainstream culture, based on the power difference between
masculinity and femininity and represented by signs with reference to the phallic
symbolic, is in play in lesbian practices. This is especially evident in the chapters
about ‘to take’ and about masculinity. The theoretical understanding of the phallic
signification is based on reworking of psychoanalysis, where the phallus is
theorized as non-paternal and transferable from one woman to the other. The
analysis of prostitution and the analysis of the sociality of an orgasm contribute in
a different manner to ‘specificity’. I argue that these cases demonstrate that power
issues are negotiated with a more fair result than suggested by the critique of
heterosexual discourse. A short description of the synthesis based on this is that
lesbian specificity, in a symbolic and social sense, is an erotic specificity marked
by flexible power exchange.
The chapter contains a discussion of possible political effects arising from the
recognition of the specificity to lesbian sexual dynamics. The question is first
about direct political influence. Do the heterosexual society have something to
learn from lesbian practices? A simple answer is that there is not much to learn on
a symbolic level since lesbians as well as heterosexuals exploit the eroticism of the
distinction between masculinity and femininity. There could be more to learn when
it comes to the more practical results of the negotiations of power. A lesbian
exchange of power seems to be typical, and the result of negotiations rather
democratic. A second aspect of possible effects is given more attention. What are
the ontological (subversive, queer) effects of lesbianism? Or, does the existence of
a lesbian specificity have the potential of challenging the ways we think and
experience sexuality? I demonstrate on the basis of the empirical study, how
lesbian specificity challenge binary thinking and asks for ontological status.
URN:NBN:no-2116
vii
Epilogue
The outset for the reflections in this final chapter is in the discussion of ontological
issues in the previous one. The greatest frustration in the project has been the
feeling of being trapped in discourse and language. Are there other words to use
than ‘women’ and ‘men’, ‘masculinity’ and ‘femininity’, ‘give’ and ‘take’, ‘have
control’ and ‘relinquish control’, ‘active’ and ‘passive’? Are there signifiers other
than those that have as their fulcrum phallic power difference? Are there other
discourses to relate to than the ‘romantic’, the ‘heterosexual’, the ‘homosexual’? In
terms of symbolizing, describing and analyzing, can we find ways that better
mediate the sensation sex sometimes is? The chapter discusses efforts made by
other feminists to go beyond empirical evidence and the well-known terms in the
field of sexuality studies.
Guidance
A guidance for reading this text fast and still get something out of it, is to read
Chapter 1: Introduction, the final part of chapter 3 about methodology, where I
sketch out the analytical approach related to the project goal, and Chapter 8:
Lesbian specificity where the reader gets the major points in the analysis and also
my reflections on what this might mean for theory, public debate and societal
change.
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1CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
People have asked me what this study is about, and often I have said that
it is about power and sexual desire. It has not failed; everyone gets the
association of sexual harassment and abuse. I do discuss subordination in
sexual relations, where power is understood as the power to exploit
another being for the sexual pleasure of ones own, the power to exploit. I
also discuss power and sexuality as a historical and structural issue,
where some norms and structures are more for the benefit of some
people than for others. This classical sociological understanding of
power represents one form power can take, which is empirically
investigated in this project. However, power understood as the power to
produce pleasure, is also a central aspect of power in this project. This
last aspect of power is conceived of as the motion between taking control
and giving up control for the sexual benefit of the involved parts. I am
not focusing in particular on the specific kind of power play that
characterizes sado-masochism (s&m),1 but socio-erotic power regardless
of identification with s&m. Thus, power will be seen as productive, with
a potential to produce subordination as well as pleasure. In two empirical
chapters (chapter 4 and 5), special attention is given to the power of the
phallic symbolic, where the phallic is understood as giving meaning to
eroticity in contemporary Western societies. Each empirical chapter
investigates separate and concrete power issues connected to sexuality.
Some will object to using the word ‘power’ since it has all its negative
connotations. I use the term ‘power’ mostly because I want contribute to
research and debates that already address ‘power’, especially power as it
revolves around the binaries man-woman, masculinity-femininity. That
is; contemporary theorizing and debate has a language that I have felt
necessary to speak. We certainly could need other terms and phrases to
set new agendas for the debates about sexuality, and this will often be
pointed to in the analysis and discussions in this text. I will discuss this
to a greater length later.
Within feminist studies sexuality and power is most often explored in a
heterosexual context, and the debates are grounded on the sexual
difference between women and men. The power problem is then seen as
the power men have over women. I want to discuss sexuality within a
lesbian context. It may sound paradoxical to some, that the sexual
1 In the concept ’s&m’ is included what commonly is called dominance versus
submissiveness (D/s), leather, and bondage practices.
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2difference then should be one between women and women. This is
nevertheless how I understand sexual desire; sexual desire is understood
in terms of eroticized sexual difference also when it is homosexual.
Desire is in this project perceived as a tension directed towards someone
or something outside oneself. To experience this something or someone
as ‘outside’ means that it the other has to be different to be
distinguishable, also when it is two women. The negotiations of power in
the light of sexual difference between women, is my research topic.
There are different feminist approaches to the critique of the power men
have over women in a sexual and erotic sense. Power and sexual desire
is a contested issue within feminist thinking (Jackson and Scott 1996,
Kitzinger 1987, Segal 1994, 1999, Snitow et al 1984). Within feminism
two prominent questions are; is it possible to be a heterosexually
practicing woman without being subordinate in some sense? Is eroticity
exiting from the back door when equality between the sexes enters?
Some have answered that heterosexuality is not compatible with
feminism; lesbianism is the consequence of feminism. This view often
goes together with an understanding of the erotic between women as
being empty of power currency.
In Norway there is now hardly any debate within feminist studies about
(hetero)sexual difference, power and the erotic. Karin Widerberg’s book
Kunnskapens kjønn (1995), Monica Rudberg’s Kjærlighetsartikler
(1997), Jorun Solheim’s Den åpne kroppen (1998) and Anne Britt
Flemmen’s Mellomromserfaringer (1999), are books that had the
potential to represent a restart of the debates that took place in the
1970’s, but did not.2 Lesbian s&m and the lesbian subcultural return to
images of the butch-femme dynamic,3 have triggered and informed the
debate, seen by some as mere reproductions of heterosexual power
inequality (far from an ideal power-free female exchange), and by others
as exciting and as promising erotic possibilities for women having sex
with other women (for different positions see Harris and Crocker 1997,
Hart 1996, Jeffreys 1990, Kennedy and Davis 1993, Lützen 1987, Nestle
1987, 1992). If these debates were not important in academia, they were
certainly important in the Norwegian women’s movement, especially in
2 Marianne Gullestad and Tordis Borchgrevink had equality, inequality and the erotic
as central issues in earlier works (Gullestad 1984, Borchgrevink 1989). Borchgrevink
points to the equality problem in the field of the heterosexually erotic, suggesting
comparative studies of homosexual relations.
3 For the reader who is not familiar with the term ’butch-femme’, it is explained on
the first and second page of Chapter 5: Masculinity in erotic play between women.
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3the 1980’s and beginning of the 1990’s.4 Organizations were split on
sexuality issues. Feminist academia has been less engaged in the
questions about the erotic and the sexes, even if there have been some
contributions as mentioned. The debates are missing. The aim for this
study is to trigger the public and academic debate about sexuality and
power, by offering perspectives from a lesbian-based position. More
concretely, by presupposing a lesbian sexual difference, and the
negotiation of power difference in a socio-erotic sense between women.
In this project lesbian negotiations of power issues are studied on the
basis of how I have learned to know power and equality domains from a
feminist critique of heterosexual discourse. I do not compare lesbian
power negotiations with the power negotiations of those who live their
lives as heterosexuals. Very early in the project, I made the choice that I
would not interview heterosexuals, but use feminist critique (politics and
scholarship) as a backdrop and a source from which I could pick relevant
power issues to discuss in a new context. Feminists have pointed to some
of the power aspects of the heterosexual erotic, and in my interviews I
find similar issues on a lesbian agenda. Four issues captured my
attention in particular: that some informants said that they sexually ‘take’
their partner, that so many of them expressed attraction to women who
show signs of masculinity, lesbian prostitution, and last but not least; the
sociality of the production of an orgasm. Orgasmic one-sidedness and
service orientation is the topic of the fourth empirical chapter. To have
the feminist critique as an outset for the analysis means a focus on
different aspects of power in each analytical case. The analytical
approach is in principle the same in every empirical chapter; to see how
lesbians relate to, negotiate, copy and rework power domains in
heterosexual discourse.
The power aspect of the verb ‘to take’ is embedded in the right the
‘taker’, usually a man, has to get what he sexually wants. The analysis in
chapter 4 of how some lesbians use the verb ‘to take’ in a sexual sense,
is an examining of what actually happens when a woman takes another
woman. The symbolic effect of using this word, so easily associated with
male power over women, is especially addressed. In chapter 5 about
signs of masculinity, the symbolic aspects are the main focus. Masculine
symbols are from a feminist viewpoint often connected to having power
4 For an illustration of the topics under debate, see the preparatory material for a
conference about pornography in Trondheim, October 1990. 21 contributions in an
ongoing debate in the Norwegian newspaper Klassekampen are commented. The
material is available by contacting Kvinnefronten, Trondheim.
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4ambitions. How can the lesbian use of masculine symbols be interpreted?
The search for an answer is in the position masculinity (‘the phallic’)
still occupies as the main signifier of desire in Western culture.
The social aspects of reworking, perceived as analytically
distinguishable from the symbolic aspects, is the main focus in the
empirical analysis of prostitution in chapter 6, and also in chapter 7
about the production of an orgasm in un-paid relations. Classic feminist
critique of prostitution is that prostitution is degrading for the female
sex-worker. The power structures of sex sales makes women (and
children of both sexes) extremely vulnerable and exposed for
exploitation and violence. Is the same critique apt when there are adult
women on both sides of the transaction? Several questions are
investigated and discussed to suggest characteristic features of the social
aspects of this trade. The orgasm that is not paid for with money or gifts,
is the analytical object of the fourth empirical analysis. As with
prostitution, one-sidedness and sexual service is an issue and again the
social aspects in terms of possible subordination is shed light on and
discussed. What is the outcome of negotiations between women?
In chapter 8, the empirical analysis is extracted and synthesized in the
term ‘lesbian specificity’. This term is then applied for an analysis of
possible effects of lesbian desire and practice. Here, ‘effects’ means
direct political effects, and also more fundamental theoretical effects, in
terms of altering the concepts with which we experience and think
sexuality. This will of course be a most central topic with regards to the
aim for the project; to contribute to the debate about power and
sexuality. What can be learned from lesbian practices? Is the lesbian
existence of any importance for a dominantly heterosexual culture, and
in what ways?
I should give a warning regarding the term ‘lesbian specificity’, because
the use of it already in the first analytical chapter otherwise might be
confusing. Lesbian specificity is not only a way of synthesizing, even if
this is the main purpose of introducing such a term. It is also central in
the analytical approach to power negotiations in the four empirical
chapters. The main analytical approach in this study is to search for the
specificity of lesbian sexual desire in the reworking of heterosexual
power domains. That is; ‘lesbian specificity’ serves as a means of
synthesizing the empirical analysis, and the existence of a lesbian
specificity is also presupposed in the analytical approach. I will
emphasize that this must not be read as a search for the final truth about
lesbianism. Rather, it should be read more pragmatically as the grip on
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disadvantage is that the variations in the lesbian negotiations are paid
less attention in the synthesis.
The text has eight regular chapters, whereof this is the first, and an
epilogue. The second chapter gives the theoretical framework for the
project, especially how the concept ‘sexuality’ is understood as a soci-
cultural term that needs to be historisized, and how it is understood as a
human practice with individual psychological significance. One could
say that the project theoretically draws on poststructural, and even
‘queer’ strategies for empirical social science, since theoreticians like
Michel Foucault, Judith Butler and Teresa de Lauretis are important
contributors. However, it might be that my inclination to make general
analytical statements disturbs the picture in this respect, such that a more
apt label would be ‘a queer contribution to feminist studies’. A ‘general
analytical statement’ is for instance expressed through the synthesizing
term ‘lesbian specificity’. In the third chapter about methodology and
methods, the project is seen in relation to several debates about what
social science can be. Chapter 3 reflects the dilemma between a
poststructural (queer) theoretical foundation and a wish to take the
researcher’s authority to generalize. I seek to solve it in this text in three
steps. Firstly, by making visible the research process, to make the reader
as prepared as possible for judging the analysis, discussions and
suggestions. Secondly, by taking a position in debates about general
validity, reliability and the potential for generalization. The third step is
not contained in the methodology chapter, but will come in each of the
four analytical chapters that follow after it. I investigate quite diverse
issues, exploits different materials, and have thus chosen to have
separate discussions of generalization in each analytical case. In the
synthesizing chapter Chapter 8: Lesbian specificity that follows after the
analytical chapters (already briefly described), generalization is again a
concern. Here are two main issues. One is the risk of ‘essentialism’
embedded in the use of a term like ‘lesbian specificity’. Is it not too
much associated with the existence of a ‘inner truth about the lesbian’,
and the drawing of a distinct line between hetero and homo, when I
otherwise deconstruct this distinction? The answer could be ‘yes’, but it
could also be ‘no’. Hopefully the last part of the chapter proves that a
delimitation of the specifically lesbian is needed for a discussion of
effects, when the ambition is to base such a discussion on empirical
analysis, not only on theory. The epilogue addresses the limitations in
language for theorizing and experiencing the sexual, and elaborate on
some alternatives to the symbols and concepts used in the empirical
analysis.
URN:NBN:no-2116
6CHAPTER 2: SEXUALITY – WHERE INNER AND OUTER
WORLDS MEET
In the last hundred years of western culture, certain aspects of being
human are understood as sexuality. Most people, both learned and
laymen, think and feel that this sexuality has existed through all times
and is the most natural of all there is and ever was. The diversity of
phenomena that the concept covers is neither randomly nor consciously
chosen but is on the other hand no more ‘naturally’ given than are the
ethical, political and moral values ascribed to the phenomenon. Sexuality
is a real fiction of tremendous psychological, socio-cultural and political
importance. It is a complex phenomenon.
Between partners and friends, and when sexuality is on the agenda in the
media and in education, usually it has to do with the body. It is about
what we do with our bodies, it is about genitals, hands, sense organs for
looking, smelling, tasting etc. How individuals experience themselves as
sexual persons in a bodily sense varies considerably, and makes the
psychological and socio-psychological aspects also important. The
impact on one’s sexuality that a childhood of sexual abuse has, is
different from that of a childhood surrounded by responsible and caring
adults. Sexuality is colored by both pain and pleasure, by feelings of
inadequacy and blissful satisfaction. We are advised in talking about
sexuality to make the most out of it. However, the term ‘sexuality’ not
only contains the personal and private sphere between individuals.
Sexuality is also legislation and organization of areas as contraception,
abortion, marriage and domestic partnership, insemination, different
sexualities, education, counseling, pornography, and commercial sex.
Other important facets involve scientific ideas, film and fiction; how we
theorize and how we create images of sexuality. Indeed, we would have
had no ‘sexuality’ were it not for the idea about it, and the politics
conducted in the name of sexuality. In this chapter I develop a notion of
sexuality that seeks to account for all these features of the phenomenon,
and connect it to the empirical analysis in this project.
My interviews are narratives about what women do and how they think
about it. I need a notion of sexuality that takes care of the aspect of
‘practicing sex’. The interviews are interpreted in a historical and
cultural context. Secondly, I thus need a notion of sexuality that allows
me to see practices, not only as the likes and dislikes of individuals, but
also as reflections and negotiations of ideas, practices and institutions
that are dominant or at least available in contemporary culture. These
features are what I have called the ‘discursive aspects’ of sexuality.
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This chapter also scrutinizes the possible usefulness of psychoanalysis,
and an account of two contributions that I understand as fundamental
reworkings of classic psychoanalytical theory. The ideas of Judith Butler
and Teresa de Lauretis are central to the interpretation of the psycho-
symbolic representation of masculinity in the lesbian erotic. Finally,
these aspects of sexuality come together in a social and psychological
dynamic ‘movement’: sexual structuring. The idea is to see sexuality as
flexible and changeable in the life of an individual as well as in culture.
Sexuality is in this project understood as a continuous process of sexual
structuring, a negotiation of inner and outer worlds.
Sexuality as practice and lived experience
The Swedish sociologist Gisela Helmius has this to say in her study of
adolescent sexuality:
‘Humans have from before birth, the physiological
presuppositions required to experience the realization of sexual
desire. However, no particular values connected to the variety of
physiological sexual reactions are contained by this biological
determined system. The social expressions of sexuality – when,
where, how, why and with whom – depend on culture, differ
between societies and vary over time. Certain values and meanings
are attributed to physiological sexual reactions’ (Helmius 1990,
p5, my translation).
The distinction between biology (physiological presuppositions,
biological determined system) and culture (values connected, social
expressions) is central to this line of argument. Such and similar
distinctions (nature-culture, body-mind dichotomies, etc) are not as easy
to make as they once were. Within feminist studies this is especially
manifested in the debate over the sex-gender distinction (Butler 1993a,
Haraway 1991, Moi 1998). I agree with those who say that nothing can
be altogether biological, disconnected from historical and social contexts
and unmediated by language and interpretation, and I will return to this.
However, to understand the biological as culture and vice versa, should
not prevent us from having a conversation about sexuality as physicality
and ‘body-cultural’ practice. When I talked with my informants in the
research interviews, we spoke about sexuality as experiences and desires
of bodily significance.
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Norwegian sexologists, have written a handbook of sexology. The aim of
the book is to inform others who are professionally interested to help
clients to get more pleasure out of sex. For this they need a practice-
oriented understanding of sexuality. Sexuality is seen as something we
do to ourselves or in encounters with others. They give the following
clarification of the terms ‘sex’ and ‘sexuality’, which they use
interchangeably:
‘In this book sex and sexuality will be used as collective terms for
onanism, masturbation and petting, and as terms for the emotions,
acts and incentives5 related to sexual intercourse6 between human
beings’ (Almås and Benestad 1997, p53-54, my translation).
If they had written in English, Almaas and Benestad would not have
conflated the terms sex and sexuality. ‘Sex’ is in Norwegian used
exclusively in the realm of the erotic. We have the term ‘kjønn’ to
communicate anatomical body differences, and the same word for
gender differences, a term which the authors indeed discuss in other
parts of the the book.
From Almaas and Benestad I have taken my understanding of the term to
have sex, a practice-oriented term, but a term that is not concurrent with
sexual practice. In this text the latter is also used with the broader
meaning of ‘practices that are about sex’, thereby containing cultural
aspects of sexuality. Hermius above, used the term ‘expressions of
sexuality’ for the practice aspect, which will be done sometimes here
too. And from the British sociologist Gail Hawkes we get yet another
practice-term: ‘expression of sexual desire’. Hawkes reflects upon words
and meanings in A Sociology of Sex and Sexuality (1996). Like Hermius,
she starts with the physical body:
‘Biological sex is allocated by the possession of definitive
physical and physiological ‘markers’: externally, genitalia, penis,
testes, vagina, clitoris; internally, verifiable uterus, ovaries, vas
deferens, prostate gland. Non-microscopic yet equally discernible
chromosomes and hormones, again (though now less definitively)
provide biochemical support for these categories. Yet the
meanings given to these anatomical distinctions have a social
origin’ (Hawkes 1996, p7).
5
‘tilskyndelser’ translated with incentives
6
‘seksuelt samkvem’
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definitive physical and physiological markers’. In a historical perspective
we have seen several, and Hawkes here makes references to the work of
Thomas Lacquer. The physically sexed body is one thing, but what about
the sexually desiring body? She continues:
‘But how have the connections been made, connections which are
of such import, between the possession of particular organs –
which, as human physiology will illustrate, share very similar
response characteristics – and expressions of sexual desire? For
the anxieties or the celebrations which accompany social attitudes
to sex and sexuality do not have their centre in the intrinsic
qualities of bodily parts, but their deployment in expressions of
sexual desire. Yet such expressions cannot, in the commonsense
view, even in the writing of some scholarship, be seen to be
synonymous with ‘sexuality’. For if sexuality were simply defined
and understood as the mode of expression of sexual desire, then
the largely intact connection between sex and gender would be
severed, and the grounding of sexuality in behavior alone would
be challenged’ (Hawkes 1996, p8).
According to Hawkes we cannot delimit sexuality to modes of
expression of sexual desire (sexual behavior). As I understand Hawkes
here, expressions of sexual desire are manifold and diverse. If sexuality
were this practice, the link between sex and gender (read as cultural
aspects of physical sex) would have been manifold as well. But,
according to Hawkes, this is usually not the case (a great majority of
individuals who look like men, actually have a penis, my comment). I
agree with Hawkes that there is more to sexuality than expressions of
desire. There are theoreticians who claim that sex and sexuality regulate
us. I agree with Judith Butler who says that ‘sex’ has ‘the power to
produce-demarcate, circulate, differentiate-the bodies it controls (1993a,
p1).
Sexuality as discourse
This paragraph is organized as follows: first I explore some basic
concepts that are crucial in discursive gender analysis. I will then apply
them more concretely in the realm of sexuality, which means
perspectives on sexuality that some scholars prefer to denote as ‘queer
theory’.
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Discourse, language, difference and deconstruction
Michel Foucault is a prominent theorist and frequently referred to when
social scientists use discursive approaches. Foucault rejects an
understanding of reality as something essential, a core truth to be
revealed by science. Rather, truth and reality are discursively produced
through processes of powers of definition. This does not mean that
reality is non-existent, but that the main topic for scrutiny is how we
have come to give something the status of truth. A discourse is a
historically, socially and institutionally specific structure of statements,
terms, categories and beliefs. Its meaning is elaborated through conflict
and the power to define, which since the Enlightenment also implies
scientific claims to knowledge. Discourses are not only to be read in
written texts, but also in organizations and institutions. Discursive fields
overlap and compete; in some cases they confirm one another mutually,
such that some cultural phenomena seem self-evident and beyond
invention (Foucault 1978).
Heterosexuality as a cultural norm is an illustrative example of a
discourse that contains all the above characteristics. I will return to this
later under the heading ‘heteronormativity’, since this is central to the
analyses in this study. Another discourse of importance in this project is
‘the discourse of sex and romance’. Women in particular are in Western
societies the bearers of ideas and practices that connect expressions of
sexual desire with the loving relationship between two individuals. As
will be demonstrated in the analysis of lesbian prostitution, this makes it
difficult to even get sight of the female customer in commercial sex.
The American historian Joan Scott made an influential contribution to
feminist discourse theory in 1988 with her article Deconstructing
Equality-versus-Difference. Or, the Uses of Poststructural Theory for
Feminism (Scott 1988). In addition to ‘discourse’ she here gives
prominence to the terms ‘language’, ‘difference’ and ‘deconstruction’ as
useful terms for feminist theory. Far from being simply a vocabulary
shared by a given group of individuals, language is conceived as a
system that constitutes meaning.
‘... that is, any system – strictly verbal or other – through which
meaning is constructed and cultural practices organized and by
which, accordingly, people represent and understand their world,
including who they are and how they relate to others….Without
attention to language and the process by which meaning and
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categories are constituted, one only imposes oversimplified
models on the world, models that perpetuate conventional
understandings rather than open up new interpretive possibilities’
(Scott 1988, p34-35).
Not only would much be gained by reading written texts within this
perspective on language. In this connection ‘text’ is utterances of any
kind, included cultural practices. And of course, my interviews are texts.
Language will be of special importance in Chapter 4: When women take,
where the use of the verb ‘take’ in a lesbian context is read in the light of
its meaning in the mainstream culture. And also, language is important
because it is determining for the analytical concepts I use. When for
instance I see homosexual desire related to the heterosexual, I have
already set analytical premises that easily may preclude the possibility of
other desires and practices than the ones already discursively given as a
binary concept. I will return to this at several points below in this
chapter, and also in the course of analysis.
‘Difference’ is the third term Joan Scott accounts for as useful to
feminist theory, and she regards it as a dimension of poststructural7
analyses of language. Meaning is made through contrasting: a positive
definition is based on the negation or repression of something
represented as antithetical to it:
‘Any analysis of meaning involves teasing out these negations and
oppositions, figuring out how (and whether) they are operating in
specific contexts. Opposition rest on metaphors and cross-
references, and often in patriarchal discourse, sexual difference
(the contrast masculine-feminine) serves to encode or establish
meanings that are literally unrelated to gender or the body. In that
way, the meanings of gender become tied to many kinds of
cultural representations, and these in turn establish terms by which
relations between women and men are organized and understood’
(Scott 1988, p37).
According to this, binaries are not oppositions, but first of all
interdependently linked terms. With references to Jacques Derrida and
7 Scott’s article is, as the title indicates, a discussion of poststructural theory and its
uses in feminist theory. I will not discuss the containment, history and debates over
the term ’poststructural theory’. I am pragmatic in relation to labeling my work as a
member of this or that category. However, my theoretical foundation and analytical
approach owes much to what is often labeled poststructural and queer.
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Elizabeth Grosz, Scott asserts that fixed interdependent oppositions are
hierarchically arranged, with one term dominant or prior. Binaries should
not be considered exhaustive. Since they contain knowledge about how
meaning is produced, they must be ‘deconstructed’ to understand their
process of production. ‘Deconstruction’, Scott says, again with reference
to Derrida:
‘... involves analyzing the operations of difference in texts, the
ways in which meanings are made to work. The method consists
of two related steps: the reversal and displacement of binary
oppositions. This double process reveals the interdependence of
seemingly dichotomous terms and their meaning relative to
particular history. It shows them to be not natural but constructed
oppositions, constructed for particular purposes in particular
contexts’ (Scott 1988, p37).
Joan Scott relies upon Barbara Johnson in her formulation of claims
about differences within entities:
‘The starting point is often a binary difference that is subsequently
shown to be an illusion created by the working of differences
much harder to pin down. The differences between entities…are
shown to be based on a repression of differences within entities,
ways in which an entity differs from itself (...) The
‘deconstruction’ of a binary opposition is thus not an annihilation
of all values of differences: it is an attempt to follow the subtle,
powerful effects of differences already at work within the illusion
of a binary opposition’ (Johnson quoted in Scott 1988, p38).
Joan Scott demonstrates the relevance of poststructural approaches by
analyzing a trial in an American courtroom. Two feminist historians
testified on opposite sides in a case in which a company was charged
with breaching the law against sex discrimination. Basically, they
disagreed on the understanding of why men and women have different
positions in corporate life. And following from this: is the struggle for
equality between the sexes a struggle for a society where gender
differences is irrelevant/non-existing or is it a struggle for the acceptance
of women as different from men? Scott here analyses the debate that in
short is called ‘equality versus difference’ debate. She illustrates how the
dichotomy works to constrain and construct specific meanings, and how
it structures an impossible choice. Instead of being trapped in this binary
form, she suggests the critical examination of the very terms.
Deconstruction of binaries is important in all parts of this project. Both
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theoretically and analytically I question the distinction between
masculinity and femininity, and heterosexual versus homosexual.
Furthermore, I deconstruct phenomena that have a certain history and
interpretation in a heterosexual context, by investigating them within a
lesbian sexual dynamic. An example here is ‘sexual service’, that usually
in the feminist critique of heterosexuality is seen as subordinating for
women, since they most often are the ones to execute the service so as to
pleasure men sexually. I ask, can sexual service in other contexts be
liberating? And in that case, how can we speak it?
The main focus for this project is not the forming of the subject, how we
become subjects in the world. Nevertheless, this will sometimes be part
of the analysis, and I will comment briefly on how it is understood in this
study. Sexual subjection is embedded in the notion of ‘sexual
structuring’, outlined in the last part of this chapter. Subjectivity is
conceived as being assumed in a process of negotiations with culture,
and the subject might even be seen as spoken into existence through
culture. I use Judith Butler’s reflections on subjectivity as constructed, to
theoretically reflect upon the possibilities for the disruptions, the breaks,
and the fissures in language, in discourse, and dichotomies. This will be
central in the discussion about possible changes in heterosexual
discourse. Butler’s focus is on the erasures and exclusions through which
this subject-construction operates. She states that an inquiry into the
exclusions will make it clear that the forming of the subject can be
thought of neither by means of essentialist nor constructionist
perspectives. ‘For’, as Butler says:
‘there is an «outside» to what is constructed by discourse, but this
is not an absolute «outside», an ontological thereness that exceeds
or counters the boundaries of discourse; as a constitutive ‘outside’
it is that which can only be thought - when it can – in relation to
that discourse, at and as its most tenuous borders. The debate
between constructivism and essentialism thus misses the point of
deconstruction altogether for the point has never been that
«everything is discursively constructed»; that point, when and
where it is made, belongs to a kind of discursive monism or
linguisticism that refuses the constitutive force of exclusion,
erasure, violent foreclosure, abjection and its disruptive return
within the very terms of discursive legitimacy’ (Butler 1993a, p8).
For my project this would imply that to approximate heterosexuality as a
discursively constructed field must also contain as part of the analysis,
the exclusions, erasures, etc that represent the constitutive outside of the
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discourse. That is needed because the field of abjections will have its
disruptive return within the law of the discourse. Without recognizing
and giving an account for the abjected (deconstruction), the
understanding of compulsory heterosexuality8 and the potential for
change will be incomprehensible. If we now replace ‘heterosexuality as a
discursively constructed field’, with ‘lesbianism as a discursively
constructed field’ it will go like this: to approximate lesbian sexuality as
a discursively constructed field must also contain as part of the analysis,
the exclusions, erasures, etc which represent the constitutive outside of
the discourse, because the field of abjections will have its disruptive
return within the law of the discourse. That is, we cannot understand
lesbianism without analyzing the processes of abjected heterosexuality.
The ambition in this project is to say something about both of these
processes of abjection and return.
Queer theory - discursive perspectives on sexuality
Discursive (poststructural) approaches to sexuality are these days usually
put into the category ‘Queer Studies’ and their theoretical foundations
into the category of ‘Queer Theory’. The term ‘queer’ was originally an
insulting term for homosexual men and women in the USA and England.
Activists removed it from the terminology in the 1970’s, and would use
‘gay’ instead. In the 1990’s ‘queer’ has been reestablished, and this time
used with pride, both as a term connected to the discussion of identity
and identity politics, and for academic critical strategies (Kulick 1996).
Queer theory, or perhaps better; queer strategies,9 is obviously in
progress as an apparently uniform theory. Some would say this is
disquieting. Judith Butler says in an interview:
‘I remember sitting next to someone in a dinner party, and he said
that he was working on queer theory. And I said: What’s queer
theory? He looked at me like I was crazy, because he evidently
thought that I was part of this thing called queer theory. But all I
knew was that Teresa de Lauretis had published an issue of the
8
’Compulsory heterosexuality’ is seen as synonymous with ’heteronormativity’,
which will be explained.
9 Dorthe Gert Simonsen and Christel Stormhøj use the term ‘kritiske strategier’
(critical strategies) with regards to postructuralism. This I find productive as a
collective term (Simonsen 1996, Stormhøj 1999). In the book Kønnets grænser,
Simonsen motivates the term: poststructuralism are strategies that seek to
demonstrate how truth is produced, rather than to formulate theories about truth
behind representations (Simonsen 1996b, p7, my translation). The same argument is
just as relevant with regards to queer theory.
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journal Differences called «Queer Theory». I thought it was
something she had put together. It certainly never occurred to me
that I was part of queer theory. I have some problems here because
I think there’s some anti-feminism in queer theory. Also, insofar
as some people in queer theory want to claim that the analysis of
sexuality can be radically separated from the analysis of gender,
I’m very much opposed to them’ (Butler in interview with Peter
Osborne and Lynne Segal, Osborne and Segal 1993).
Butler is saying at least two things here: people are beginning to interpret
her work as integral to a stream called ‘queer theory’. She recalls having
heard the label, but does not identify with it. She is concerned about the
tendency of anti-feminism and the radical separation of sexuality and
gender that seems to be part of queer theory. In the interview, Judith
Butler mentions Teresa de Lauretis, a literature and film critic also
frequently referred to in queer studies. de Lauretis states that the concept
‘queer theory’ ‘has quickly become a conceptually vacuous creature of
the publishing industry’ (de Lauretis 1994b, p297). The historian David
M. Halperin, expresses skepticism towards the efforts to make queer
theory house-trained with regards to the academic contexts: ‘... the more
it verges on becoming a normative academic discipline, the less queer
«queer theory» can plausibly claim to be’ (Halperin 1995, p113). I share
such views, and also the caution given by the British literature historian
Tamsin Spargo when she reminds us that queer theory, like other
theoretical approaches, is best understood in ‘... Foucauldian terms as
part of a dynamic network of different but overlapping fields of
knowledge and discursive practice’ (Spargo 1999, p42).10
These are kinds of critical reflections that not only apply to queer theory,
but also to poststructural strategies in general. Michel Foucault, together
with Judith Butler, is probably the name most often referred to by
scholars who identify with poststructuralism. According to the
Norwegian literature critique Eivind Røssaak, neither Michel Foucault
nor several other French theorists called or call themselves
poststructuralists or postmodernists. The labels are too much of an
American construction (Røssaak 1998, p20). Some even questions the
novelty value of these new strategies. The Norwegian anthropologist
Jorun Solheim invites us to acknowledge previously developed
theoretical and methodological positions. In her opposition to the Danish
researcher Dorte Marie Søndergaard (self-identified poststructuralist),
she mentions semiotics, the philosophy of language and anthropology as
10 For further critique, see also Grosz 1994b, fn3, p153-154
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examples of disciplines where poststructural approaches were used long
before the concept existed (Solheim and Søndergaard 1996). In the
introduction to her book Den åpne kroppen (1998) she is no less critical.
My own position is that I find the development of queer theory, which I
rather understand as queer strategies, proliferating in sexuality studies. I
identify to a large extent with this stream of theoretical and empirical
work. On the other hand, I am critical of the attempts to present queer
theory as a unified body of scholarship. If we can talk about a specificity
of ‘the queer’ at all, part of the specificity must be that it is a broad and
manifold contribution that resists normalization and respectability. And
of course, queer theory has a historicity that is deeply rooted in the
history of all critical theory. As I said in the introduction, I prefer to see
this text as a queer contribution to feminist studies. With these critical
considerations and cautions in mind, I will give an account of elements
in queer theorizing that are useful for my work. The prominent topic in
queer theory is to criticize the hegemony of heterosexuality, to theorize
the position heterosexuality has as ‘nature’ beyond ‘culture’, and discuss
the normative effects upon society and individuals. This complex issue is
often called ‘heteronormativity’ (or ‘compulsory heterosexuality’, Rich
1983).
Heteronormativity
Don Kulick claims that what unifies the different perspectives within
queer theory are that heterosexuality is regarded as a problem that needs
explanation. He continues:
‘Instead of being persuaded by the stories heterosexuality repeats
about itself, different queer perspectives ask: Why is it that
heterosexuality believes that it is natural and original? Why does it
have this strong need to convince about its self-evidence? And, by
the way, what is heterosexuality after all? How is its history? How
is it organized? How is it performed? How is it experienced? And
to what degree and how is it dependent on homosexuality to be
existent and persuasive at all? By asking such questions, queer
scholars have created a totally new object for investigation,
namely heterosexuality’ (Kulick 1996, p10, my translation).
This is to investigate and seek to denaturalize heterosexuality instead of
unilaterally treating homosexuality as the object of scrutiny and
explanation (and of juridical and medical measures). The theorization of
heteronormativity is often based on the works of Judith Butler.
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To Butler, heterosexuality and the individual assumption of one of two
sexes and genders are linked in the process of becoming an intelligible
human being in this culture. Heteronormativity and the ‘normalcy’ of
categorizing individual human beings into two sexes are the effects of
this process, rather than the cause. The law of normative heterosexuality
is embedded in the process of making sexed subjects; failing to conform
means to be abjected and culturally un-readable, culturally unintelligible.
The construction of sexed subjects operates through the reiteration of
norms. Every reiteration means a possible failure, so sex and sexuality
are both produced and possibly destabilized in this operation. It is the
ritualized practice of repetition that makes sex emerge as natural (Butler
1993a, p10).
Heteronormativity implies that sex and heterosexuality emerge as natural
through repetition. One can argue that the effects of such ritualized
repetition are the division of human beings into two sexes,
heterosexually defined, and that this appears to be of pure nature, beyond
change. At the same time, these effects produce ‘the law’ as a law
pertaining to a natural state. In a country like Norway one can obtain a
dispensation from ’the law’ and, for instance, exercise one’s right to a
domestic jural partnership for homosexuals. However, this does not
necessarily change ’the law’. Another example is that the majority of
Norwegian women, despite the increased opportunities to ‘arrange their
lives according to their own preferences’, continue to adopt a traditional
model (Haavind 1998, p252). Haavind says:
‘To tolerate lesbian relationships, to respect the voluntarily
childless, and to accept separation as a not too difficult way out of
a failed relationship, are all important ingredients in constructing
the trajectories of the majority of women who are guided by
personal choice’ (Haavind 1998, p252).
As I understand Haavind here, there are still hegemonic patterns in the
gendering of the Norwegian society, but contemporary young women
present this as consciously made choices. There are therefore alternative
routes that most young women do not choose, even if they consider it.
This opens up for, among other things, a tolerance of lesbianism, which
of course does not mean that heterosexuality is denaturalized. Is ‘the
law’ changeable at all, or is this pure determinism? Later in this chapter I
return to the more psychological aspects of this, and in Chapter 8:
Lesbian specificity discuss it theoretically and empirically. However,
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some general theoretical remarks about cultural change seem apt here.
Judith Butler puts it this way:
‘As a sedimented effect of a reiterative or ritual practice, sex
acquires its naturalized effect, and, yet, it is also by virtue of this
reiteration that gaps and fissures are opened up as the constitutive
instabilities in such constructions, as that which escapes or
exceeds the norm, as that which cannot be wholly defined or fixed
by the repetitive labor of that norm. This instability is the
deconstituting possibility in the very process of repetition, the
power that undoes the very effects by which ‘sex’ is stabilized, the
possibility to put the consolidation of the norms of ‘sex’ into a
potentially productive crisis ’ (Butler 1993a, p10)
Sex is both produced and destabilized in the process of reiteration. The
effect of the reiteration is a sexing of the culture that seems to be natural.
To reiterate is also to be threatened by failure and shortcoming; sex is
not something natural that comes by itself; it requires work and one risk
both success and failure. In the case of homosexuals, feminine men and
masculine women for instance, the process is obviously only incomplete,
however, most important, this is what it always will be. The straightest
individual with apparently no gender confusion risks failure in the
process of reiteration and confirmation of his or her gender position. The
instability, the deconstituting possibility, the productive crises, do not,
and this is important, automatically change the norm. ‘The structure of
the demand that the law makes’ (Butler 1993a, p105), is not necessarily
changed even when individuals ‘fail’, or societies fail (for instance by
giving homosexuals equal rights). The norm continues to have regulative
effects on individuals. It is the symbolic field that evades change, even
when we get amnesty before the law. This is the main concern in this
project, regarding ‘the queer’ and the potential for societal change. I will
return to this issue in the course of what follows.
I explained in the introductory chapter how in my analysis I understand
‘power’ as the ability to subordinate others for one’s own sexual
pleasure, but also to produce pleasure in a dynamic of taking control and
giving up control. It will be demonstrated how this notion of power is
given meaning also as a dynamic within discourses of power, as for
instance in the chapter where I analyze a lesbian use of the concept ‘to
take’ someone sexually. The women ‘take’ each other, but it is not just
any ‘taking’. The verb has a meaning that is connected to power
structures in heterosexual discourse. Michel Foucault is a prominent
scholar on discourse and power. In volum one (1976) of his work
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Histoire de la sexualité, translated into several different languages in the
years that followed, we find a radically new analysis of power and also
of how ‘power’ is central to the inauguration of ‘sexuality’ as a
regulatory system in society (Foucault 1978). I will start with his
understanding of ‘sexuality’, and proceed more specifically with his
notion of ‘power’.
‘Sexuality’ in a Foucauldian sense
According to Foucault sexuality is a western invention that became an
object for scientific knowledge in the nineteenth century. In his account,
a ‘Scientia Sexualis’ based on a law of what is forbidden or permitted
(useful), has replaced the former ‘ars erotica’, where truth is ‘drawn from
pleasure itself, understood as a practice and accumulated as experience’
(Foucault 1978, p57). Already from the eighteenth century one can
distinguish four power and knowledge strategies, that gradually
developed coherence, effectiveness and productivity:
• a hysterization of women’s bodies – the female body was seen as
being saturated with sexuality, integrated into the sphere of medicine
as inherently pathological and placed in organic exchange with the
social body
• a pedagogization of children’s sex - children indulge or are prone to
indulge in sexually dangerous activity. Onanism was considered
particularly bad, and parents and other educators were expected to
prevent children from masturbating
• a socialization of procreative behavior – economical, political and
medical socialization of (heterosexual) couples
• a psychiatrization of perverse pleasure – sexuality was seen as an
autonomous, biological and psychic instinct, that could be played out
according to normal manners. However, pathological incidents
occurred, and became objects for treatment
These strategies are not a struggle against sexuality, an effort to gain
control and more effective regulation over it, an attempt to mask
unwanted aspects of sexuality, and it is not a way of formulating
sexuality and acceptability. In Foucault’s argumentation, the four
strategies were none of this.
‘In actual fact, what was involved, rather, was the very production
of sexuality (my italics). Sexuality must not be thought of as a kind
of natural given which power tries to hold in check, or as an
obscure domain which knowledge tries gradually to uncover. It is
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the name that can be given to a historical construct:11 not to a
furtive reality that is difficult to grasp, but a great surface network
in which the stimulation of bodies, the intensification of pleasures,
the incitement to discourse, the formulation of special
knowledges, the strengthening of controls and resistances, are
linked to one another, in accordance with a few major strategies of
knowledge and power’ (Foucault 1978, p105-106).
Foucault here describes sexuality as a historical device or apparatus,
invented and constituted through the interweaving of distinguishable
strategies and discourses. Furthermore, sexuality might be understood as
‘the set of effects produced in bodies, behaviors, and social relations by a
certain deployment deriving from a complex political technology’
(Foucault 1978, p127). When one’s juices flow and one’s heart beats and
one engages in certain activities and relations with oneself or others, for
specific reasons linked to technologies of power and knowledge this is
called sexuality. The effects (the juices, the heartbeat, the things one
does) confirm the existence of sexuality. These effects achieve the status
of biology and nature and nothing to be historically or sociologically
questioned. According to Foucault, this is how sexuality becomes
sexuality, and heterosexuality becomes the one normal and natural form.
Power and law
Power, for Foucault, is not to be understood in terms of formal laws,
state sovereignty or mechanisms for obtaining subservient acquiescence.
These are merely terminal forms power takes. ‘It seems to me’, he says:
‘... that power must be understood in the first instance as the
multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which
they operate and which constitute their own organization; as the
process which, through ceaseless struggles and confrontations,
transforms, strengthens, or reverses them; as the support which
these force relations find in one another, thus forming a chain or a
system, or on the contrary, the disjunctions and contradictions
which isolate them from one another; and lastly, as the strategies
in which they take effect, whose general design or institutional
11 David M. Halperin is not pleased with the English translation of the French
‘dispositif’ into ‘construct’. Halperin suggests ‘apparatus’ or ‘device’ as relevant
alternatives (Halperin 1995, fn6, p188). In the Norwegian translation from 1995,
Espen Schaanning uses ‘anordning’, which should be very close to Halperin’s
suggestions (Foucault 1995, p117).
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crystallization is embodied in the state apparatus, in the
formulation of the law, in the various social hegemonies’
(Foucault 1978, p92-93).
That power is organized and outspoken is, according to Foucault, the
least important feature. Power is everywhere, not because it consolidates
everything ‘under its invincible unity’ (p93), but because power relations
are moving substrata, that form and shape states of power that are both
local and unstable.
As we saw, Judith Butler uses the term ‘law’ for the power of normative
heterosexuality. She uses ‘the law’, ‘the symbolic’ and ‘normative
heterosexuality’ interchangeably. ‘The law’ in Butler’s Bodies that
matter (1993a) is the structuring realm of symbols and norms that
engender human subjects in such a way that the heterosexual relationship
between the masculine man and the feminine woman seems natural.
Other options will be repudiated on all levels of human activity. This law
is, however, not to be perceived as fixed and already present, preceding
the subject. Rather, in order to be a law it needs to be cited, and it gains
its power from being cited.
Foucault and Butler both understand sex and sexuality as produced in the
production of ‘sexuality’ as a regulatory regime. According to Elizabeth
Grosz, Judith Butler adds a third term; gender. Grosz asserts that ‘for
Butler, performance is the term that mediates between sex and gender:
gender is the performance of sex’ (Grosz 1994b, p139). Grosz here
ascribes to Butler an account of ‘sex’ as a pre-established foundation.
Toril Moi on the other hand interprets Butler quite differently. According
to her, Judith Butler is ‘... a person who believes that sex is an effect of
gender and “regulatory discourses” ‘ (Moi 1998 p83, my translation);
that is: Grosz and Moi read Butler in fundamentally different ways. Or
do they? Perhaps the most important feature of Butler’s work is that she
actually operates with a distinction between sex and gender even if she
does not like it. Which one there is to be read as prior to the other may
depend on what text of her you are referring to. Let us see what Judith
Butler says in terms of her understanding of the relation between these
two concepts:
‘Gender ought not to be conceived merely as the cultural
inscription of meaning on a pregiven sex (a juridical conception);
gender must also designate the very apparatus of production
whereby the sexes themselves are established. As a result, gender
is not to culture as sex is to nature; gender is also the
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discursive/cultural means by which “sexed nature” or a “natural
sex” is produced and established as “prediscursive”, prior to
culture, a politically neutral surface on which culture acts’ (Butler
1999, p11).
But, this does not mean, as I read her in other contexts, that gender
precedes sex. Sex and gender are both effects of cultural processes that
work to regulate what is to be conceived as human. This compels Grosz
to say that the notion of ‘gender’ is irrelevant or redundant. I agree with
both, but my practice will be to use both terms. When I use the term
‘sex’ it will be to indicate that it is primarily anatomical difference we
are talking about. I use ‘gender’ when I find it irrelevant to distinguish
between sex and gender, when I discuss sex in which aspects other than
the anatomical and biological are central, or simply because in my
mother tongue, Norwegian, sex and gender are not distinguished by two
separate words.
What about sex/gender as a regulation, as normative, as law, and the
potential for changes/subversion? According to the theoretical
considerations above, sex and gender are creations that not only regulate
individuals but also make these individuals human. This implies that we
cannot even describe and talk about gender relations without reiterating
the normativity embedded in the notions of sex and gender. How then is
‘resistance’ possible? 12
This is a crucial question in Chapter 8: Lesbian specificity. Lesbians
obviously resist normative heterosexuality by desiring women, and, as
we shall see, by practicing sexuality in modes that is possible to delimit
and describe. Since I analyze and describe this within the language that
is accessible to me - a language that entails regulations of the
phenomenon it seeks to describe - gender seems to escape from
subversion. This is one major critique of queer perspectives, namely that
change is impossible. Contrary to this view, another critique argues that
change is perceived as too simple. One example is Judith Butler’s theory
about performativity. In her book Gender Trouble she uses drag as a site
for change. Her critics say that you cannot simply put a man on stage in
a woman’s dress and expect society to change. In the preface to the 1999
edition, Judith Butler evaluates the reading and critique of this book.
Here she says that no ‘revolution is possible without a radical shift in
one’s notion of the possible and the real’ (Butler 1999, pxxiii). Applied
12
’Resistance’ understood not only as planned and conscious repelling of normative
forces, but also as slippages in discourse etc.
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in this context it means that when in my analysis of lesbian desire I have
chosen an analytical term like ‘masculinity’, I have not made this
‘radical shift’. I have not explored other possible ‘realities’, and the
revolution is now postponed. Subversiveness, resistance, change of
existing orders and ‘laws’ are difficult matters, and their slipperiness will
be demonstrated later, especially in a discussion about language and the
use of analytical concepts. In the empirical analysis I use formulations
like ‘heterosexuality inside of homosexuality’, ‘the binary hetero and
homo dissolves’, and other formulations that indicate that linguistic
distinctions are at stake. I will now present a ‘queer’ theoretical
foundation for a perception of inside and outside as interwoven.
Inside and outside as mutually constitutive
Sigmund Freud wrote that not only is every human being capable of
making a homosexual object-choice, they have ‘in fact made one in their
unconscious’ (Freud 1977, p56). Any choice of sexual object is a result
of ‘restriction in one direction or the other’ (p57). It is Freud’s position
that psychoanalytic research is against ‘any attempt at separating off
homosexuals from the rest of the mankind as a group of a special
character’ (p56). His idea about mourning and melancholia, as they are
interpreted by Judith Butler, entails a lost love (for instance the sexual
object of the same sex) is internalized and becomes part of the ego. The
lost ‘other’ is set up inside the ego, contributing to a new structure of
identity (Butler 1999).
Judith Butler puts it this way:
‘In this sense, then, the subject is constituted through the force of
exclusion and abjection, one which produces a constitutive outside
to the subject, an abjected outside, which is, after all, «inside» the
subject as its own founding repudiation’ (Butler 1993a, p3).
Both Freud and Butler understand such processes of exclusion (loss) and
identification as constitutive for gender and for the choice of object for
one’s sexual desire.13 Homosexuality is melancholically denied or
preserved in the heterosexually framed production of gender. My
13 Unlike Freud, Butler does not see masculinity and femininity as ‘dispositions’ in
the ego. To her this would be to accept the heterosexually framed ‘masculinity’
versus ‘femininity’ as part of identity in the outset. ‘Far from being foundational,
these dispositions are the result of a process whose aim is to disguise its own
genealogy’ (Butler 1999, p82).
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understanding is that we can search for the excluded ‘other’ (it being a
desire, a gender expression, an identity) within that which is the
excluding entity. 14 As will be demonstrated later, the analytical approach
in this study is to search for lesbian specificity as the reworking of
heterosexual discourse, to search for the heterosexual within the
homosexual. In a theoretical sense I understand ‘the excluded’ as being
part of ‘the inside’, and that this is relevant for subjects as well as
cultures. As already mentioned with reference to Butler: that which is
excluded, foreclosed, and abjected, may have a disruptive return within
the discursive legitimacy; homosexuality is within, and may even disrupt
the heterosexual hegemony.
I have now given accounts of some of the terms and debates within queer
theory. By referring to two examples I want to demonstrate how a queer
strategy might change our approach to theorizing compared to how we
are used to approach phenomena within the context of what is called
‘gay and lesbian studies’.15
When ‘queer’ makes a difference
The first example is ‘the closet’. In this project I use a notion of ‘the
closet’ that is familiar from traditional gay and lesbian studies and from
‘coming-out’ stories. The ‘closet’ is here the secret place to hide when
one is too afraid to inform those in one’s surroundings about one’s
sexual preference. To be ‘closeted’ is not considered healthy and coming
out often means an improvement in life quality. It is also understood as
liberating for the individual and for others who need open gays and
lesbians as role models. In the chapter about prostitution, the one who is
selling sex is an ‘open’ lesbian, while the customers are in ‘the closet’.
Neither the customer nor the ‘sex worker’ wants the commercial aspect
of the transaction to be known. For the closeted customer there is also a
second secret; the homosexual character of the transaction. This, I argue,
gives a power advantage to the prostitute. Thus the closet has still a
concrete social function in the lives of homosexuals. The queer
questioning would be: what does it mean to come out of the closet? What
do I actually say when I reveal that I am a lesbian (Butler 1993b)? That I
am the same as the others who also call themselves lesbians? But apart
14 Trine Annfelt (forthcoming) bases a line of argument on this theoretical
perspective in her lecture Jazz og maskulint rom (Jazz and Masculine Space, my
translation), where she analyses the bonding between male jazz musicians on stage.
15The distinction between queer studies and gay and lesbian studies is not absolute
and distinct, no more than the distinction between poststructural feminist studies and
‘classic’ feminist studies.
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from the fact that I desire women (also?), like other lesbians do, I believe
that I have more in common with my heterosexual sisters (we are
country girls, we appreciate to be together, and we always play and have
a lot of fun). So why is it that I have kept on ‘coming out of the closet’
for years and years? There is one important explanation embedded in
epistemology.
In her book The Epistemology of The Closet from 199016 Eva Kosofsky
Sedgewick says that ‘so resilient and productive a structure of narrative
will not readily surrender its hold on important forms of social meaning’
(Sedgewick 1993, p45). Leaning on Michel Foucault she argues that in
the late eighteenth century, ‘knowledge’ and ‘sex’ became conceptually
inseparable from each other, such that ‘knowledge means in the first
place sexual knowledge; ignorance, sexual ignorance; and
epistemological pressure of any sort seems a force increasingly saturated
with sexual impulsion’ (p49). She not only demonstrates how knowledge
means sexual knowledge, but also how secrets are sexual secrets, and
that this, by the turn of the century had become current, ‘as obvious to
Queen Victoria as to Freud’ (p49). The sexually legitimate and the
sexually forbidden (the closeted) had become fundamental to scientific
knowledge.
The other example of the difference a queer questioning makes is about
identity. The identity categories ‘homophile’, ‘homosexual’, ‘gay’,
‘dyke’, ‘lesbian’ etc. have been most crucial for the struggle to get civil
rights and life quality improvements for homosexuals. It used to be quite
simple, it was ’us’, the homosexuals, against an oppressive culture where
we were seen as sick and criminal, or at least sinful. Gay and lesbian
studies served to strengthen homosexual identity and the struggle for
equality, where the queer question would be: ‘to what price?’ Gays and
lesbians are not the ones to share a genuine interest in the maintenance of
the distinction that for so long has worked to their detriment. In
Sedgewick’s words:
‘Far beyond any cognitively or politically enabling effects on the
people whom it claims to describe, moreover, the nominative
category of «the homosexual» has robustly failed to disintegrate
under the pressure of decade after decade, battery after battery of
deconstructive exposure – evidently not in the first place because
of its meaningfulness for those whom it defines but because of its
16 The book contains an essay with the same title as the book. The essay is reprinted
in Routledge’s Gay and Lesbian Studies Reader from 1993, and is my reference here.
URN:NBN:no-2116
26
indispensableness to those who define themselves as against it’
(Sedgewick 1993, p55).
According to David M. Halperin, this has two related explanations: one
in a deconstructive mode and one in a psychoanalytic mode. According
to the first, ‘homosexuality’ stabilizes heterosexual identity discursively,
according to the second ‘the homosexual’ is the imaginary ‘other’ whose
difference serves as a dumping ground for the internal contradictions of
heterosexuality (Halperin 1995). The major dilemma in the maintenance
of identity categories is on the one hand the political efficacy of a strict
distinction, versus the function the very distinction has in maintaining
the subordination of the homosexual. One attempt to solve this is to
introduce the ‘queer identity’, which is supposed to function as a
replacement of the stable identity of homosexuals. This is what David M.
Halperin has to say about queer identity:
‘To shift the position of «the homosexual» from that of object to
subject is therefore to make available to lesbians and gay men a
new kind of sexual identity, one characterized by its lack of a clear
definitional content. The homosexual subject can now claim an
identity without an essence. To do so is to reverse the logic of the
supplement and to make use of the vacancy left by the evacuation
of the contradictory and incoherent definitional content of «the
homosexual» in order to take up instead a position that is (and
always has been) defined wholly relationally, by its distance to
and difference from the normative. (Homo)sexual identity can
now be constituted not substantively but oppositionally, not by
what it is but by where it is and how it operates. Those who
knowingly occupy such a marginal location, who assume a de-
essentialized identity that is purely positional, are properly
speaking not gay but queer’ (Halperin 1995, p61-62).
A more practical interpretation of ‘queer identity’ is to be found in The
Passionate Camera. Photography and Bodies of Desire, where the editor
rejects the terms gay and lesbian because of their strong interrelation
with two crucial binaries: the difference between men and women and
the difference between homosexual and heterosexual. ‘Queer’ is on the
other hand, a ‘radical assault’ on both of these naturalized dichotomies
(Bright 1998, p3). To me, it is not that easy. A new name for identity
does not necessarily make any difference to the reigning gender
arrangements of this culture. ‘Queer’ is still one side of the binary
opposition of queer and straight. And even if it is more inclusive for the
queer part than the alternative homo-hetero binary that it seeks to
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replace, we have to be sober in terms of how subversive it is to the
existing dominant order. Subversiveness will be discussed on the basis of
my empirical analysis in Chapter 8: Lesbian specificity.
’Sexuality’ was first ascribed a practical aspect in this text: one can have
sex with oneself or with others. Then, sexuality was also said to be
culturally produced within relations of power and knowledge, where
sexuality is conceived of as produced in the same movement as sex and
gender. Sexuality is not only what we do with our bodies and with
whom. It is also culture.
What about the psychological aspects, some will ask. And indeed, in my
analysis I find it necessary to take the psyche into account, especially in
the chapters 4 and 5, When women take and Masculinity in erotic play
between women. In particular I require some ideas about the symbolic
aspects of desire, as connected to human sexual psychology. I agree with
Almaas and Benestad when they say:
‘Far more emotions exist than words to describe them. Human
sexuality consists of a network of emotions, a network unique for
every individual, built of individual experiences and probably
some innate qualities. We do not know exactly how this network
is put together’ (Almaas and Benestad 1997, p54, my translation).
No one can know exactly. It is too complicated, and besides, the
individual psychology is not this project’s main object. I am sure that
within the discipline of psychology I could find theorizing that would be
helpful in increasing my understanding of the emotional and
psychological aspects of sex. However, it is the field of the psychic as
connected to symbolization of the erotic that is especially thematized in
the empirical analysis. What is particularly appealing to me as a means
to grasp the symbolic theoretically, is when poststructural studies meet
psychoanalysis. I have already referred to Judith Butler several times in
this text. She bases her ideas about subjectivation upon the rewriting of
psychoanalytical theory. It is her theorizing of the phallic representation
of desire in our culture that I have found particularly useful in my
empirical analysis. Another theoretician who is important for the
analysis of this issue is the film and literature critic Teresa de Lauretis.
Sociologists do not usually find psychoanalytical perspectives digestible.
And there are good arguments for this.
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Psychoanalysis - ‘... perhaps now is the time…’
‘Since «desire» in whatever form is first and foremost a psychic
reality, it would be foolish even to try to comprehend it without
some knowledge of the troubled and troubling legacies of
psychoanalysis’ (Segal 1994, p118).
As Segal states above, the legacies are ‘troubled and troubling’,
especially in the case of female sexuality, not to mention female
homosexuality. The latter is related to the former. According to
psychoanalytic orthodox accounts of women’s desire, women are in a
state of loss, lack and passivity. This is complimentary to the masculine
and active desire, the desire that is desire. In this perspective the
exchange of sexual desire between two women becomes quite a
challenge to handle theoretically. At least one of them has to posit a male
psychosocial sexuality, which means that the other desires a ‘man’ and
we are left with heterosexual desire after all. This is discussed in Chapter
8: Lesbian specificity. Most feminists find psychoanalysis too
misogynist to be relevant for their work, but some rework
psychoanalytical theory for their own purposes. The
Australian/American philosopher Elisabeth Grosz is one, even though
she eventually found that the framework of concepts and ideas was too
narrow. In order to illustrate tensions in the debate within feminist
scholarship on this issue, I will use her discussion with the film critic
Teresa de Lauretis, who still finds the reworking of psychoanalytical
theory productive.
When in 1994 Teresa de Lauretis published the book The Practice of
Love. Lesbian Sexuality and Perverse Desire, it was reviewed in the
American journal for feminist cultural studies differences by Elisabeth
Grosz (Grosz 1994). In the same issue of the journal, de Lauretis was
given the opportunity to reflect upon Grosz’s views and further elaborate
on the topics that she had discussed in her book (de Lauretis 1994b).
What de Lauretis does in The Practice of Love is to develop an
understanding of lesbian desire from Freud and Freudian followers’
theory of perverse desire and fetishism. Grosz, who herself at that time
in several publications had used psychoanalysis and especially Lacan’s
contributions to get a grip on lesbian desire, is clear in her judgement. To
her, the time has come to establish other foundations for the analysis of
desire than those of psychoanalysis:
‘The Practice of Love is an attempt – perhaps the final one –
(Grosz’s footnote: This will be my major argument in this paper –
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that psychoanalysis is incapable of providing an account of female
sexual desire and that this failure is constitutive) to bring
psychoanalysis to account for its own most strategic and
vulnerable blind spots, its points of greatest elision or repression:
its by now well-recognized failure to account for, to explain, or to
acknowledge the existence of an active and explicit sexual female
desire, and, more particularly, the active and sexual female desire
for other women that defines lesbianism’ (Grosz 1994, p274-275).
Grosz is not only questioning psychoanalysis as provider of the
theoretical apparatus for the understanding of lesbian desire and
psychology. To say that the failure of psychoanalysis to grasp female
desire is constitutive implies that there is no way of criticizing and
reworking psychoanalysis that will improve its capacity. She also
questions such a project for the following principal reasons:
‘... it must also be recognized that by placing lesbian desire under
the microscope of intellectual, scientific, or discursive
investigation, it is thereby increasingly invested with a will to
know that may be part of the very taming and normalization (even
if not heterosexualization) of that desire. This depends to a large
extent on the status and effects of the discourses one uses. Perhaps
now is the time to rethink which discourses these should be’
(Grosz 1994, p291).
Grosz does not question the quality of de Lauretis’ work, but de Lauretis
has ‘pushed psychoanalysis to its limits of toleration’ (Grosz 1994,
p291). I think Elizabeth Grosz is right in several respects. The account
de Lauretis gives is analytically logical within a body of
psychoanalytical theory. At the same time, the approach and conclusions
are paradoxical, drawn as they are by a lesbian feminist who, in an era of
increased ‘tolerance’ for sexual differences, accounts for lesbian desire
in terms of perversion and fetishism. This is hardly what one would
expect. After all, these are terms charged with moralism and
pathologism. When the analysis follows such a trajectory in a time like
ours, perhaps the time has come to leave psychoanalysis all together?
For the analysis I need theoretical reflections on the capacity of the
human body to become a sexually desiring subject, and in particular how
this is connected to the field of the symbolic. This should preferably be
reflections that take into account the possibility of an active lesbian
desire. To deal with the conclusion first: two authors who work within
the framework of psychoanalytical theory offer the major contributions
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on this issue in this project. I investigated the applicability of theory that
steers clear of binaries like masculine-feminine, active-passive, that
reflects alternatives to the phallic signification of the erotic. Elizabeth
Grosz and Elspeth Probyn (eds.1995) have in the anthology Sexy Bodies.
The Strange Carnalities of Feminism signaled the onset of a process of
theorizing sexuality as ‘the production of sexuality, not their description’
(p.ix). Grosz and Probyn are aware that The Fathers also speak through
their collection of texts; however, when ‘these master discourses are
evoked it is in an oblique, refractory and wanton line that emerges’
(p.xii). Probyn sketches out how she understands the challenge:
‘While it is, as I mentioned earlier, beyond my interest to engage
in a rigorous critique of the role of desire within psychoanalysis,
what I will do is suggest ways in which desire may be put to work
as method within queer theory. To replay that, let me state that
desire is my point of departure and my guide. This in turn involves
reconceptualizing desire as well as the idea of departure in theory.
In a nutshell, as a problematic, desire compels me to work along
the lines set up between and among longing, leaving, being,
bodies, images, movement; in short, it causes me to take departure
from any strict and stationary origin’ (Probyn 1995, p4-5).
I was not able to find a practical analytical approach based on this or
similar theoretical ideas about desire. It appears to me that the
groundbreaking task, to develop such theory outside a critical
psychoanalytic framework is not yet refined and reworked into theory
with a minimum of stringency required to stand out as an alternative for
a sociologist doing empirical analysis in the field of sexuality.17 It is very
promising and necessary, though, that scholars like Grosz and Probyn
make the efforts, and I will come back to a further discussion of their
ideas in the epilogue.
I said that the reworking of psychoanalytical theory done by Judith
Butler and Teresa de Lauretis is central in the empirical analysis. To be
able to account for their theories, I should clarify some concepts that I
have used. Some readers will be familiar with these concepts, but others
might benefit from the clarification.
17 It was a relief when Elizabeth Grosz, after I had aired the same frustration about
her ideas at a conference, said that not all theory is applicable. Which is right, of
course, but no less frustrating.
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Central terms in psychoanalysis
I will not pretend that I know psychoanalytical theory, and certainly not
that I can give a neutral presentation of central concepts in
psychoanalysis. A collection of Sigmund Freud’s texts, On Sexuality.
Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality and Other Works will be the
main source (Freud 1977). Where that is not sufficient for my purpose, I
will rely on Juliet Mitchell’s (1975) reading of other Freud texts.
Objects, aims and deviations
‘Let us call the person from whom sexual attraction proceeds, the
sexual object, and the act towards which the instinct tends, the
sexual aim’ (Freud 1977, p45-46).
Normal sexuality in Freud’s writing is heterosexual in object choice, and
the aim in normal adultery is intercourse. An individual can deviate with
respect to the sexual object, as in homosexuality (what Freud also calls
‘inversion’). Freud discusses inversion as either innate or acquired and
suggests that it be neither. Psychoanalytic theory is later utilized to
pathologize homosexuals, although Freud himself did not do so, at least
not that only. On this issue and several others, it is possible to read
Freud’s work as suffering from inner inconsistency, which also offers the
possibility to develop his ideas in other directions than those that became
the psychoanalytical canon:
‘psychoanalysis considers that a choice of an object independently
of its sex – freedom to range equally over male and female objects
– as it is found in childhood, in primitive states of society and
early periods of history, is the original basis from which, as a
result of restriction in one direction or the other, both the normal
and the inverted develop. Thus from the point of view of
psychoanalysis the exclusive sexual interest felt by men for
women is also a problem that needs elucidating ... (Freud 1977,
p57).
This is receptive to a notion of homosexuality as one direction that
sexual interest can take, depending not only on psychosexual and
sociosexual (family) factors, but also on cultural regulations and
prohibitions.
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The sexual instinct, libido
The first striking difference between Sigmund Freud and his
contemporary theorists, is that Freud does not consider sexuality to be an
instinct emerging in puberty, but rather that sexual instincts and
manifestations are already there from the beginning: ‘As a matter of fact,
the new born baby brings sexuality with it into the world’ (Freud 1977,
p175).
The sexual activity of the newborn is attached to self-preservation,
implicit in sucking the breast of the mother. The sexual drive and the
non-sexual drive of hunger are interwoven. The infant will feel a need
for a repetition of this activity and the satisfaction entailed, also after the
phase of breast-feeding, this activity now will be separated from self-
preservation:
‘The need for repeating the sexual satisfaction now becomes
detached from the need for taking nourishment – a separation
which becomes inevitable when teeth appear and food is no longer
taken in by sucking, but is also chewed up’ (Freud 1977, p98).
The sexual instinct (drive, force in the field of sexual excitement) is seen
as ‘the psychical representative of an endosomatic, continuously flowing
source of stimulation, as contrasted to a «stimulus», which is set up by
single excitations coming from without’ (Freud 1977, p83).18 The sexual
instinct is perceived by Freud to be a term on the frontier between the
mental and the physical. In the infant the sexual instinct is auto-erotic;
that is, satisfaction is obtained from the subject’s own body, no one
constitutes a sexual object for the infant. Moreover, other parts of the
body now become possible erotogenic zones for the child, that is; part of
the skin or mucous membrane ‘in which stimuli of a certain sort evoke a
feeling of pleasure possessing a particular quality’ (Freud 1977, p99).
Freud displays uncertainty about the character of stimuli, but asserts that
a rhythmic character must play a part.19 The oral, anal, urethral and
genital zones are central, but it is important to underline that to Freud,
18 In The Practice of Love, de Lauretis shows us that Freud did not preclude that
instincts in part are the ’precipitates’ of the effects of external stimulation (de
Lauretis 1994a, p301), which underlines the connection between the physical, the
psychic and the social in Freud’s writing.
19
’It seems less certain whether the character of the pleasurable feeling evoked by
the stimulus should be described as a »specific» one – a »specific» quality in which
the sexual factor would precisely lie. Psychology is still so much in the dark in
questions of pleasure and unpleasure that the most cautious assumption is the one
most recommended’ (Freud 1977, p100).
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any zone and any activity can become erotogenic and a source of sexual
satisfaction.20 The sucking of the labial zone has to be replaced,
however, by other muscular actions according to the position and nature
of the other zones. According to the nature of the genitals, most children
will take pleasure in masturbation at an early stage. The aptitude for
what Freud labels ‘polymorphous perversity’ (p109), is innately present
in children’s dispositions. It means that childhood represents a variety of
impulses, ‘a disposition to perversion’ (p155), that first in the (normal)
adult acquires a single aim, namely heterosexual intercourse. The
process of becoming a ‘normal’ adult might of course go wrong, and the
sexual instinct might collapse into one of the components from which it
is constituted, resulting in deviation.
Freud defines libido, which is to the sexual instinct as hunger is to the
nutritional instinct, as ‘a quantitatively variable force which could serve
as a measure of processes and transformations occurring in the field of
sexual excitation’ (Freud 1977, p138). Freud presupposes that there is
energy underlying mental processes in general and that libido has a
special origin in energy. Sexual libido has a qualitative character that can
be distinguished from, for instance, hunger, due to a different origin in
energy.
Castration anxiety, Oedipus, Phallus
The Oedipal complex is central to Freud’s notion of sexuality. In solving
it, the girl child has to change the direction of her sexual attention from
her mother who, until that point in the girls’ development, has been ‘an
object so intensely and exclusively loved’ (Freud 1977, p378), to a
person of another anatomical sex; her father. This is part of the girl’s
challenge in the mastering of the Oedipus complex, as it also is to
dissolve the libidinal feelings for her father and the growing feelings of
hostility toward her mother. The boy has to master his libidinal feelings
for his mother and hostility toward his rival, his father.21 Unsolved, the
Oedipus complex is the main source for neurosis, not because of the
20 Some readers will question why I have not mentioned the connection between
different erotogenic zones, and stages in the development of sexuality. The reason is
as simple as it is complicated: Freud’s interest in chronology waned during his
authorship, and since I do not find the theory about stages particularly relevant for
my project, I leave it out (together with most of the debates over internal
inconsistency).
21 Freud did not develop the theory of the Oedipus complex in the Three Essays of
1905. He mentions it in footnotes added in 1920. He addressed it in a new text for the
first time in 1910 (Freud 1977).
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incestious and homosexual aspects, but because of repression of these
aspects. As Judith Butler (1997) rightly notices, the theory of the
Oedipus complex presupposes the prevalence of heterosexual desire. It is
not only about avoiding sexual relations between parents and children. It
presupposes that every member in the family drama already knows the
difference between homosexuality and heterosexuality, and that it is
already installed as a normative difference.
In her book Feminism and Psychoanalysis (1975), Juliet Mitchell gives
an account for Freud’s development of the castration complex and its
fundamental connection to the Oedipus complex. These phenomena are
obviously theoretical challenges on which Freud spent several decades.
According to Mitchell, after having developed the concept of a super-
ego,22 Freud realized ‘that the Oedipus complex was with good reason
the cornerstone of psychoanalysis – its overcoming was the single most
momentous sign of human culture’ (Mitchell 1975, p73). However, it is
not possible to realize the full meaning of the Oedipus complex without
understanding the castration complex, which is the cause of the
dissolution of the Oedipus complex. The cause of the dissolution is the
danger of castration, a danger that is actual or imagined. A fear of the
genitals is already pre-Oedipally present through the narcissistic
valuation of the genitals. For the boy the sight of the female genitals ‘can
bring into operation the idea of castration that was already feared’
(Mitchell 1975, p88). But how can castration anxiety come into play in
the girl who is already castrated?
Freud explains that by taking into consideration a full utilization of his
notification of anxiety. The production of anxiety might have different
reasons, the common feature being that of separation: birth, object-loss
of the mother, the girl’s loss of phallus.23 These are possible complexes
of anxieties that the girl will have to solve in the Oedipal complex,
which for the boy is more directly connected to genital castration.
Mitchell sums this up:
‘The boy and the girl who both thought all had a penis, who both
were attached to the mother as the only important «other», must
part ways, never to coincide again except in neurosis or psychosis,
22 The presence in the psyche of various regimes and authorities ’watching’ the ego
(or self), the ego being on the frontier between the conscious and the unconscious.
23
‘The girl’s loss of phallus’ means the loss the girl experiences when she has to
change her main erotogenic zone from clitoris to vagina.
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except in perversions, and except in all those perpetual neurotic,
psychotic and perverse moments that lie behind normality. In
these moments there is unleashed an aspect of the psychological
sex one might have been were it not for culture’s interpretation of
the different places to be assigned to the two sexes.
(...)
The (pre-Oedipal) father, if he enters at all, is a “troublesome
rival”, no more. To the Oedipal boy he continues to be a rival, to
the girl he must become the loved one. She makes the shift from
mother-love to father-love only because she has to, and then with
pain and protest. She has to because she is without the phallus. No
phallus, no power – except those winning ways of getting one.
Recognition of her «castration» is the female infant’s entry into
girl-hood, just as acceptance of the threat and deference to the
father in exchange for later possibilities is the boy’s debt to his
future manhood’ (Mitchell 1975, p95-96).
The girl will have to learn that she represents the ‘passive’ and feminine
and the boy that he represents the ‘active’ and ‘masculine’. In Freud’s
own words:
‘Maleness combines (the factors of) subject, activity and
possession of the penis; femaleness takes over (those of) object
and passivity. The vagina is now valued as a place of shelter for
the penis; it enters into the heritage of the womb’ (Freud 1977,
p312).
I will return to the feminist critique of Freud’s narration about castration
anxiety and the Oedipus complex.
Sexual desire
The concept ‘sexual desire’ is not used much by Freud, and as far as I
know never defined by him. I will draw on Teresa de Lauretis:
‘Even as it is perceived as a quality of the self, the support of
one’s being, and although it can exist only through fantasy, desire
is a tension toward the other(s), a drive toward something or
someone outside the self. The signification and representation of
that tension necessitates a signifier, «the sign which describes both
the object and its absence» (in Laplanche and Pontali’s words); it
URN:NBN:no-2116
36
is this sign that signifies,24 for the subject, the object’s existential
otherness, difference, and distance from the self’ (de Lauretis
1994a, p234).
In accordance with this, I understand desire as a phantasmatic (of the
nature of a phantasm) movement towards something or someone that is
possible to delimit from the self. It is signified by anything that can carry
the meaning of this movement. Teresa de Lauretis says this about lesbian
sexual desire:
‘I may be guilty of literalism, but it seems to me that only when
sexual pleasure is phantasmatically linked, for the subject, to
another woman or another female body – whether in actual
physical proximity, in memory, or in phantasy – can we speak of
lesbian desire. This is the sense of my assertion that it takes two
women, not one, to make a lesbian: however similar, the bodies
are two, not one and the same. The difference is what enables
desire’ (de Lauretis 1994a, fn17, p235).
This understanding of lesbian desire implies that there is sexual
difference between women, not only difference in terms of income,
class, ethnicity. It also implies that there is a difference between
heterosexually and homosexually desiring women. This consideration of
desire, along with the concepts from psychoanalysis discussed above,
help equip us to follow up Judith Butler’s idea about the lesbian phallus
and Teresa de Lauretis’ theorization of lesbian desire as fetishistic. These
accounts represent major rewritings of Freud, and also of feminist
critiques of classical psychoanalytical theory.
Judith Butler and the lesbian phallus
Butler elaborates on an ambivalence in Freud’s writing about erotogenic
body parts. She seems to believe that was it not for Freud’s androcentric
orientation, he would have elaborated on it himself. 25 The question is:
24
’Sign’, ’signifier’ and ’signify’ are all concepts from semiotics, the philosophical
theory of signs and symbols in language. A sign or a signifier is a symbol, sound or
image (a word, for instance) that represents an underlying concept or meaning. ’To
signify’ is ’to be the sign of’ (Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, tenth
edition).
25 Judith Butler disagrees on several aspects of Freud’s writing, eg., his tendency
towards patalogizing, his notification of phallus privilege, his notion of masculinity
and femininity as dispositions. As with Lacan, she criticizes his heterosexism and his
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when, according to Freud, all body parts can be erotogenic and convey
sexually stimulating signals to the mind, what kind of inconsequential
jump or ‘metonymic slide’ as Butler calls it (1993a, p61), is it that he
must make to install the phallus as the origin and source of
erotogenicity? Butler uses Freud’s major text on narcissism to elaborate
on this question, to which I will not refer directly, except in so far as
Butler interprets it.
According to Butler, Freud establishes a ‘theoretical indissolubility’
(1993a, p58) of physical and imaginary pain. Hypochondria posits libido
on an injured bodily part, and through this investment the body part will
become conscious, delineated, knowable. Freud then states that ‘bodily
pain is the precondition for bodily self-discovery’ (Butler 1993a, p58).
He also claims that ‘the ego is first and foremost a bodily ego’ (p59), a
projection derived from the sensations on the surface of the body. At the
same time, the ego represents ‘the superficies of the mental apparatus’
(Freud cited in Butler 1993a, p258, fn4). This does not establish the body
as imaginary, but it does underline ‘the indissolubility of the psychic and
the physical body’ (p59). And Butler continues:
‘This ambiguity between a real and conjured pain, however, is
sustained in the analogy with erotogenicity, which seems defined
as the very vacillation between real and imagined body parts. If
erotogenicity is produced through the conveying of a bodily
activity through an idea, the idea and the conveying are
phenomenologically coincident. As a result, it would not be
possible to speak about a body part that precedes and gives rise to
an idea, for it is the idea that emerges simultaneously with the
phenomenologically accessible body, indeed, that guarantees its
accessibility’ (Butler 1993a, p59).
Butler refers to Lacan who also reads Freud along similar lines. Lacan
concludes that the ‘libidinal drive is centered on the function of the
imaginary’ (Lacan cited by Butler 1993a, p59). Freud states already in
his main essay on narcissism that the ‘the familiar prototype of an organ
sensitive to pain is the genital organ ... in the state of excitation ... ’ (cited
by Butler 1993a, p59). He here talks about the genital organ (that is one),
but in his text it ‘appears to lose its proper place and proliferate in
unexpected locations’ (p60), and gives rise to the definition of
understanding of the symbolic as nearly immutable. In a talk in a conference in 1998,
she makes clear that she is not a ‘Lacanian’ (Butler 1998, Left Conservatism II,
http://calliope.jhu.edu/journals/theory_&event/v002/2.2butler.html, 12.02.00.
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erotogenicity that might be the activity of any given bodily area.
According to Butler he then proceeds by saying that ‘certain other areas
of the body – the erotogenic zones – may act as substitutes for the
genitals and behave analogously to them’ (p60), and this is the cross-
roads where he and Judith Butler part company. Butler follows the path
hinted at by Freud himself, in a flexible notion of erotogenicity, while
Freud proclaims the male genitals to be both the cumulative example and
the prototype for secondary exemplifications, which to Butler is logically
very problematic. She seems to find no other explanation for this than his
wish to ‘understand these genitals as an originating idealization, that is,
as the symbolically encoded phallus’ (p60). Butler instead elaborates on
Freud’s statement: ‘We can decide to regard erotogenicity as a general
characteristic of all organs, and may then speak of an increase or
decrease of it in a particular part of the body’ (Freud cited in Butler
1993a, p61) and proceeds like this:
‘To be a property of all organs is to be a property necessary to no
organ, a property defined by its very plasticity, transferability, and
expropriability’ (p61).
The main symbol for active desire is transferable, anyone can have it or
confirm that the other has it. This theoretical point will be central in the
chapters 4 and 5, Masculinity in erotic play between women and When
women take’.
With her critique of Freud Judith Butler provids an idea about the plastic
and exchangeable phallus. Her reading of Lacan is theoretically crucial
for the discussion of lesbianism and the potential change in
heteronormativity that is central in Chapter 8: Lesbian specificity.
Jacques Lacan has a distinction between ‘the imaginary’ and ‘the
symbolic’. I interpret Butler’s understanding of the terms like this: the
imaginary is the permanently unstable site where the subject perpetually
negotiates the interior and exterior. The symbolic is ‘the normative
dimension of the constitution of the sexed subject within language. It
consists in a series of taboos, sanctions, injunctions, prohibitions,
impossible idealization and threats’ (Butler 1993a, p106). Butler first
describes how Lacan understands the establishing of the body as an
imaginary relation between the child and the outer world. This happens
in what he calls ‘the mirror stage’. The child before the mirror, produces
an image of its body as a totality, as delineated from others, as having its
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own morph.26 This takes place as a psychic, phantasmatic event,
meaning that to Lacan, the body is an imaginary formation. In the field
of the symbolic, the body is named, which means to install gender and
kinship. Being named is to be ‘inculcated into that law and to be formed,
bodily, in accordance with that law’ (Butler 1993a, p72). Like Freud’s,
Lacan’s ego is formed from the psyche through projecting the body. The
ego is thus also imaginary. The imaginary perception of the body makes
it possible to have a position in the world of objects. That is; ‘both
objects and others come to appear only through the mediating grid of this
projected imaginary morphology’ (p73). As with Freud and the
erotogenic body parts, Lacan’s trajectory becomes problematic as soon
as he introduces the phallus. The parts of the body before the mirror,
previous to the emergence of the totalizing image, obviously do not have
equal status, in spite of Lacan’s declarations. In Lacan’s writing, the
phallus is of the symbolic order; the privileged signifier of symbolic
order. The body parts establish the condition for knowledge, the phallus
establishes the condition for signifiability in the symbolic field. Judith
Butler objects to the installation of the phallus with this feature, and
demonstrates how his reasoning is inconsistent. Central to her critique is
the connection between the penis and the phallus, and how Lacan’s
elevation of the phallus into the symbolic depends on the idealization of
a body part, a rejection of its ‘substitutability, dependency, diminuitive
size, limited control, partiality’ (p81). Her argumentation is that the
phallus is established in a dependency of denial of the connection
between the two, and that the penis thereby is constitutive to the phallus.
The phallus might then be understood as an effect of a signifying chain
that is totally suppressed, made invisible, not questioned.
I want to elaborate on this, because it introduces the most difficult point
in my discussion of what the effects would be if lesbian desire, and even
female desire, achieved ontological status as something that is as such,
and therefore has to be signified symbolically (in language, in the
collective sexual fantasies, for instance). Where are we when the phallus,
based on the difference between masculinity and femininity, has to
signify all desire? Butler sees the similarity between Lacan and Freud:
‘Not unlike Freud’s efforts to put a stop to the proliferation of
erotgenic body parts in his text, parts which were also sites of
pain, Lacan stalls the sliding of the signifier into a proliferative
catachresis27 through a preemptive assertion of the phallus as
26
‘Morph’ meaning shape, form, structure (Websters Dictionary)
27 An extremely productive misuse or strained use of words
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privileged signifier. To claim for the phallus the status of a
privileged signifier performatively produces and effects this
privilege. The announcement of that privileged signifier is its
performance. That performative assertion produces and enacts the
very process of privileged signification, one whose privilege is
potentially contested by the very list of alternatives it discounts,
and the negation of which constitutes and precipitates that phallus.
Indeed, the phallus is not a body part (but the whole), is not an
imaginary effect (but the origin of all imaginary effects). These
negations are constitutive; they function as disavowals that
precipitate - and are then erased by - the idealization of the
phallus’ (Butler 1993a, p83).
Judith Butler here reveals a fault in the logic of Lacan and Freud. Here
theory of ‘performativity’, where performativity is ‘the vehicle where
ontological effects are established’ (Bulter in interview with Osborne
and Segal, 1993), underlines the process where ‘a natural truth’ is
established. The truth about the phallus is not any truth. We are talking
about what is to signify as sexual desire and even about what is to
signify at all. Freud and Lacan have a point if this is seen as a mere
description of the erotic symbolic in Western culture in the twentieth
century (as well as the twenty-first century). I have yet not seen one
scientific contribution in the field of sexuality studies that objects to the
fact that we are ‘surrounded’ in a physical, psychical and phantasmatic
sense, by phallic symbolization of the erotic. Many women,
homosexuals and even straight men hope and work for an ontological
change here. As some people are doing, one could begin outside the
linguistic frameworks of the phallic language. I have referred to Grosz
and Probyn, and will, as mentioned, return to them in the epilogue. An
alternative, that I take here, is to see the possibility in the ‘puncturing’ of
the symbolic field. And Judith Butler again offers valuable philosophy.
The strict distinction between the imaginary and the symbolic has
collapsed when the signifier of primacy in the symbolic, that which
delimits and orders, is understood as a set of imaginary effects, the set
‘which has become naturalized and reified as the law of signification’
(Butler 1993a, p79). And this is an announcement about the possibilities
for subversion. The symbolic is proven penetrable by the imaginary,
which means that the symbolic, the law of normative heterosexuality can
be rewritten. Butler has demonstrated how phallus is connected to penis,
how phallic constituency is linked to this particular body part. She now
proceeds by arguing that other body parts might be granted the
significance of the phallus. ‘The lesbian phallus’ is connected to parts of
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the body other than the penis (tongue, hand, knee, pelvic bone etc). The
term ‘phallus’ is in this case of course problematic.
‘When the phallus is lesbian, then it is and it is not a masculinist
figure of power; the signifier is significantly split, for it both
recalls and displaces the masculinism by which it is impelled. And
insofar as it operates at the site of anatomy, the phallus
(re)produces the spectre of the penis only to enact its vanishing, to
reiterate and exploit its perpetual vanishing as the very occasion of
the phallus. This opens up anatomy - and sexual difference itself -
as a site of proliferative resignification’ (Butler 1993a, p89).
Even if Butler seemingly here elevates other body parts into a function
of privileged erotogenic significance, her major point is not to replace
one body part with another. What Butler says we need instead of a new
body part to signify erotogenicity is:
‘a displacement of the hegemonic symbolic (heterosexist) sexual
difference and the critical release of alternative imaginary schemas
for constituting sites of erotogenic pleasure’ (Butler 1993a, p91).
This means to have available other signifiers for the erotic, than the
phallic representation. In consequence this is not unlike what Grosz and
Probyn try to do (1995). However, Butler still works within the
analytical concepts that are used in psychoanalytical theorizing. As
argued previously, this seems to be what I can handle analytically. The
other theoretician who rewrites psychoanalysis to incorporate lesbian
desire, is Teresa de Lauretis. She launches ‘lesbian fetish’ to avoid the
‘semantic complicity of phallus with penis’ (de Lauretis 1994a, p231).
This occasions a different problem, but nevertheless a problem. Laurel
Meredith Erickson prefers de Lauretis’ fetish to Butler’s phallus because
the fetish ‘rejects the socio-symbolic function of the phallus as the
paternal pointer to heterosexual reproduction’ (Erickson 1998, p112). I
would say that what she gains is a label that culturally pathalogizes
lesbian desire, and I will thus not choose between them. I prefer to
discuss the problems connected to both terms, and also utilize the ideas
from both scholars.
Teresa de Lauretis and the non-phallic fetish approach to lesbianism
In her book about lesbian desire as perverse desire (1994a) Teresa de
Lauretis gives an account of psychoanalytic theory on female
URN:NBN:no-2116
42
homosexuality, feminist critique included, and concludes that it has
either been subsumed by models of female heterosexuality or male
homosexuality. She asks for models that do not place lesbianism on a
scale where women identify with each other (Irigaray, Kristeva), thereby
neither accounting for the necessary differences between the (two)
women, nor the sexual difference between heterosexual women and
lesbians. She asks for models that better understand lesbianism, ‘not only
as a specific form of female sexuality but also as a sociosymbolic form:
that is to say, a form of psychosocial subjectivity that entails different
production of reference and meaning’ (de Lauretis 1994a, p.xvii). Since
de Lauretis works within the framework of psychoanalysis28 she is
compelled, like Butler, to start within its conceptual framework and use
its tools. de Lauretis cannot (will not) reject the notion of castration. To
reject castration and the fear of loss, is ‘to leave the lesbian subject
without symbolic means to signify desire’ (de Lauretis 1994a, p203).
Having nothing to lose, there is nothing to desire. To understand desire
as originated or mediated by loss might of course be questioned. I have
already discussed one alternative (Grosz and Probyn 1995), and will
elaborate on it after the empirical analyses. de Lauretis rethinks the
notion of castration and gives it new meaning, such that it may contain
sexual difference between women. She does this by rewriting the theory
of perversion. In her words perversion is ‘a sexuality of component
instincts, which, unlike infantile polymorphous perversion, is inclusive
of phallic and genital drives but, unlike “normal” sexuality, is not bound
to a necessary phallic, genital, and heterosexual primacy’ (de Lauretis
1994a, p76). She reworks Freud’s idea of the fetish.
In clinical fetishism, the subject will see that the mother does not have a
penis, but refuses to acknowledge the absence of one. The missing
maternal penis is substituted by another object, which resembles it, but
cannot serve the ‘normal’ sexual aim. The substitution might be a part of
the body or something that is assigned to the person the fetish replaces,
for example hair or a piece of clothing. This means that the mother has
got a penis, but it is no longer the same as it was before. When the fetish
takes its place as the sole sexual object and longing for it has become the
sexual aim, variations of the sexual instinct has passed over into
pathological aberrations. The boy’s disavowal is linked to his fear of
castration. He cannot accept the possibility that this might become his
faith too. Since the girl has accepted already that she has no penis,
fetishism is not a possible sexual structure for women. Teresa de
Lauretis, however, fundamentally rewrites Freud’s narrative. As the boy,
28 For her argumentation here, see de Lauretis 1994b
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the girl observes that the mother does not have a penis. The boy refuses
to acknowledge the absence. The girl accepts the absence, but disavows
that a castration has taken place. In the girl’s mind the mother has no
penis, but it does not mean that she is castrated. The psychic process of
disavowal, the negation of castration in women might, according to her,
detach desire from the paternal phallus:29
‘... what the lesbian desires in a woman (“the penis somewhere
else”) is indeed not a penis but a part or perhaps the whole female
body, or something metonymically30 related to it, such as physical,
intellectual, or emotional attributes, stance, attitude, appearance,
self-representation - and hence the importance of clothing,
costume, performance, etc. in lesbian subcultures. She knows fully
well she is not a man, she does not have the paternal penis (nor
would her lover want it), but that does not preclude the
signification of her desire: the fetish is at once what signifies her
desire and what her lover desires in her. It is both an imaginary or
fantasmatic “object”, a cathected signifier, whose erotic meaning
derives from its placement in a subjective fantasy scenario; and a
symbolic object, whose meaning derives from a sociohistorical
context of cultural and subcultural discourses and representations.
In short, then, the lesbian fetish is any object, any sign whatsoever,
that marks the difference and the desire between the lovers ...’ (de
Lauretis 1994a, p228).
de Lauretis underlines that ‘any sign whatsoever’ has to be socially
coded in order to be a sign. Since we live in a culture where desire in a
symbolic sense is phallic, ‘masculinity’ must have a special position as a
sign of lesbian desire. She briefly discusses other signs, and I will come
back to that. The importance of masculinity as a sign is focused in
chapter 5 entitled Masculinity in erotic play between women. Teresa de
Lauretis suggests that in perverse desire the fetish takes on the function
of the phallus as the signifier of desire, but that the paternal function of
the phallus is left behind and with that its role in the physical and socio-
symbolic reproduction:
‘In other words the fetish releases sexuality from its embeddedness
in reproduction and thus demonstrates that reproduction is not a
29 Here she relies on Bersani and Dutoit’s elaboration of Freud, see for example de
Lauretis 1994a, 222-229
30 The use of the name of one object or concept for that of another to which is
related, or of which it is a part; eg., ’crown’ standing for ’king’.
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feature of sexuality as such, but rather an effect of the construction
of sexuality in modern Western cultures’ (de Lauretis 1994b,
p309).
What the lesbian is afraid of losing, or has already lost and now desires
is not the penis but the female body. The lesbian fetish, the ‘any sign
whatsoever’ that can signify this wish for the female body, according to
the thinking of Teresa de Lauretis, is not phallic. However, it is the
phallus that gives the fetish (most often masculine signs, but also others)
its erotic signification, because the fetish has its origin in the disavowal
of castration. Castration has no symbolic meaning without the threat of
the phallic. de Lauretis is clear that the fetish has the active, phallic and
genital valences (1994a, p289). As we saw, Butler’s ‘lesbian phallus’
both recalls and displaces masculinism. The lesbian fetish of Teresa de
Lauretis does exactly the same. Lesbian desire is phallic and genital, but
nonetheless non-paternal since this is female active desire. This desire is
not a wish for a penis, but rather for the female body. I have in this text
chosen to denote the lesbian signifier a ‘non-paternal phallic’ signifier.
Another apt and paradoxical phrase could be ‘desire that is non-phallic
but mediated via the phallic’.
As I said, I do not really know psychoanalytical theory. However, in
spite of this I want to rely on Butler and de Lauretis because they are
among the few scholars who theorize the lesbian desire and the phallic
symbolic, and do it in a way that can be linked to sociological analytical
questions. As will become obvious later, I can avail myself of their
perspectives when I ask the question why some lesbians say that they
‘take’ each other, or why some say that aftershave might be smart to
wear when a woman wants to attract another woman.
The closing part of this chapter represents a unification of the three
aspects of the term ‘sexuality’ that is accounted for already; practical,
cultural and psycho-symbolical aspects. Again Teresa de Lauretis offers
a useful term as I see it: sexual structuring.
Sexual structuring
Teresa de Lauretis understands ‘semiosis’ as each instance of the
unending process of mediations or negotiations between the self and the
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world, of producing and interpreting signs (1994a).31 She exploits
semiotics to make stronger and more likely the fact that the process of
continuously being and becoming a sexual subject, has a social and
historical dimension. By doing this she can explain, as psychoanalysis
cannot, why a person’s practice changes. She can explain identity
changes, how experiences in adult life also have their mental effects, and
last but not least, how sexuality as a subjectivating process is linked to
socio-historical changes. The following can illustrate this point:
‘Or, looking at it another way, sexuality appears as a semiotic process in
which the subject’s desire is the result of a series of significate effects
(conscious and unconscious interpretants,32 so to speak) that are contingent
upon a personal and a social history; where by history I mean the particular
configurations of discourses, representations, and practices - familial and
broadly institutional, cultural and subcultural, public and private - that the
subject crosses and that in turn traverse the subject, according to the
contingencies of each subject’s singular existence in the world’ (p303).
With reference to previous presentations of theoretical approaches to
sexuality, this approach links psychoanalysis to a
Foucauldian/postsructuralist/queer perspective through semiotics. What
is achieved is a dynamic and flexible notion of sexual subjectivation that
is founded in the subject’s constant negotiations with the inner and outer
world. I like it.
In the trajectory followed by this chapter, I have outlined the theoretical
perspectives I need for the analysis. The ambition has been throughout
the chapter, to connect these persepctives to the empirical analysis that
follows in the chapters 4,5,6,7, and in the synthesizing eigth chapter
about lesbian specificity. Briefly summarized, a practical understanding
is needed because practice is what I talk with my informants about.
Sexuality seen discursively is important because this is how I handle
heterosexuality in the analysis; as a background of hegemonic discourse
against which lesbian practice is discussed. Finally, the project is based
on a perception of desire as something that needs to be mediated
symbolically. I found no way around theoriticians that rewrite
psychoanalysis. Together with ‘sexuality’, ‘power’ is the concept that
profitably could have been elaborated on in this text. I mentioned in the
31 In Merriam –Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary: ‘a process in which something
functions as sign to an organsim’.
32 Each moment, to the subject, of imperceptible passage from object (or event, in the
outer world) to sign (mental or physical representation) to meaning effect (in the
inner world).
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introduction chapter the different ways in which power is understood in
this study. Power is discussed theoretically in a Foucauldian sense as
well as in a psychoanalytical sense in the present chapter, respectively in
terms of discursive power and phallic power. However, I have chosen
not to go into the rich field of psychological literature about power
exchange in personal relations, or the correspondingly extensive body of
‘classical’ sociological theorizing of structural power. These streams of
theory are often used in studies where the project-aim more directly than
here is to improve the living conditions for homosexuals. Chapter 3 is a
presentation of the empirical material and the research process, and how
this is related to my theoretical and empirical ambitions.
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CHAPTER 3: REFLECTIONS ON METHODOLOGY, METHODS
AND DESIRE
The question of validity and reliability is important in all research, not
only within what one could call a positivist tradition where the terms
were inaugurated. A most crucial aspect of quality is for the reader to
know what the results are based upon. In a study like this, where the
methods are of a qualitative character, my understanding would be that
the visualization of the reasoning and choices made in the research
process, as well as the analytical and theoretical argumentation, must be
an important part of this ‘what’. I will come back to my reason for this
assertion. Hopefully the analytical and theoretical argumentation is
convincing as presented in the analytical chapters and the previous
chapter about the theoretical foundation of the project. Here I will
emphasize the more processual aspect of the study. The description will
emerge in a rather personal wrapping. As the Norwegian sociologist
Anne-Jorunn Berg puts it; I have tried to do that ‘without giving in to the
temptation of glossing over what I felt was the banality of my own way
of doing it’ (Berg 1997, p5). And, I might add, without wallowing in the
realm of the private.
Introduction
At the very beginning of this project, I sat with a group of scholars who
engaged in informal conversation about the connection between our
research topics in the field of feminist study and our personal lives. One
of the women said that since I was about to write about lesbians and
sexuality, I would be writing about myself. I think I managed to stop
myself from shooting back from the hip and stating that I found it
frustrating that heterosexual feminists studying taken-for-granted-
heterosexuality in, let us say the working life or in politics, usually do so
without realizing that they are writing about their own sexuality too.
They simply fail to make it visible. Or rather, they do not in particular
reflect upon the connections between heterosexual desire and
heteronormative social organization. Why is it that sexual harassment is
the only topic in research about sexuality and organizations? Why is it
that homosexuals are the only ones who are sexual, and heterosexuals
just are? I was tempted, but I do not think I said all this, and of course, I
have to accept that my interlocutor also had a point.
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I have chosen in this project to raise questions that are closely related to
my reflections about feminism and sexuality over the years, as well as to
my own sexual practice. There is a difference between, on the one hand,
investigating questions clearly rooted in one’s own personal life and, on
the other hand, handling analytical issues that are more distanced from
one’s own practice. It has scientific implications that I have come to
understand as productive to reflect upon. I try to situate the analytical
questions, the analytical perspectives, the theories, the results etc. In
short I to try to situate the knowledge that I produce in the name of
science. This could profitably be an aspect of all research. I am not
willing to say that this is only about my position as a lesbian
interviewing other lesbians, or in the language of anthropologists; about
me being an ‘insider’. This is something every social scientist ought to
take into consideration, regardless the character of the personal relation
to the field. As the Norwegian anthropologist Gry Paulgaard puts it, the
researcher should do it whether she does ‘fieldwork at home or away’
(Paulgaard 1997, p90, my translation).
One’s own relation to the field of study is a large topic in itself, not least
within the feminist theory of science. I have referred to some important
contributors in Chapter 1: Sexuality – a clarification of terms. Scholars
like Michel Foucault and Judith Butler have inspired me to reflect upon
the discourses I am part of and the problems of being caught in the
language and discourses that are available. It is (nearly) impossible to
produce knowledge without also at the same time reproducing existing
orders. I put ‘nearly’ in brackets here. With reference to the works of, for
example Foucault and Butler, I take the position that it is impossible to
produce without reproducing. However, I also believe that the
production of knowledge might have subversive effects, sometimes more
important than the reproductive aspects. One example of this paradox in
this project is that I confirm that we have individuals we can label
‘lesbian’, a derogatory term used to categorize for the purposes of social
exclusion. At the same time I denaturalize the term by demonstrating its
cultural inauguration, and I discuss the slippages in discourse, the breaks
in hegemonic discourse and the potentially subversive effects. In effect,
this is to understand ‘resistance’ as productive in a scientific and political
sense. This paradoxical situation of questioning a discourse by the use of
symbols and terms that the language of that very same discourse can
offer, is accounted for in the above-mentioned chapter. When I again
refer to it here, it is because this way of perceiving cultural phenomena
also represents a fundamental epistemological aspect of the project;
namely that research cannot be done from an ‘outside’. The researcher
will always be part of what she is studying. This is always so in terms of
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the language with which we observe, think and communicate, and
sometimes also more directly, as in this project where a lesbian
investigates the experiences of lesbians. I consider this aspect of
methodology (the ontological part33) to be addressed already. Here I
intend to demonstrate the practical analytical work that also is
accomplished, and how I reflect upon the research process. This
illustrates that I understand myself as involved in the results I produce,
not only in an ontological sense as a member of discourses I am
investigating, but also in a more practical sense.
I owe this understanding of methodology mainly to debates within
feminist theory. There are names more central than Foucault and Butler
when it comes to the question of taking discursive analysis further in a
practical sense. I used the phrase ‘to situate knowledge’ which is a
reformulation Donna Haraway’s term ‘situated knowledge’, inaugurated
in a response to Sandra Harding on a conference in 1987.34 The work of
Haraway (biologist/philosopher) is influential within the strand of
feminist epistemology associated with poststructuralism. In the
introductory lines, one verb is already used frequently: ‘to reflect’. I have
so far used it in a non-technical sense, seemingly unconnected to the
term ‘reflexivity’, which has now become an important concept within
mainstream sociology. Anthony Giddens is often the reference here,
even when in his work the term is primarily exploited as an analytical
term in the analysis of modernity (1990). ‘Reflexivity’, ‘situated
knowledge’ and other terms connected to the critique of positivism have
been central in the debate about feminist epistemology in the last thirty
years (Berg 1997). Whether or not it constitutes a strength of the project,
I have a rather pragmatic attitude to the debate, in the sense that I do not
present the development of terms and conflicts. It is research practice
that is my main focus here. In this dissertation I relate to methodological
issues, as they are developing in the practical analytical work of social
scientists. Sometimes terms and practices have become so common over
the years that I have seen no point in locating their origin. I simply know
that they fit my way of thinking and my analytical practice. While this
may not do justice to the development of methodology within feminist
theory, it does represent one of several topics that might have been
elaborated in this text.
33 The other part is perceived as the more concrete ’techniques and rules for
collection and ordering of data’ (Berg 1997, p4).
34 The paper was published in the journal Feminist Studies in 1988, and came later as
a chapter in her book Simians, Cyborgs, and Women (1991).
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The Swedish ethnologist Bo Nilsson (1999) uses ‘reflexivity’ as a point
of departure for reflecting on hegemonic discourses that make certain
social phenomena seem natural, as well as a way to scrutinize his own
analytical practices. To Berg (1997) it is about a ‘careful examination of
historical and cultural values in the research process’. She also suggests
making the process of writing more visible and collective. I see this as a
good guidance. It implies that the project is visualized as situated within
certain discourses, and at the same time the reader is given the
opportunity to take a look over the shoulder of the researcher to see what
cards she is playing with, and why she plays like she does.
Reflexivity in this sense is important. Part of being reflexive in this
project is also to underline that I understand the ultimate importance of
social science to be social change: ‘the resistance’ (Foucault), ‘the
subversive effects’ (Butler), ‘diffraction’ (Haraway). The potential
resistance embedded in this project is touched upon in the section about
project aim, elaborated on in Chapter 8: Lesbian specificity, and finally
drawn into speculation in the epilogue.
As I said, the hegemonic discourses that I have found most important for
this project are already accounted for. I will now account for the process
in which I produce empirical results, which is essential for the evaluation
of the validity and reliability of my analysis. The end of the chapter
elaborates on this. The presentation is chronological, that is; the steps in
the research process make up the skeleton of the chapter. Let me start
with what here might be called ‘the beginning’: the application and the
project aim.
An unfamiliar project aim
From 1987 till 1994 I worked at the Centre for Rural Research in
Trondheim. In this period I saw myself as a Marxist, structuralist
feminist, doing research in the service of people in the rural areas. I
appreciated working as a social scientist in a group where people were
outspoken on values and politics. In the present project, however, I
wanted to tell a different but culturally recognizable story about gender
and sexuality, and I wanted no one to expect me to make general
statements on behalf of an identified group that needed the
implementation of new and more effective political measures. To write
an application where the solid political purposes were missing, or at least
played down in favor of a ‘contribution to the public debate’, was an
altogether new experience. It was outlined with societal relevance. I
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would not have received the grant if that were not the case. It was the
indirect nature of the link to practical politics that was something new
compared to my previous applied research. However, it was relatively
simple for me to make that turn.
Since the 1970’s I had been engaged in the women’s movement. The
debates and conflicts within the movement had not ‘got to me’ as they
were beginning to do in the middle of the 1980’s. The central topics for
Kvinnefrontens’ (the Women’s Front) summer camp in 1985 were ‘the
subordination of women’s sexuality and the sexual subordination of
women’. We debated sexuality and power issues, especially as they
appeared in pornography, prostitution and s&m, but also in sexual
fantasies. For me this coincided with starting to have sexual relationships
not only with men, but also with women. I experienced some crucial
differences, but perhaps more important, some similarities that triggered
my theoretical and political curiosity. Since then, the feminist debate on
power/control and sexuality has been important in my own life,
personally as well as politically and intellectually. Did I have to
reconsider some positions? I participated in media-debates, set up
conferences and demonstrations and even experienced the fractioning of
the organization of which I was a member. I learned that sex between
women was not free from control issues. Was sexual desire basically
about difference? How are power issues and the question about losing
and gaining control to be understood? The PhD project represents an
opportunity to systematize some of the production of theory in the field
of sexuality studies, and to contribute with my own interpretations and
investigation as well. It implies most of all an opportunity to change and
broaden my understanding of sexual desire and difference, and mediate
to an audience my perspectives, since I believe that I have a contribution
to make. This is to me politics in an indirect sense compared to previous
research practices, and is how I have wanted to do politics this time.
One distinct political decision was however made in the application
phase; I wanted to focus on women. In literature about sexuality there
are considerably fewer references to women than to men, and this project
may be understood as a contribution to the never-ending toil (to some of
us) to make women more visible in all areas where they seem to be
underrepresented. Besides, it is, by and large, women who throughout
the world problematize sexuality and equality, and thus ‘ask’ for an
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investigation. In the next section I will discuss the societal importance of
the project.35
To contribute to the debate
It is clear, then, that the aim of the project was more one of theory than
of practical politics. However, it was and still is expected that an
investigation of same-sex relationships can bring new elements to the
debate about sexuality and equality. It was expected in the application
that the project would be important in the following connections:
• Women in contemporary Western societies have to carry conviction
both as equal with, and attractive to, men. Knowledge about how
lesbians negotiate cultural sexual practices, submit to them,
reinterpret and disentangle from them, might throw light on possible
strategies also for heterosexual women.
• The analysis of the meaning of sexual difference between women
might shake habitual ideas about differences between women and
men in the realm of the erotic.
• The project discusses questions that also are on the agenda of the
national and international gay and lesbian movement.
To the extent that I do and will continue to participate in the public
debate, and to the extent that this text will be used by others, the project
will represent an important source for comments on the issues listed, as
well as related matters. As the theoretical aspects of the project
developed I came to see the relevance of the project as a possibility for
challenging more profoundly the categories within which we think and
experience sexuality. One example is the questioning of the inside and
the outside of heterosexual and homosexual discourses, which puts the
distinction at stake. This is discussed as ‘ontological’, ‘subversive’ or
‘queer’ effects in Chapter 8: Lesbian specificity.
35 For the sake of order, I should mention that I am not going to focus on the absence
of quantitative methods and legitimize the use of a more qualitative approach. I
consider this as being thoroughly discussed already in several studies where
interpretation and the offering of new perceptions of cultural phenomena are the
main research activities.
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An early start
Early in 1998 I knew that I would get the grant from The Research
Council of Norway. The project’s formal commencement would not be
until October, but I was impatient to start. I rented a conference room at
a downtown hotel, while I still held a position as a senior consultant at
The Centre for Women’s Studies, Trondheim.36 One afternoon in
February 1998 I spent several hours with six women, among whom I
knew three very well, and three not so well or not at all. The intention for
convening this gathering was to air and possibly get a confirmation of
the project idea: would the analytical focus make sense to other lesbians,
would the issues I wanted to raise evoke response related to their own
experiences? From my own log from the session on can read:
‘I felt the need to bring the project back to the realm of reality. I
wrote the application in the space of academia, inspired of my own
experiences as a lesbian, the reading of lesbian pulp fiction written
in English, and last but not least; non-fiction produced in urban
USA and England. Would the topics I had intended to ask
Norwegian lesbians about, evoke interest and the inclination to
answer? And would they answer intimate questions?’
There is more than one lesbian reality. I consider that my own reality
was reflected in the application, and I wanted to know if theirs was
reflected as well. To find this out was one of the purposes for the
meeting. To have an early test of different methods for the practical
fieldwork was yet another intention. I had pointed out two methods in
the application (qualitative interviews and observation), and had also
some other possible alternatives in mind, all of which I was familiar with
through my work at the Centre for Rural Research. This was the planned
schedule for the session, which I followed:
1. Create a safe atmosphere – I welcome everybody, we all give our
names, age, say where we come from, how long we have lived in
town. I present the project and why they are here, why I need them in
this phase of the project.
2. We go person-to-person around the table and answer the questions:
what is important when you dress up for a night out, what was the
attraction the first time you knew that you desired another woman,
what was the attraction the last time you desired another woman?
3. Parallel activities: Individual interviews and individual writing. I
conduct a couple of individual interviews about the following topics:
36 Thanks to the leader of the centre at the time, Kari Melby.
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tell me about a situation in which you experienced that power or
power play was important, tell me about a relationship where the joy
of sexuality has faded, tell me about the last time you argued with a
lover. In the meantime, the rest of the participants are writing,
reflecting on the topics: I hit on someone, someone hits on me, the
last time I had sex with a partner.
4. We go around the table and they tell me what these hours have been
like, the writing, talking in plenary, the one-to-one conversation. Do
they have some advice?
5. Make them help me to get informants by using their networks37
This turned out to be a successful meeting in all respects. The questions I
asked made sense and the women had a lot to tell. There would probably
be no need to worry whether the basic project issues were rooted in some
sort of shared lesbian experiences in the realm of the sexual/erotic. And
the closer the conversation was to a narration about actual incidents, as
they remembered it and cared to tell, the better. One of the women was
the lover of my best friend, and one was the new lover of another friend.
That did not work. Their contributions were good when they talked
about previous attractions. When they talked about recent episodes, they
became vague. They would not expose our shared friends and kept their
talk on a general level. This confirmed two points: 1) I wanted stories,
not opinions or vague statements 2) the informants should be unknown
to me.
There was not doubt about it, it was the interviews one on one I liked the
best. The women seemed to be less inhibited, talking more freely. I felt
easier when I pushed a matter further by asking for more details to the
narration. Sexual attractions will sometimes sound culturally strange, un-
normal, even sick. In a group it is less likely that people will take the risk
and share a story that they might be judged by. This has, of course, some
moral and ethical aspects. Do we as researchers create situations where
people talk more openly than is ethically and morally justifiable (Fog
1992)? The discussion of that matter will be taken up later in this
chapter, and connected to three of my interviews where I felt that I had
to relate to it more directly. One of the women I interviewed that
afternoon was more detailed in her descriptions than the others. I did not
37 When I use the word ’informant’ as a general term for ‘the person that I
interviewed’, it is because it is convenient. Later in this chapter the reader will find a
section where I present different ways of understanding the interview material. The
difference between the conception of the interviewee as an ‘informant’ versus a
‘representative’ is discussed there.
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need to follow up with further questions to make her elaborate. She was
the one, who said that I seemed to be a bit shy and uncertain as the
interviewer at times. I understood what she meant by that, because with
her I think I sometimes got more information than I was prepared to take
at that point in the process. She also gave me a piece of advice: set apart
enough time and try to relax. I see her comments as an important part of
the preparations in front of the interviews that were to come. This did not
hinder me from feeling very self-conscious in a first test interview, but at
least I knew what was going on. I will return to that interview below.
The women wrote. Some of it might have been useful material for my
purposes, some not. And that is one of the reasons that it felt secondary
compared to a conversation: when one talks one always has the
opportunity to change the course, make the person stick to the planned
topic; one can follow up on side issues that the informant does not see as
relevant. Through the dynamics of the conversation the interviewer can
guide and encourage, and that suites me. I believe that my preference for
interviews is also due to taste and dispositions. Some researchers prefer
the face-to-face talk, some prefer to analyze written material. I am more
the first kind of researcher. However, why not do both, since the
advantages might be complementary and give a richer material? I did not
drop the idea of making lesbians write. I took it to a second round later
on, with a group of young lesbians. I will come to that.
The plenary sessions were relaxed, a mix of joyfulness and seriousness.
The women had different backgrounds in all respects, childhood,
education, present social status, sexual experiences etc. We had an open
atmosphere between us, and everybody spoke. The great importance of
the group conversations was the confirmation these women gave me
regarding the project issues. It was nice to feel that I probably was on a
good track! Nevertheless, I felt restricted by the responsibility for the
dynamics in the group; I could not focus on whatever evoked my interest
to pursue, everybody should have their share of the talking time, I had to
secure that everyone’s contribution was treated with equal amounts of
interest. Most important, I had to see to it that I did not expose
individuals more than they would be comfortable with in the group. I
wanted stories that probably were too intimate for a group session. But
again, I took this to a second round, as will be evident below. Dorte
Marie Søndergaard (1996) makes use of the group interview in her Phd
project, and it seems to be appropriate for her aims. When she finds it
appropriate and I do not, I think it is due to differences in analytical
questions and project aims. She investigates the process of gendering in
a postmodern society, to provoke us to rethink what gender means. One
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of the advantages with the group interview is, according to Søndergaard,
that the group interview makes visible some of the processes, through
which meaning is negotiated.38 In my project by comparison, I am not as
concerned about the negotiating process, as I am about the results and
effects of certain negotiations. More specifically, I focus on the results
and effects of the process where lesbians negotiate a hegemonic
heterosexual discourse. I could have been investigating how the women
position themselves towards each other’s stories, to try to get a grip on
how what one might call ‘a hegemonic lesbian discourse’ (as different
from a hegemonic heterosexual discourse) takes form and shape. Or,
perhaps rather how a hegemonic lesbian discourse might be verbalized
into existence. I have not tried to do that in this project, and I think that
is partly the explanation why the group interview worked analytically for
Søndergaard and primarily as a ‘reality-check’ for me.
One important effect of the meeting at the downtown hotel in February
1998, that I cannot say was due to any method in particular, was that
when I left the hotel I was already in progress with the analysis. Ten
days later I wrote in the log: ‘What differences are there, or are created?
How are they to be interpreted? Do we have to interpret them as a re-
creation of heterosexual signs?’ Some months later, but still before the
project formally started, the log says: ‘Do lesbians exploit signs of
masculinity? Is it actually something else? Is it on our own terms?’
When I look at this today, I can see that I had started to reflect on
analytical questions that were to become central in the project. Some
would say that this is what one should expect when a candidate has
thought it all through in an application phase. Others would say that I
was very lucky. The Norwegian psychologist Steinar Kvale, known for
his writing about qualitative interviews, says, provocatively, that the
meaning of what is said in the interview ideally is already ‘interpreted,
verified and communicated at the moment the tape recorder is shut off’
(Kvale 1992a, p64). I never lived up to Kvale’s standards (not that I
wanted to – the dialectic move between the interviews and the
development of theory is too important for that). However; compared to
some other doctoral candidates I had seen over the years, I nevertheless
felt lucky after this early start in the field, and this is how I understand it
in retrospect too.
Finally, one very important bonus was the effect of the meeting on my
claims to scientific validity. I had set up the meeting to ensure that the
38 In a study of girls and computer technology, Kjersti Kvaløy refers to similar
experiences (Kvaløy 1999)
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project had a basis that not only reflected my own experiences and some
abstract theories from abroad, but also that it would play into the
experiences of other Norwegian lesbians as well. By that I do not mean
that the project would reflect something that one could call ‘truth’ about
the experiences of lesbians. From my side it was more about making
research with analytical challenges that were recognizable from the
perspective of other lesbians. The six women were excited about being
together, telling and listening to stories. They responded to this specific
project with enthusiasm. This will often be part of phases of
initialization, and could be read as an effect of getting attention from a
researcher from the university. That I do not view the situation this way
is because I did not experience the event in that way. Every year of the
project I would give a lecture during Gay Pride in town, and every time
the audience was very attentive and active in the discussions. I felt that
from the start the project was rooted in the earth, and that it stayed that
way throughout the process. As we will see later, I link this directly to
the question of validity.
In April 1998, still before the formal commencement of the project, I had
an interview that I first considered a test case.
A test interview
This time as well, the interview was with a lesbian that I knew from
before. I was obviously not ready to take the consequences of what I had
found out already. I rationalized this into view to myself by saying that
this would be a test of the interview guide. I feel safe with this woman,
she will be talking about things that I know something about, and it will
be useful to get an indication about how people will relate to phenomena
that I know as ‘true’ or ‘false’. For example, I had seen her through the
years in the gay and lesbian club; I had seen her approach women; I
knew a couple of her ex-girlfriends, and knew her ‘style’ pretty well.
The interview went fine. My questions made sense to her, her answers
made sense to me. I got some good sequencies on what I call the ‘lonely-
hunter-style’ which she used at least once, as we will later see. But, it
was again totally clear that I should stay away from interviewing women
that I knew. I did not want to know the intimate details about her
relationship with her partner, and this made me excessively hesitant.
After having transcribed the interview I wrote in the log:
URN:NBN:no-2116
58
‘Wording the questions is a problem to me. I am unclear, hesitant.
I leave it to her to interpret. For example: Actually I ask her about
a particular incident between her and her partner. She tells me
about how their relationship came into being’
This may also be interpreted as a personal problem for me, of course,
caused not only by the fact that I know the interviewee. I was reminded
the preparatory meeting and the woman who shared more with me than I
had been prepared to handle. I became shy, uncertain and self-conscious.
These two incidents were essential in making me aware that there were
certain points from which I wanted to back off. There still remain many
taboos surrounding sexuality in the Norwegian culture, and sexual
pleasure is still about shame. As to my informant’s shamefulness I would
simply find a way to handle it in the conversation; my own was
something of which I had to think more about. I am convinced that the
interviews became ‘thicker’ when this awareness became a position to
question and listen from, instead of a transfer area I wanted to get out of
as fast as possible.
I mentioned that I did not immediately bury the idea of group interviews
and making people write, in spite of a limited interest in those methods
after the early meeting in February. I gave the methods a second chance
when I approached a group of young gays, lesbians and bisexuals.
Group-interviews, interviews with couples, observation
The group met regularly once a week. I asked permission to go there and
meet with them. Late in November 1998 I participated in the meeting
and introduced my project. Twenty-one women took the sheet of paper
where I suggested some issues for writing (pre-addressed and pre-
stamped envelopes enclosed). I conducted a group interview with four
young persons, and I talked with one of the leaders who promised to ask
a young couple to participate individually in an interview.
The group interview represented a shortcut into some important
contextual issues that many young queers have at heart: coming out to
peers and family, being new in the group and in the subculture in
general, the lack of space for identifying themselves as bisexual. It
seemed to me that those were the kinds of issues they were concerned
about and wanted to air, and I found the group too diverse regarding
experiences to pose questions that was directly relevant for the analytical
focus of this study. I did not manage to establish a group dynamic that
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was appropriate for posing personal questions. Part of the explanation (in
addition to everyone’s shyness and my lack of qualifications) may have
been the composition of the group; that there was a romance in the air
and perhaps also some unsolved ex-partner questions. Later, when I
came back to my office to transcribe the tape, there was nothing on the
tape! I have learned to be superstitious, so this was all I needed to drop
permanently the idea of more interviewing in groups.
Only two lesbians wrote to me out of the twenty-one who had received
the questions. One was later interviewed individually. The other wrote in
detail and poetically about her first experiences. Some days after the
interview with one of the young women, she sent me an erotic short
story she had written. I could have used these two texts as material, since
they fitted into the picture of lesbian specificity that was eliciting. I did
not use them, however, and did not try to make people write after that. I
stand by my reflections in the previous section. In addition I had now
learned that in this project, there would be far more work required in
order to motivate an audience for writing. This was work I was not
prepared to take up.
In the application I had said that as one method I would be using
observation at places where lesbians hang out. This would involve
observing how non-verbal communication in terms of modes of dressing,
body language and initiating contact actually played out in practice
(Henley 1986). It had been considered a supplement to the interviews.
My reasons for not using this method is not linked to principal
considerations about observation as a method in sociological research.
Under other conditions it would have been relevant to do observations in
pubs, at conferences, discotheques etc. My decision was made on the
basis of likes and dislikes. Let me explain.
Before the project started for ‘real’, I went out one night to the local gay
and lesbian club, trying to imagine how such a fieldwork situation would
play out. I quickly realized that the situation would not suit me. Firstly, it
seemed very complicated to inform people that they were participating in
an investigation, which would have been the proper thing for me to do
(not everyone would agree to the ethical necessity of this). Secondly,
friends came up to talk to me. I was at that time participating in a project
(run by the gay and lesbian organization) focused on making newcomers
feel comfortable, and I observed some newcomers who probably felt
rather lost. I felt a responsibility to talk to them. Others talked to me and
were in a flirting mood. Passive observation turned into participation,
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and it was obvious that personal challenges of this kind simply would
not give me the reflective space I required for the project.
The American anthropologist Ralph Bolton considers participant
observation, including having sex with people that are attractive to the
investigator, as almost a necessity to anyone wanting to understand a gay
subculture (Bolton 1995). To him, studying sexuality requires intimacy. I
agree that it would probably be meaningless to investigate sexual
dynamics between people without having interpersonal sexual
experience of any kind, be it homo- or heterosexual. (Even if that would
mean that you could pose intriguing questions that others probably
would not think of). However, Bolton goes a bit too far for my taste.
Having said that, I did know the Norwegian lesbian subculture from a
participant’s position at the time when I started this project, which is
discussed already in connection with the inside-outside question. My
interest in making on site observations did not arise from a wish to feel
the erotic dynamic of the sub-culture(s) on my body and psyche, but to
be systematic in observing, taking notes and reflecting. Since I did not
go through with systematic observation of any sort as explained above,
my nights on the town are to be understood as part of the background
and context of the project. This is outlined in the beginning of this
chapter. The sexual experiences I happen to have, will always be part of
how I talk with my informants, how I relate to what they tell me, and is
integrated to my analytical focus etc. Sometimes the connections are
obvious to me, and sometimes not. I have not found it scientifically
productive in this text to make visible and discuss possible connections
between the analysis and my personal sexual experiences. On a general
level I will say that I have tried to be conscious about my own
experiences and interpretations of events. Not because they are
particularly interesting, but because it could be helpful when I was trying
the impossible: to transcend my own experience.
In the application I had also sketched out that I would be interviewing
cohabiting couples combined with participant observation in their
homes.39 In the end, I focused on only three couples (that is: six out of
twenty informants) and my observations occurred only during the hours
it took to interview them individually. I am looking for the sexual
dynamics in this project, and interviewing couples gave me the
opportunity to have one incident presented as different experiences. In
39 One of the readers of a first draft to this chapter comments dryly that since this is a
project that focuses on sexual practice, I should be particularly precise in that which I
intended to observe and participate.
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this material it is striking how the two women agree upon what is
erotically working for them as a couple. The interview with the second
partner serves as a confirmation of what the first found arousing and
working for her. I think I like these interviews especially due to
confirmation, which with more than three couples as well might have
revealed points of contradiction. Or, most likely I would have found that
it was important for the couples to express a sort of ’verified’ version of
how the erotic side of the relationship works.40 For reasons that I do not
recall exactly, I did not take very seriously my early suggestion of
interviewing only couples when I started to let the snowball run. It may
have been due to arguments conveyed by participants when I presented
this project for the Network for Research on Homosexuality in Oslo,
November 1998. Some said that the informants would not feel free to
answer when they knew their partners also were supposed to be
interviewed. It may have been because partners who have lived together
for a while are known from sexological surveys to take less interest in
sex. The most probable reason was that I did not try hard enough to find
couples. If I were to do the interviewing one more time, I would perhaps
have tried harder to include more couples among my informants. I am
not sure, though, since the members of the Network had a point about the
reticence in couples. At the same time it could well have cost me a lot of
work to find couples and not losing the social variation within the group
of informants.
I have interviewed seventeen women who label themselves ‘lesbians’,
and three who do not. I do not problematize the self-labeling, as might be
done. What is a lesbian? Is having sex with other women necessary to
feel like one or to be seen as one? What is sex between women anyway?
What kind of activity contributes the criterion? (Richardson 1992). That
debate is a true side-track for me here. To be honest, it has never
interested me, since it has always seemed to me that some women bed
each other whether neither, one or both call themselves lesbian. It seems
to be all about the sexual desire felt for each other regardless of labeling.
By seeking self-identified lesbians, I would probably either get women
with a reasonable amount of lesbian sexual practice, or women with a
conscious desire for such experiences. That was what counted for me. I
used snowballing.
40 This is a parallel to the reasoning behind not doing group interviews. A couple
will, to a certain extent, function like a group and attempt to negotiate some of the
differences into shared perspectives.
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Recruiting informants by snowballing
The most common way of getting participants in studies of gays and
lesbians is using the mailing lists of identity-based organizations and
press. As Nardi and Sherrod see it from a North American context, the
risk is that one will then have a sample ‘composed of white, educated,
middle and upper-middle class, urban gay men and lesbians in their
thirties and forties who are self-identified as gay and attending gay-
identified organizations’ (1994, p190). The risk is similar in Norway.
When NOVA (Norwegian Social Research) undertook their study of the
living conditions and life quality among lesbian women and gay men,
they went through the standard channels to recruit participants. However,
they also put a lot of effort into the distribution of questionnaires through
various private networks. The result was a sample that ‘compares
favorably with previous ones’ (Hegna et al 1999, p316).
The studies referred above are studies where generalization, in a very
basic and quantitative interpretation of the term, is important. Large and
representative samples are needed, and it would be difficult to reach
enough people without using the organizations. Strategic samples are
impossible because we do not know what the total population of gays
and lesbians look like. Extended use of snowballing through private
networks would probably be an almost impossible process to overview
and evaluate. I wanted a more profound understanding of socio-erotic
dynamics. The potential for representativity and generalization is
nevertheless of interest, and I will return to that. I wanted to talk with
women in a number of approximately twenty, a number I considered
adequate and feasible to handle. I wanted persons from a variety of
social circles. More specifically: I wanted to control the representation in
terms of class and education, because I believed (and still do) that a
variation in this respect would make it more likely that I got a sample
with various erotic styles, especially regarding power issues.41 The
question of class and eroticism is a large topic in itself. Working class
women are supposed to be less ‘respectable’ in a sexual sense than
middle class and upper class (Skeggs 1997). I do not even touch upon
this issue in the present work, however much I have felt tempted to do
so. Class and other background variables are not central to my analysis
of erotic dynamics. The concern for class and education was a means to
improve the diversity of my material. I did not want to use open
advertising or the organizations, and then find myself stuck with a
sample of middle- class, well- educated lesbians like myself. I am
41 The word ’class’ will not be defined other than that I use ’class’ the way I used it
as a Marxist in the 1970’s based on Lenin’s criteria.
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convinced that this project would not have stimulated the contribution I
wanted to make to the debate, if my data were based only on educated
middle-class lesbians. A process of controlled snowballing seemed
appropriate.
In this case there were several snowballs in play, and none of them ran
very far. I use the test interview as a regular interview, since it has
qualities similar to the others. As already mentioned, I knew this
informant from before. In the course of the interview she mentioned a
woman who was central in the lesbian subculture in the older days. I
phoned one of my acquaintances to track this woman down and found
that she was willing to participate. One of the women at the meeting in
the pre-project phase put me in touch with a friend of hers, who seemed
suitable. She turned out to be ready to contribute. Then, from a woman
who I knew to be familiar with the s&m circles in Norway, I got the
name of a contact. This contact wanted herself to contribute, and she also
put me in touch with a friend of hers, plus a young couple who she
believed might be in the process of becoming attracted to s&m
dynamics. Five informants (one couple included) of diverse backgrounds
were the result of my visit to the group of young persons mentioned
earlier. One of them connected me with a bisexual ex-lover, who was not
a member of the group. One of my own ex-lovers came to mind as being
particularly interesting to interview, which of course was out of the
question for reasons discussed above. I called her and discussed the
matter, and she had a couple of friends she thought would probably
interest me. And it turned out that indeed talking to them was productive.
With the help of an acquaintance within the health profession, and, in
turn, a friend of hers, I found a socially well-adjusted and well educated
couple who had been living together for a considerable number of years.
One woman I met incidentally at a seminar insisted, when I told her
about my project, that it would be interesting for me to talk with an ex-
lover of hers. And she was right. And last but not least, I interviewed one
heterosexual woman (I met her at a pub and she agreed to meet me and
be interviewed) and one former lesbian in the transition to becoming a
heterosexual man. As already mentioned, diversity in class and education
was a guideline during this process, and so was geography. That my
informants live in different places in Norway has made it easier for me to
secure their anonymity in writing this text.
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The bisexual, heterosexual and transsexual are clearly enough not self-
identified lesbians.42 Primarily, the interviews with them work as a
contrast to the rest of the material, especially when it comes to the
wording of analytical questions. One example: the heterosexual
informant said that it was totally out of the question for her simply to
pleasure her husband sexually, without being aroused and getting
something sexually out of it herself. Not even occasionally would that be
her intention in a sexual encounter. This made me aware of the ‘service-
orientation’ that could be read out of the stories coming from the
seventeen self-identified lesbians, which is discussed in Chapter 7:
Usually I will start with her. Her statements contributed to the
formulation of what, in my opinion, is an interesting analytical issue.
I made a rough comparison of some variables; my sample compared with
the one in the NOVA-study and with the total Norwegian female
population sixteen years of age and above.43 The information I have
about my informants is not in all cases adjustable to the categories used
in the above-mentioned studies, so the following is to be understood as
my informal evaluation of numbers.
The oldest was born in 1946 and the youngest in 1979. My interview
material has an overrepresentation of women in the twenties and a
corresponding underrepresentation of women aged fifty or more,
compared to the other samples. The percentage with higher education is
lower than in the NOVA-sample, but higher than in the total population
of Norwegian women over sixteen. A higher proportion of the women in
the NOVA report have full time jobs, compared to my sample, and so is
the share who are in a stable relationship of more than two years
duration. Perhaps the age variable explains the differences in education,
proportion of respondents in full time jobs and stable relationships;
perhaps class has an impact.
Two informants live on social welfare, seven hold middle-class jobs (as,
for example, teacher, middle-rank manager, nurse) and six have what I
call working class jobs (as, for example, secretary, shop assistant,
42 The idea of conducting some contrasting interviews came from Tordis
Borchgrevink in a meeting in Oslo on November 4th, 1998. She had agreed to meet
with me in an early phase of the project, for which I am grateful.
43 I do this primarily out of curiosity, but also because I do what Berg (1997)
suggests that all social scientists are doing, namely struggling with ‘the ghost of
positivism’. Statistics for the Norwegian female population are from
Levekårsundersøkelsen 1995, as referred in the NOVA report, Chapter 2, Part 3
(Hegna et al 1999).
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assembly line worker). The five students have diverse family
backgrounds in terms of class. I do not have informants from an upper
class, and the reason for that is a combination of different factors, which
I present in order of declining importance:
• the participation of women from working class and middle
class was my prime concern
• my own class prejudice
• when my snowball rolls a short distance, it will not reach the
upper class
I have no suggestions as to what it would have meant in terms of
variations within my sample. The relationship between class and sexual
desire is a most interesting topic for a future project. However, I have not
made it an issue here except in the way I have described already.
The interviews were two hours in length, except in one case where it is
more accurate to say four hours. I added and removed questions from the
interview guide at several occasions. When the informant was talkative
beyond the average, I would pose the questions in a casual order,
according to the development of the conversation. Some of the women
had perspectives and experiences on matters of sexuality that made most
of my questions look as if they were designed for someone else. In those
cases I had to play it by ear. In one particular case, I let the interview
turn into a kind of two-way communication in which I gave up my role
as a researcher in favor of being an interlocutor in a conversation. I was
unable to make the informant talk about experiences of sexual attraction.
Her focus was the practical measures required to get someone to date,
and she would constantly return to this issue. The other interviews are
referred to in the analysis, either by direct quotation, or more indirectly.
The interview guide and the communication
The interview guide is a list of issues, or vaguely formulated questions:
do you remember your first time with a girl, another occasion that you
can recall, boys versus girls, when you are intent upon sexual relations -
what do you notice, rejections etc. The first version contained twenty
issues. When three interviews were accomplished I had added several
issues. I rewrote the guide, and this time it contained thirty-eight issues. I
used that version in eight interviews. In the third version I added another
twenty-five issues, and used that for the rest of the fieldwork. I did not
pose all the questions in all the interviews; if so far the conversation had
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made it obvious that she would not relate to what I had intended to ask
her, the questions were left out. For example: one does not ask a woman
who has never touched a man’s body in a sexual encounter, what she
experienced in terms of surprise/contrast when she had sex with a
woman for the first time. (You could change the question, and ask her
what she imagined would be the difference, as will be shown that I
actually did). Or, some questions that are important for cohabitants will
seem irrelevant to the one who has never lived together with a lover.
The issues that were continuously added are reflections of the richness of
the narratives of my informants. One after the other they came up with
new experiences and ways of reflecting upon them, and so as to be able
to use later what I learned, I added these issues and insights to my list of
topics to discuss. Perhaps I would want the next person to comment on
such an experience and tell me her stories. Some questions were not on
the list at all, but were nevertheless the ones that I posed most
frequently: could you be more specific, details please, what did you do
then, what did she do? Some informants did not easily share details, but
were ready to do so in response to my firm but friendly pressure. On
some occasions I would give up soliciting the details. I will discuss the
ethical aspects of this later.
Wendy Hollway and Tony Jefferson make a distinction between
‘conventionally inspired qualitative interview schedule’ and ‘a more
indirect approach of eliciting narratives derived from the biographical-
interpretive method’ (Hollway and Jefferson 1997, p67). Based on
experience from a study of anxiety and fear, they argue that the
conventionally qualitative interview encourages the clever
intellectualizing of emotional experiences. While, on the other hand,
asking open questions, following up on details, in short: eliciting stories,
implies a richer material for analysis. They have a psychoanalytically
derived understanding of anxiety, and see the close similarity between
the method of narration and the psychoanalytic method of free
association. The trick is to get stories that are more structured according
to unconscious logic, than to the conscious logic. Unlike Hollway and
Jefferson, my aim is not to ‘go behind the defenses to the anxieties they
protect’ (1997, p60). After all, I am a sociologist and not a psychologist.
But, even a sociologist might prefer like a material consisting of stories
rather than opinions. Let me give an example from the field. First, a
sequence where I fail to get what I want out of the informant. We were
talking about sexual exchange where the dialogue between having
control versus giving up control is not just a vague feeling, but out in the
open. Examples may be when the participants are engaged in a play
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where one person wants to have sex and the other pretends not to, or
when they set up a teacher-student scenario. My comments in retrospect
are in italic.
KGR: Whether I have experienced that?
AB: Yes, will that often be part of sex with other people? Why
don’t I say: ‘have you ever experienced that’?
KGR: I have not used it that often.
AB: Have you had it both with boys and girls? Why don’t I say:
‘can you tell me about one time you were engaged in this sort of
play’
KGR: I have had it with boys and girls, but not very explicit. It
was like; some.
AB: When you did it with boys, what role did you play? What a
lame question! I give her the opportunity to continue to talk
without being specific.
KGR: I had both roles.
AB: What did you like the best? I give up! This is leading
nowhere!
KGR: Actually, I liked both (KGR p9)
After this sequence I am left without one single clue as to what kind of
dynamics she has been engaged in, with whom and when. She
emphasizes that power play was not very explicit or frequent, that it was
with boys and girls, and in either case she would be switching positions.
There are analytical questions that might have been relevant for this
passage. For example: how are lesbians presenting themselves in terms
of power exchange? I will take the discussion of how I am utilizing my
interview material later. Just briefly now and related to the
communication between her and me: since I was more concerned about
her experience, I was not pleased with this sequence of replies. I was,
and still am, more pleased with the next situation. Here I am with an
informant who has never been in bed with a man. I want to know how
she imagines differences between having sex with men compared to
having sex with women. I have just one comment in italic here, because I
think I am good enough, also in retrospect.
NK: ’I would have to guess only. I am not sure if I am qualified to
answer at all. Perhaps you’ll be more dominated in bed with a
man, or something. I have possibly got it all wrong about
heterosex, but it looks like it on TV.’
AB: ‘That men dominate, you think it looks like that on TV?’
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NK: ‘Yes, that’s what it looks like. Others would know more
about this than me.’
AB: ‘You say ‘dominate’, can you give me an example on what
you mean by that?’
NK: ‘No, actually not. I have only seen it on TV.’
AB: ‘Yes, but you must have seen something that make you say
that.’ I am a little too insistent here. ‘you might have seen’ would
probably have been sufficient.
NK: ‘It seems like ..., but that is in the movies, and that might
happen to be the way they make it, it is probably not actually like
that ... I think that they are always on top and the woman is under,
and it gets like all too passive. I’m sure it’s not the way it happens
in the Norwegian homes,44 but it seems like it ... If I went to bed
with a man, it would probably be like that, I reckon’ (NK p9).
What I wanted to illustrate here is that I manage to elicit her imagination,
the picture she has, as a woman without sexual experience with men, of
sexual practices between men and women.45 One other interesting thing
here is her protective attitude towards Norwegian heterosexuals. She
does not want to say anything critical about them, or insinuate that
heterosexuals have bad sex. It is probably just the filmmaker. I am not
sure exactly where and how she has got such a protective attitude, but I
know that I have had the same concerns. I will return to that.
My approach is basically the ‘conventionally inspired qualitative
interview schedule’, as Hollway and Jefferson put it. But, I also ‘elicit
narratives’, and put a certain pressure on my informants to be specific
and detailed when they seem to slip away on a wave of general
statements.
Ethics
The qualitative research interview gives the social researcher the benefits
of the confident conversation. That is: the more the researcher is clever,
44 In this context ’in the Norwegian homes’ (i de norske hjem) means in heterosexual
Norway in general
45 The last example represents an instance where the informant is encouraged to talk
about what she has seen on TV, not about her own experiences. This is of course a
situation where it is easier for me to put the mild pressure, and easier for her to yield.
I could not find an exemple where the issue was more private, and at the same time
short enough and relevant to illustrate my point. In more personal questions it has
taken us more time to get there.
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lucky and develops good chemistry, the more confident, open and honest
the informant will be. That implies a moral responsibility for the
researcher, the research ethics of which will have to be considered. Jette
Fog emphasizes that the question of morals is not a special one in
research. It is as in all other interpersonal connections embedded in the
relationship between individuals. We recognize morality in basic
manners, and this same knowledge is also made use of in research. The
power we have as researchers gives us no other rights than we have in
any other kinds of contact with other people (Fog 1992). I share her
considerations.
Sometimes this is not experienced as a challenge in the project, even if
the interviews are open, long and thorough. According to my judgement,
the moral aspect is handled in a basically sound way through the efforts I
have made to protect my informants from being identifiable in the texts I
produce for an audience. However, I have had to go some extra rounds
because of three of my interviews. One case was when I felt pity for my
informant.
She was a petite woman. I am not big either, but I felt really huge in
comparison. She was very excited about all the kinky sex she sometimes
would have with strangers, balancing, as she then would have to do,
between good sex and a health risk. It was hard for me to believe, despite
all her enthusiasm, that this small and fragile (so it seemed to me)
woman could endure such treatment for years to come. During the
transcription of the interview it came to me that I had the responsibility
to see to it that she got the help she needed to break her erotic pattern
and live at a lower risk. It is not that I have a problem with making
public what she told me about her life. I feel confident that her
anonymity is protected, I am ready to defend my interpretations of the
interview with her, and I am not concerned about publishing my
suggestions. It is my responsibility as a fellow being that began
bothering me. Should I try to rescue her from herself? I aired the
question in a group of colleagues a couple of weeks after the interview.
They suggested that I talked with other scholars in the field of sexuality,
which I did not. I continued to think it over, and came to the conclusion
that she would have to take care of herself: she had friends and family,
and she was very happy about the way her sex-life worked (except that
there was to little of it). She had not agreed to be interviewed only to
find herself under the protective wings of a sociologist. She was
interested in the project, she liked to talk about sexual issues, she liked to
tell me about events in her life – I finally let go of the rescuing heroine in
me. The other case is linked to the first. This was a woman who liked to
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‘top’ other women, and her limit was cutting off parts of her partner’s
body. She had done that once, but was rather pleased when she found
that it did not excite her. I began thinking that I perhaps should stop her
from making women (want to) bleed from being cut during sex.
However, due to similar reasons as in the first case, I dropped the idea.
She was open, frank and enthusiastic about her sexual practice. As I see
her, she is not one to hide her sexual preferences when she approaches a
woman. I finally concluded that she was capable of taking responsibility
for the sex she had with others.
The third and last case is somewhat different. It is about the woman who,
for one period when she was young, would sell sexual services to other
women. I decided that I wanted to analyze the interview as a significant
story about female sexuality, and not as an exception from the rule that
women do not usually buy sex from other women (or from men). This
choice of analytical strategy is linked to the wish I have in this project to
break up some naturalized ideas about sexual matters and hegemonic
heterosexual discourse. The challenges regarding this particular
interview were several. It is difficult to protect her right to anonymity.
Some of her friends might be able to identify her, despite of all my
efforts. One other matter that challenged me here, was that if a journalist
found something to write about from this thesis, it would be about
women buying sex from other women. What would happen if OP were
recognized and did not share my analysis, not even on the basic points?
What about her right to be anonymous and what about her dignity? I
came to the conclusion that I had to talk with her about all these topics:
anonymity, analysis and a possible attention from the media. She was
positive to meeting me again, so I sent her the relevant pages of text and
visited her some days after. To me this was a new experience, and I was
very nervous. What if she denied having said the things I quoted? What
if she was totally against my way of understanding her case? What if she
wanted me not to refer to her at all? I did not need to be anxious. OP was
very clear on what she wanted to be changed to get better protection
regarding anonymity, and she even had a good suggestion how to do it.
And she said that it seemed as though I had understood what she had
meant to say. As you will see from Chapter 6: Hire a woman! What
woman would? she disagreed with viewing the sex sales as an
experiment connected to developing a lesbian identity. All in all, my first
experience with having an informant read unfinished text, was a success
story. At least so far.
Except for the informant that represents the case interview about
commercial sex, I cannot see that I have had any particular problems
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concerning the anonymity of the informants. I do not use their real
names. I have changed their place of residence in some instances. Since
the rural-urban dimension is not part of the analysis, I have found that
this has been a contextually unproblematic change. As I have discounted
the importance of age for the analysis, I have left people’s ages
somewhat imprecise, not exceedingly and not in all cases, but to a
certain extent and in some instances. Anonymization is a relatively
uncomplicated process here, because in the analysis of the interviews,
the life context (childhood, work, education, social life, living
conditions, etc) of the informant is toned down in favor of dynamics in
actual events. ‘Context’ is primarily represented by different aspects of
heterosexual discourse and not by the individual informant’s socio-
material environment. In all cases my evaluation is now that the reader
will get too little information to suggest who the informant is.
Evaluation of the data collecting46 process and the material
I had the feeling that all my informants talked. That is not self-evident
even in interviews where people have agreed to participate. It was a good
atmosphere, as I understood it. Usually they would ask me if I were a
lesbian. I believe that contributed to the openness and the rapport. I liked
talking with every single informant. That helped here as in other kinds of
conversations. So did probably the ‘gate-openers’, which had introduced
me for my informants in the first place, in positive terms I suppose, since
the informants all had agreed to participate. The tape recorder worked, I
had adequate money for the travelling involved. With the exception of
the challenges mentioned about interview dynamics and level of
precision, and the moral aspects linked to three of the interviews, I
cannot think of a problem worth mentioning from this phase of the
project.
I transcribed the interviews myself, with one exception. With twenty
interviews this was a manageable task. A total of 366 pages (eighteen
pages on average per interview) were also simple to handle during the
analytical work that followed. It was relatively easy to remember what
each of them had said, easy to search for passages and find them in the
transcriptions. I went through the material an innumerable times, making
notes on the particular topics that were to become my analytical focus. I
46 I would rather not use the word ’collecting’, because it sounds as though there
were some information out there and my task was to go out and get it. That is not
how I see the matter. I created the material together with the informant. However, I
have not found an alternative formulation that I like better.
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will have to say that the fieldwork went smoothly and that I am pleased
with the result in terms of data material on which this study is based. The
material could have been richer on certain issues, as in the prostitution
case. There were moments when I thought that I ought to have a second
round, if not with all, then at lest with some of the informants. I actually
visited two informants a second time, one to try to secure her anonymity
more effectively as we saw in the previous paragraph, and also to have
my analysis confirmed. In the other case I just wanted to go deeper into
an issue with one central informant. Both these visits paid off in terms of
bringing me further along the writing process.
The interviews read as lived experience and as text
In the analysis I treat the interviews as my informants’ version of ‘the
truth’ about their experiences. I accept their version of the truth, and
write my own story based on theirs. I interpret what they are telling me
by using analytical perspectives and analytical questions that have been
developed in the academic, political and personal situation that is part of
my own story.
In contemporary literature, one often gets the impression that there is a
deep ditch between, on the one side, the postructuralist social scientist
perceiving her interview material as text, and on the other side, the more
classic social scientist perceiving her material as containing the
informant’s ‘reality’ or real experiences. The words used to name this
binary vary considerably. Steinar Kvale operates with a distinction
between the interviewee as a representative and as an informant, where
respectively the consequences and the information are interesting (Kvale
1992b, p158). Or, the author could focus on ‘the construction of
memories‘ versus ‘how things “really” were’ (Flemmen 1999, p9, my
translation). Harriet Bjerrum-Nielsen (2000) discusses or uses binaries as
‘language’ versus ‘experience’, ‘text’ versus ‘context’, and ‘discursive’
versus ‘material’. ‘Text-context’ is also the historian Ingar Kaldal’s
(2000) main terms when he discusses how to understand what old people
tell him about the past. Dagfinn Slettan (1994), also a historian,
discusses several distinctions. (Actually, the terms are developed as
characterizing different aspects and levels of the discussion, but to
demonstrate this would be beyond the scope of my task). In addition to
‘text-context’ he addresses ‘life narrative-life story’ (p21), ‘inside of
culture-outside of culture’ (p36), ‘subjective-objective’, ‘what is told
about the past - what actually happened’, ‘the narrative event - the
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concrete event’, and more (p93). My own position in this project is not
definitely on the one or the other, and I will explain what I mean.
As I said in an earlier footnote, when I use the label ‘informant’ for my
interviewees, it is out of convenience, and also out of habit. It does not
reflect that I am solely interested in the ‘facts’ about other people’s lives.
As a rule, the ‘truth’ is one version given by a particular voice, in a
particular situation and at a particular time. Some elements in the story
are possible to double-check, like birthplace, year of birth, marriages,
etc, however, in this project such information is of little importance.
Slettan objects to distinguishing between a subjective and an objective
(personal versus social) part of a memory, and refers to Tonkin (1992) in
saying that it is as if you were trying to tear apart the two sides of a piece
of paper (Slettan 1994, p67). In the memory the limit between subjective
and objective dissolves (p66). In my analysis of the interviews, I do not
question whether the informant really was part of a certain situation, I do
not question the objective aspect of the interview. The narration is her
own, it is part of the presentation of herself in front of me at that time; it
is subjective. The information about concrete episodes and events cannot
be separated from her situated presentation of self. Slettan says:
‘The narrative event refers to an actual event, but is in itself a
construction produced with the help of memory. This construction
changes with the passage of time as we reflect on the event’
(Slettan 1994, p93, my translation).
What this means for my analytical work is that I understand the
interviews as a report from a reality, namely the reality they describe.
This is at the same time the reality they are recreating in the interview
relationship with the interviewer. I make my own story about the reality
on the basis of such stories. My interpretations and the theoretical
perspectives within which my interpretations are framed, my ‘truth’, are
not necessarily shared by the informant herself. It is like trying to tell the
truth, but all the time also saying that there is no such thing as the truth,
it is rather my way of producing it. And I do it in two steps; first
referring to ‘true’ stories from others and then making my own ‘true’
story out of them. What probably is the real truth after all, is that my text
represents an opportunity for others to reflect about the culture of
sexuality of which they are members, as well as their own practices
within this culture.
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Until now, this has been a rather chronological presentation of the
process. The issues I am about to address are issues that concern the
process as a whole, especially as they are even more linked in particular
to the quality of the analysis. We saw NK’s concern about offending
heterosexuals; ‘I have possibly got it all wrong about heterosex’ and I
mentioned that this was also an issue for me. The following paragraph
has a double mission. I discuss the representation of heterosexual
discourse, but since I do it in the context of the analytical issues, this is
also an account for the formation of the substance of the project: the
issues under debate.
Never forget that there is more than one discourse of heterosexuality
I had decided that a comparative perspective was part of my analytical
approach, and of course this implied that I needed units to compare.
Lesbian practice was already given. (Not that I knew exactly what
‘practice’ was supposed to mean, although I will discuss this under the
next heading ‘An issue becomes an issue’). That the other unit would be
‘heterosexuality’, with the weight on heterosexual desire and power
issues/control issues was also consciously assumed by this point in time.
But, how to picture heterosexuality as part of a comparative analysis
became the single most challenging issue in this study. This particular
methodological question was a continuous headache during the process
of analyzing the data. Central to the portrayal of heterosexual discourse
is how it has been perceived in feminist scholarship and political debate
over the last three or four decades. This means that a lot of heterosexual
people will not recognize the picture I draw of heterosexual negotiations
of power when they relate it to their own lives. I do understand feminist
critique of heterosexual power issues as a discourse that produces what it
names (see references to Foucault and Butler in the previous chapter). I
have not made it part of my project here to deconstruct feminist
discourse and the erotic. This would be, however, an interesting idea for
a future project.
I never developed a uniform presentation of heterosexual discourse. I
came to picture it in varying ways, ways that I found proper dependent
on the character of the analytical questions at hand. I will again
underline, however, that in every instance my literature of reference is
feminist theory and empirical studies; in short, feminist critique. I will
illustrate what I mean.
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An issue becomes an issue
The work with the transcription of the interviews was the most important
period in terms of forming analytical questions. When I listened to the
dialogue between the informants and myself for a second time, I noticed
that certain things they told me, and words they would use, started to
form my focal points. That some of them used the word ‘to take’ to
describe what they did to their female lovers, became the first analytical
issue. The interviewer, being a member of a Norwegian culture
dominated by heterosexual discourses and at the same time having a
feminist consciousness, was brought up short when she noticed that
women would use this term in an interview. Many of us have one speech
register we use with our partners during sex, and another when we talk
with a researcher and a stranger. Immediately after having finished the
transcribing, I started to work on a paper on sexually ‘taking’. And in the
first round of comments from colleagues, I understood that I had to be
careful with my characterization of heterosexual ‘taking’.
As a member of this culture I had observed that the word was not used in
the public debate or between people talking about sex. The problem was
that I could not find the word used other than in pornography and in
dictionaries. The consequence was that my presentation of ‘heterosexual
taking’ is that the woman is ‘the taken’ and that it is an act wherein the
man is gratified. This in sharp contrast to my material where it is about
the gratification of ‘the taken’ part. The advice from my colleagues (as I
heard it) was to write more about the possible variations in heterosexual
‘taking’, and to ensure that I did not express anything like an opinion
that lesbian sex is better then heterosex. I have chosen not to follow the
first part of this advice. It is not within the scope of this project to
investigate how heterosexuals relate to the verb ‘take’. I could have had
a sample of heterosexual women, which of course may be relevant even
when the focus is on same sex relations as here. I have chosen not to
interview heterosexuals, and have four reasons for my decision. First, the
fieldwork and the material would have become more complex, and I had
decided already it was complex enough. Second, were I to have had two
small samples, there would be analytical problems regarding
comparison, and especially generalization. Third, culturally speaking, the
discourse on heterosexuality is loud and extensive already. Fourth, I am
really not convinced that heterosexual informants would have used the
term at all. Anne Britt Flemmen made a similar choice in her study of
women’s fear of sexualized violence. Her attention is exclusively on how
women experience men’s behavior. She puts it more bluntly; ‘Men’s
thoughts, reasons and intentions in the concrete situations do not interest
me in this work’ (Flemmen 1999, p4, my translation). I decided that the
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heterosexual representation would have to be a kind of backdrop, a
provider of analytical points about eroticism in Western culture.
The second part of the advice, the point about not picturing lesbian sex
as better than heterosex, is not simple either. One of my commentators
said that it was easy for her to read caring and equality as being a central
part of lesbian discourse. I re-read the text, and I could not find what she
found in the text. To emphasize the equality aspect of lesbian discourse
is not central in my reflections about lesbian desire when looking at this
project in general. I am more focused on difference. She is right though,
that I find (as several surveys have demonstrated already) that certain
social aspects of lesbian dialogue are more marked by mutuality than is
heterosexual dialogue as pictured here. One can say that lesbians are
more successful regarding equality issues in sex and partnership, and this
is not such a big surprise when one recalls the results from gender
studies in general. However, theoretically I have made a point that
heterosexuality is inside homosexuality and vice versa. I recognize the
power aspect in all eroticity and investigate how power and control
issues are reworked when the situation is composed of two women. It
has been a bit surprising to me that no Norwegian scholars have
criticized the fact that I take as a presupposition, power as part of the
erotic, even between two women.47
The analysis of the lesbian exploitation of the word to ‘take’ sexually,
and the discussions in connection with the first draft of a paper48 inspired
me to follow up with an analysis of what I call sexual ‘service
orientation’. One thing is that some would use the word ‘take’ when
actually, what they were doing was ‘giving’. A second focus took form
and shape when I realized the pragmatism several of the informants
expressed regarding the production of orgasms. I decided to compare a
kind of laid-back ‘first-me-and-then-you’ attitude among my informants
with the heterosexual discourse and feminist critique (advice) in the field
of orgasm. What some researchers call the ‘coitus imperative’ is part of
the analysis, and some heterosexually practicing will probably not
recognize such an imperative. Again, the picture might have been quite
different had I asked practicing heterosexuals, and again, that was not
my point.
47 At a conference presentation of the ’take’-case, an American lesbian activist was
rather upset that I claimed that lesbians would use this word. She was convinced that
US lesbians never would.
48 A paper presented at the 7th International Interdisciplinary Congress on Women,
Tromsø, 20-26 June 1999. Later published (Bolsø 2001).
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In retrospect, the next analytical chapter to be written also seems to
follow logically. I was very much aware that I had one case where a
woman had sold sexual services to other women. At first I did not know
whether I should treat that as an exception and make no other analytical
point. However, after the chapter about sexual service orientation in
general, I wanted to open up for another kind of analysis. Here my
material is analyzed on the basis of a feminist critique of commercial
sex. Or; heterosexuality is represented by classical feminist analysis of
prostitution. Are the traditional power structures of heterosexual
prostitution reproduced in my case of woman-to-woman paid exchange?
Are there differences?
After the first draft of the chapter about commercial sex, I went to the
USA and concentrated on the further development of the theoretical
foundation of the project. Teresa de Lauretis’ thoughts about lesbians,
masculinity and erotic significance in The Practice of Love (1994a),
caught my attention. What about my informant who loved being labeled
‘macho-babe’, and the one with jeans and boots sitting in the bar,
watching women? Could they be read in light of masculinity as a
mediator of eroticity? The next analytical topic would be lesbian desire
and signs of masculinity. Heterosexuality is in that chapter represented
by its main erotic signifier: the phallus. With the risk of repeating
myself: this does not imply a statement saying that all heterosexual
conduct puts the erect penis centerstage.
In sum: my picturing of heterosexual discourse is not very positive from
the point of view of a woman. In many cases, and for this we should be
happy, this picture does not fit with the experiences of living
heterosexuals. British feminist scholarship contains a continuous debate
between heterosexual feminists about the possibilities of finding other
representations of heterosex that is liberating for women. Wendy
Hollway is one of them. In her article Feminist Discourses and Women’s
Heterosexual Desire, I believe she gives me a good reason why it is
difficult to find representations that are not negatively evaluated from a
feminist perspective (1995). Her point is that female pleasurable and
liberating heterosex has to be mediated through discourse. The problem
is, however; there is no such discourse available. We have all the terms,
symbols, notions and institutions we need to mediate women’s sexual
subordination, men’s abusive behavior, women’s discontent about men
as lovers, etc. Hollway puts it like this:
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’...the lack of emancipatory discourse of women’s heterosex
means that it is very difficult to communicate the experience of
pleasurable, egalitarian heterosex, both at the level of simply
talking about it, and also at a theoretical level of conceptualizing
women’s heterosexual desire as consistent with a feminist politics’
(Hollway 1995, p87).
Hollway believes that it will be possible to develop such a discourse. The
faith in this is embedded in the contradictions between discourses, and
the room this creates for individuals, in spite of heteronormativity, to
practice heterosex in ways that ‘can escape the oppressiveness of
dominant forms of heterosexual relating’ (p101). As I said at the
beginning; it is necessary to reflect on discourses, terms, binaries, and
symbols by which we think analytically as social scientists. I need
heterosexuality as a backdrop to my empirical analysis, and have chosen
to stick to available discourses that do not seem to contain much pleasure
for heterosexual women. It is my hope though, and this is also reflected
in the aims of the project, that this text viewed as a whole, will
contribute to the same progressive aims as those of Hollway. ‘Slippages’
in discourse are constantly demonstrated in the analysis, and are
interpreted as future opportunities; however, I must admit predominantly
in a theoretical sense. The difference between slippage in discourse and
social change is discussed in Chapter 8: Lesbian specificity.
This means that I perceive heterosexual discourse as being no more
unified than I consider lesbian discourse to be. In both cases, though, it is
possible to develop a notion of hegemonic discourse. I have done that
with heterosexuality, I am not doing that in the case of lesbianism,
because to do so would require another approach to the question of
generalization. This text is about the different aspects of lesbian
discourse that I read from (or into) the interviews with the help of
analytical questions. I do develop a notion of lesbian specificity in the
end. However, the meaning of the term ‘lesbian specificity’ as it is used
here, is to be understood as different from a possible notion of ‘lesbian
hegemonic discourse’. The reason is that I establish a notion of lesbian
specificity based on different types of generalization potentials in each
chapter. A lesbian hegemonic discourse would have to be developed as
one discourse that is more dominant compared to other lesbian
discourses. That is another project.
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Potentials for generalization
With some modification I agree with Harriet Bjerrum-Nielsen in her firm
assertion that social science is meaningless without generalizing
statements (Bjerrum-Nielsen 2000, p26). Some projects may be of great
importance without such claims. In cases of testing new methods, trying
different analytical perspectives etc., an explorative approach to
generalization might be fruitful. However, I believe she is quite right
when she says that it is impossible to imagine development of theory
without generalizing and universalizing statements. What she asks for is
that the author takes on the authority of interpretation and takes the
responsibility for making such statements.49 There is in this study a
diverse potential for generalization, due to the variation in analytical
approaches, analytical questions, the relation to previous studies and my
own data material.
This text has four main analytical chapters, and one chapter called
Lesbian specificity that is a summary of sorts. Each chapter has its own
internal analytical logic. They are dedicated to different discursive
aspects, but in this connection the most important is that they contribute
in significantly different modes to the theoretical and empirical totality. I
could have taken this discussion as a joint summing up presentation, but
have decided that it is better to make it after each empirical analysis. The
reader will then be familiar with the particularity of the analysis, and be
able to make a more informed evaluation of my way of reasoning.
As will be demonstrated in the empirical analysis, the use of fiction and
pornography is important in the discussion about generalization. As in
my interviews, I exploit fiction and pornography in different ways in the
analysis. On the basis of the chapters where these sources contribute the
most to the results I will briefly demonstrate and discuss how fiction and
pornography play a role.
Fiction and pornography
Erotica/pornography is used in two purposes on the question of ‘taking’.
Firstly, it is used as one of three sources from which I extract a culturally
49 Her contribution could be read as a positioning against some types of empirical
studies based on poststructural strategies. I cannot support her offensive against ‘the
endless rows of small, near-sighted investigations, that do not theorize the major
social patterns of power..’ (Bjerrum-Nielsen 2000, p26, my translation). It seems to
me as if Bjerrum-Nielsen here is rejecting experimental writing that, in my opinion,
continuously is needed within the social sciences.
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dominant understanding of the word. Secondly, I use lesbian
pornography in contrast to heterosexual pornography to underline some
analytical points already made likely on the basis of analysis of the
interviews. The purpose is to strengthen the argumentation arising
directly from my interview material. On the question of timing of an
orgasm, I again use lesbian romantic fiction and pornography to
strengthen my argumentation on analytical points already made on the
basis of the interview material. In this chapter, one might say that the
protagonists in fiction to a certain degree play the part of interviewees,
since I use the literature for the purpose of generalizing from researched
data. In both the ‘take’- and ‘orgasm’-cases, fiction adds an emotional
dimension to the illustration of the findings. Lesbian romantic writing
and lesbian pornography operate on the level of detail, where my
interviews do not. To understand the protagonists in literature as
informants can, of course not, bear an examination from the perspective
of the science of literature.
I have accounted for the research process in a rather detailed manner,
and not in the purpose of telling a story. It is connected to the quality of
this investigation. Have I produced results about the analytical questions
I have posed? Is there a correspondence between the aims of the project,
analytical questions and methods? Is there, to use the words of Dorte
Marie Søndergaard, ‘an internal consistency between the levels of
methodology’ (Søndergaard 1996, p61)? The materials I have used for
my analysis – are they reliable sources? We are talking reliability and
validity, and I will examine those issues in that order.
Reliability
Dorte Marie Søndergaard (1996) makes a distinction in qualitative
research between studies based on a paradigmatic versus a narrative
epistemology. The former focuses on classifying phenomena in
categories or concepts on different levels. In her opinion this kind of
qualitative research resembles quantitative research because both create
order by the means of categorization. My project has more of a narrative
character than a paradigmatic one, since categorizing is of little
importance here. According to Soendergaard, the question of research
reliability would then not be relevant (fn 17, p84). I will discuss the
question briefly.
When we ask for the reliability of an investigation, we ask ‘whether the
repeated investigations of the same phenomenon by the same method
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will yield the same answer’ (Kvale 1992c, p211); or according to
Søndergaard’s formulation: ‘Is the instrument measuring what it is
supposed to measure, is it a reliable instrument’ (Søndergaard 1996, p84,
my translation). The problem is that in the case of, for instance, the
qualitative interview, ‘the method’ or ‘the instrument’ cannot possibly be
the same from one situation to the other. This is due to the interpersonal
character of the interview. There is a unique dynamic to every human
relation. The possibility exists that two persons asking an informant the
same questions, would get two significantly different sets of data.
Moreover, the same interviewer and interviewee could hardly reproduce
a previous dynamic at another point of time. What this implies is not that
the question of reliability of interview-based research is irrelevant. We
will just have to pose the question differently. We will have to take into
consideration as many differences between interview situations that are
possible to think of, and investigate how these differences may explain
differences between interview materials. That would have to be a very
complicated reliability analysis, requiring social-psychological skills. I
will not discourage social scientists from doing this, but I am not
convinced about its profitability in terms of increased understanding. My
suggestion is instead to give the information you believe is relevant
about your actual interview situations. Thereby giving your audiences
the opportunity to reflect upon the production of the material you exploit
in your research, and on which you base your analysis. The conclusion is
after this: the question of reliability is relevant to ask, very complicated
to answer, and the achievements questionable. A better alternative is to
put considerable efforts into the presentation of how the data was
produced.
Validity: correspondence, coherence and the pragmatic
It is also not self-evident that the question of validity is asked in a
qualitative oriented research project. The question is often linked to the
positivist claim that there is a true reality that science should be able to
represent. In other words, science is valid when there is a
correspondence between reality and some sort of a linguistic
representation. This is still ‘comme il faut’ within the natural sciences
and some strands of social science. More common within the humanities
and the social sciences is to claim validity based on the coherence
regarding the ‘unity, consistency and internal logic of a statement’
(Kvale 1992c, p207). Or also common, and especially within social
science, validity is based on a pragmatic criterion connected to practical
consequences.
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In this project I use all three approaches. I claim to represent a major
practice, general among lesbians within the Western societies in Chapter
7: Usually, I will start with her. I think I must say that in that chapter I
present the view that my findings here are representative for lesbians in a
statistical sense, even though I do so without the deployment of
statistics.50 It might seem like a considerable dilemma, but I do not see it
to be such. Representativity (or correspondence) is based on
argumentation, as in the other chapters containing empirical analysis. As
I hopefully show in the empirical analysis, I present various
interpretations of my interviews, argue for some in particular, and use
the works of other scholars (some places even statistics) to strengthen
my reasoning and convince the reader. This is what Kvale calls
‘checking the credibility’ (Kvale 1992c, p210), that is very much part of
a positivist view of validation, based on the correspondence criteria.
Here ‘checking credibility’ is also linked to validation based on
coherence. Is the argumentation good enough, is the reasoning coherent,
how is this juxtaposed to the works of other scholars?
The empirical chapters are different regarding what I analyze and why.
About ‘the what’: In one chapter I analyze social facts (how do you do
it?) and in others: what is the meaning of this act? About ‘the why’: in
one chapter I make likely a general finding, in one chapter my purpose is
to demonstrate a way of deconstructing hegemonic discourse or
confirming a theory about society. A diversity of ‘whats’ and ‘whys’ will
imply that various methods may be relevant, which is demonstrated in
this thesis. The consequence for the validity question is that it must not
be posed in the same manner in every case. The example below is about
a chapter where validity is based on pragmatic criteria.
In Chapter 5: Masculinity in erotic play it is the symbolic erotic
signification of masculinity (the phallus) that is discussed. The analytical
point I make is about the presence and the function of heterosexuality as
reworked inside homosexuality. The question of validation should be
posed in relation to theory. Does my empirical material fit the theory
about ‘inside’ and ’outside’ discourse? What about Butler’s notion of the
lesbian phallus, could there be an interpretation of my material that
50 To make one thing clear: I am not against statistical methods. I cannot imagine
social science without statistics playing an important role. I will not elaborate on the
questions of situatedness, reflexivity, ethics, and politics of the production of tables
and figures, but simply state that an objective representation of reality is not what we
are talking about.
URN:NBN:no-2116
83
makes sense related to it? Does my analysis in this chapter confirm the
theoretical foundation of the project? How might theory be further
developed - is there a place beyond the Lauretian lesbian fetish? The
pragmatism in this is embedded in the usefulness of analytical results
with regards to theoretical perspectives.
In this chapter I have tried to clarify the premises for the investigation to
the extent that I am able to see them myself. I want to make one last
point before I close this chapter. It is about dialogue; after this text
leaves my hands I will constantly have to debate my interpretations with
qualified ‘others’. ‘Qualified others’ are in this case colleagues,
informants, media, and lay persons who have opinions and experiences
they want to share. This does not imply rewriting the analysis so as to
reach a lowest common denominator, where all parties involved agree
more or less. I can still, as a researcher, produce controversial ideas
about culture and society. However, I must do so in a dialogue that will
continue also after the production process. This dialogue has started
already and has been a part of the validation process all the way since the
meeting with six lesbians in February 1998. I have discussed drafts with
colleagues, students, journalists, gays and lesbians, friends, family and in
some of the cases also with informants. This will continue as long as the
text has something to give.51
An introduction to the empirical analysis
In this last section of chapter 3 about methodology, I will first single out
some elements of the theoretical considerations done in Chapter 2:
Sexuality - where inner and outer worlds meet. I do that to make more
explicitly and visibly the link between theory and the empirical analysis
that is to follow in the next chapter.
I have argued that normative heterosexuality is inescapable for all
members of the culture. Individuals assume membership of one of two
sexes, and the law of normative heterosexuality is embedded in the
process of making sexed subjects; to fail means to be abjected and
culturally un-readable, culturally unintelligible. The construction of the
sexed subject operates through the reiteration of norms. Every reiteration
brings with it the possibility of failure, hence sex and sexuality are both
51 An example of how scientifically productive such a dialogue may be is the
publication of Solheim’s oposition to Soendergaard’s doctoral thesis. The publication
is referred to in this text, and used also by other researchers (Solheim and
Søndergaard 1996).
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produced and possibly destabilized in this operation. This entails that
heteronormativity is hegemonic, however, it does not completely dictate
the sexual structuring of all individuals. There are possibilities of
transgression and ambivalence; there is a vacillation in the lives of
people between positions that are putatively inside or outside
heterosexual discourse. These theoretical arguments give rise to the
analytical perspective that is my point of departure in the empirical
investigation that follows.
In the introductory chapter I say that I want to contribute to the debate
about sexuality and power by studying how lesbians handle power issues
in the erotic field.52 More specifically I study a lesbian negotiation of
power issues that are known from feminist critique of heterosexual
discourse. I also say that the analysis is drawn together by the help of the
term ‘lesbian specificity’. One important motive for the introduction of
the specificity-term is to use it in a discussion of what can be learned
from the analysis, what can be learned from lesbian discourse, what are
the effects of the investigation. The analysis of lesbian negotiations and
effects of lesbian specificity is to be understood as a description of the
thread that goes through the thesis. However, when I formulate my
analytical approach I use a notion of ‘lesbian specificity’ as a starting
point, not as an analytical endpoint only. This is of course a bit confusing
since it then seems that the thesis actually had as its red thread the search
for lesbian specificity. This dilemma may possibly arise from my main
analytical approach, decided early on, and inspired by Judith Butler:
‘Is it not possible that lesbian sexuality is a process that reinscribes
the power domains that it resists, that it is constituted in part from
the very heterosexual matrix that it seeks to displace, and that its
specificity is to be established, not outside or beyond that
reinscription or reiteration, but in the very modality and effects of
that reinscription?’ (Butler 1993b, p310).
To me, this implies that the analysis presupposes that it is meaningful to
talk about a specificity of lesbian eroticity, and to look for it. I was
immediately captivated by this way of formulating an analytical
approach. It seems so useful and relevant, and at the same time so simple
and elegant. The problem now is that I wanted the project first of all to
be a comment to a general debate about sexuality and power, and less to
52 Similar to Marianne Brantsæter’s project, where she studied expectations
regarding ’femaleness’ by focusing on the experiences of lesbians in working life
(Brantsæter 1990).
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be a project that tries to find the specificity of lesbianism. I see no way
out of this dilemma without changing aims or analytical approach, and I
do not want to do either.
The analysis will be after this, to study lesbian sexual practices from a
perspective where a hegemonic, normative heterosexuality is recognized,
but at the same time not perceived as fully determining woman-to-
woman sexual practices. A possible lesbian specificity will be explored
by wresting new interpretations from a lesbian reworking of heterosexual
discourse. And as already mentioned several times; aspects of
heterosexual discourse as read from a feminist perspective.
Reinscription (not to mention reiteration) sounds alarmingly close to
imitation, and seems too static a term lacking the analytical potential that
is needed to grasp change, specificity, new meanings and
interpretations.53 Let us see, however, through the empirical analysis,
whether or not ‘reinscription’ and ‘reiteration’ also means rewriting with
a potential for social change.
53 Similar objections to her own term heterosexual matrix (Gender Trouble,
originally published 1990), is given by Judith Butler in an interview with Osborne
and Segal in 1993. Here she explains why she refrains from using the concept in
Bodies That Matter (1993a), and instead turns to heterosexual hegemony.
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CHAPTER 4: WHEN WOMEN TAKE
In interviews with Norwegian lesbians about their sexual practices, I
noted that some of my informants would use the term ‘to take’ to
describe what they do when they have sex with another woman. To
many feminists, myself included, the term ‘to take someone sexually’ is
associated with some undesirable power structures of heterosexuality,
where the man has the power ‘to take’ the woman, penetrate her and
have his climax, not necessarily bothering much about her pleasure. Why
would lesbians, some of them outspoken feminists, use this term in
connection with woman-to-woman sexual activity? What is going on
technically when a woman ‘takes’ another woman, and what are
reasonable interpretations of the use of the term? Is this an example of
homosexual imitation of heterosexuality, making sexual practice
between women a faulty copy of ‘real’ sex? Or does it just appear to be
an imitation; lesbian sexual encounters being something totally different
from heterosexual conduct?
First I will argue for the existence of a ‘mainstream’ (and heterosexual)
interpretation of the sexual meaning of the verb ‘taking’. The main part
of the chapter will be the analysis and discussion of an empirical
material consisting of interviews with Norwegian lesbians who use the
term. The analysis to follow does not claim that ‘taking’ is typical for a
‘lesbian sexual subculture’ nor that my informant’s ‘taking’ reflects how
the term is understood and used in general among Norwegian lesbians.
On the contrary, I agree with Robin M. Queen and do not assume that a
‘lesbian speech community’ with ‘specific sets of linguistic features’ can
be identified (Queen 1997). I consider sexuality as a site where
individuals create meaning out of their practices, and do so in cultural
contexts where meaning also is prescribed. As for the verb ‘to take’, I
argue that while it has a dominant heterosexual meaning, it is also
possible to create other meanings. And what are these meanings in the
present case?
To take someone sexually – some possible interpretations
My project is situated within a Norwegian cultural context; the
informants are Norwegians and they speak the Norwegian language. The
discussion about possible interpretation of the verb ‘to take’ (å ta)
someone in a sexual sense, is based on information about this language
and culture. This means that the interpretations represented here will not
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automatically be valid for an English speaking culture. I would expect
there to be significant similarities, but that would have to be investigated
separately. It is not obvious that ‘to take’ would be the chosen term
within an English speaking context; ‘having’, ‘fucking’ and ‘doing’ a
partner are alternatives to consider.54
It is not the lexical meaning of a word that is intriguing, but the use of
words in language (Erson 1990). Despite that, it is usually interesting to
see what the ‘certified’ interpretation is, through looking the term up in
reputable dictionaries. Norway has two official languages; bokmål
(labeled in different ways in English as bookish language, standard
Norwegian, Dano-Norwegian) and nynorsk (new Norwegian, modern
Norwegian). Related to my perspective the respective dictionaries
account for this verb in similar ways.55 In the dictionary for bokmål, the
sexual meaning of the verb take is given the following definition: take
control, gain by force, conquer. The example given is: «he took her, see
rape» (Bokmålsordboka 1986). In the dictionary for nynorsk the sexual
meaning is acknowledged in the following definitions: call somebody,
choose, fetch, capture, get power over, manage, win, conquer, demand,
use, enjoy. And we find the following specification in the area of
sexuality: «he took her several times», explained as having intercourse
with (Nynorskordboka 1991). Central to the meaning given in both
dictionaries is that this is a male-female activity and that the male part is
active in sexually taking. Whether the woman is active or not is left
unsaid. Those interpretations indicate that the sexual meaning of the
word implies subordination of the female.
As I said, dictionary definitions do not say much about how words are
used in current communication in the «real world». Indeed, a word may
be used quite differently, have additional meanings and in any case be in
a state of lexical transition. In this case, however, I will argue that the
dictionaries are rather in line with the common understanding of what
‘taking’ is in a sexual sense of the word. In terms of public policy,
Norway is a society where equality between women and men is a basic
54 Words mentioned by Tamsin Wilton, University of West of England, who was a
very helpful referee when an article about this issue was getting ready to be
published (Bolsø 2001).
55 In Webster’s Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language (1996)
the sexual significance of the verb to take is «to have sexual intercourse with» and in
the On-line copy of Encyclopeadia Britannica (08.04.99) it means, «to copulate
with».
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presupposition in many, perhaps most, areas of discussion.56 In
mainstream literature and public debate in Norway, whether hetero- or
homosexual, to use the sexual denotation of ‘to take’ would be
considered quite out of line, being a bit vulgar and provocative.
Unsurprisingly, I am left with pornography (in addition to the
dictionaries) when it comes to the concrete use of the verb in a
Norwegian context.
In a reading of two arbitrary issues of well-known Norwegian magazines
whose target audience is men, Aktuell Rapport (Topical Report) and
Gullrapport (Gold Report), I find the word ‘take’ used five times. An
interview contains two occurrences (Aktuell Rapport 10/95, p50, 51),
where it clearly means men’s penile penetration of a woman, and it is
taken for granted that the reader will know that. No details are presented.
The other three examples where somebody is ‘taken’ are to be found in
readers’ letters. The authors of these give detailed descriptions of the
penile penetration of women (Aktuell Rapport 10/95 p68, Gullrapport
5/95, p39, p41). In each story we are invited to identify with the man’s
orgasm. In these examples, the woman either does not reach orgasm or
does so solely from penetration.
Cupido is another Norwegian erotic/pornographic magazine, and aspires
to meet both men’s and women’s erotic interests. With its combination
of scientific and pornographic/erotic material, it has a certain appeal to
readers with higher education. In the latest to appear while this chapter
was being written, the verb ‘to take’ is used seven times (Cupido 4/99
ps46, 49, 50 (two times), 71, 74, 81). In six instances it is used to mean
men’s penile penetration of women, and, as in the ‘for-men-mostly’
magazines, the women climax from being penetrated or the focus is
merely upon the man’s orgasm. The sole variation on this pattern is
represented by a very young man, lying on his back saying; «Take me,
Susanne». This story is different from the others because of the
tenderness between the parties and the detailed presentation of the girl’s
orgasm, which is achieved by a combination of simultaneously being
touched and penetrated (Cupido 4/99, p71).
56 I do not say that Norway is better off than other countries when it comes to
discrimination or male violence against women. However, such discrimination runs
counter to state policy, and a policy for equality between the sexes is implemented in
important areas of the society, such as education, job security, child care, and
regional politics. And this is probably more the case in the Nordic countries than in
other parts of the Western world (von der Fehr, Jonasdottir, and Rosenbeck 1998).
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These magazines portray the women involved as wanting very much to
be taken. This is not necessarily a contradiction to the interpretation in
the dictionaries, where male power is an overt aspect. Neither the
dictionaries nor the present paper deal with questions about women’s
likes or dislikes in relation to male dominance in heterosexual conduct,
the question of women’s sexual submissiveness would be a complex
field of its own (Benjamin 1988, 1997, Califia and Sweeney 1996,
Nestle 1987, 1992, Snitow et al 1984). In pornography it is simple: here
women find sexual pleasure in male power (Hardy 1998).
There are good reasons to argue that there is a symbolic meaning
associated with the loss of control in being penetrated, and a
corresponding gain of control by the penetrator. Rape is the most
obvious example, but this symbolism seems equally to apply in non-
abusive situations. For example, the Norwegian anthropologist Annik
Prieur found, among gay men and male transvestites in New Mexico, a
distinct difference in prestige held by the men who would never let
themselves be penetrated and, on the other hand, the ones who would
(Prieur 1994). Another Norwegian sociologist might also be interpreted
in such a way, as she theorizes over women’s ‘open bodies’ as
symbolically open to invasion (Solheim 1998). The evidently powerful
‘connection between being penetrated and being feminized’ is also the
starting-point when the American literature critic Ann Cvetkovich tries
to redefine penetration through a ‘notion of active receptivity’
(Cvetkovich 1995, p129). The reader may find the discussion of the ’un-
touchable butch’ interesting in this connection (Kennedy and Davis
1993), and also the research on penetration in gay male subcultures
(Ying Ho and Tat Tsang, 2000).57 Such debates will influence how the
term ‘to take someone sexually’ is understood by members of European
and American cultures, not to say other cultures we know of.
From the Norwegian dictionaries and popular pornography, which are
the sources where I have found it, the concept ‘taking’ refers solely to
men’s penile penetration of women, and if one of the involved persons is
presented in a subordinate position, it will be a woman, whether she
likes it or not. The interview material is, of course, comparable to neither
Norwegian dictionaries nor pornography. The dictionaries, the
57 Some feminists draw the conclusion that women should refrain from heterosexual
penetration because it is doomed to be oppressive to women. These have proved to
be very productive political standpoints, but I cannot see that it offers much to the
analysis of desire, since the dilemmas related to power and pleasure are left
unrecognized. See Carol Smart’s discussion of the positions of feminists like Andrea
Dworkin and Sheila Jeffreys (Smart 1996).
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pornography, and the wider Norwegian culture as I understand it,
represent the term in a mainstream heterosexual sense, while narratives
given by my lesbian interviewees will represent a lesbian use. In the
pornography case the verb is used mostly in talking during sex, and in
the other instances it is the language about sex which is investigated.
Keith Harvey and Celia Shalom make a similar distinction between
language about desire and desire in language (Harvey and Shalom
1997). This means that there is a difference in analytical levels, thus a
methodological problem. It would have helped to make heterosexuals
talk about what they do sexually with each other, and see whether the
verb ‘to take’ turns up and with what meaning attached. In this project I
want, however, to focus on women and power issues, and in a more
general sense study women’s negotiation of power issues that have been
part of feminist critique. To try to get a grip on what the women are
doing, how they do it, and extract new understandings is the main aim. A
project will always have its limitations, and this is a project where I have
chosen to make no claims regarding an understanding of variations in
representations of heterosexuality. This is already accounted for in the
methodology chapter. I will now let the informants talk.
Lesbians who take and who are taken
This section will incorporate excerpts from the interviews where the
informants use the term ‘to take’. I must emphasize that I do not intend
to discuss my informants’ possible intentions in the sexual encounters in
question. That is, I do not discuss what the agents possibly have set out
to fulfill in the sexual meeting recorded. There are several possibilities,
some shortterm and some more longterm. The focus will be on what they
do when they are ‘taking’, related to how the term is constructed in a
heterosexual discourse as outlined above.
AR turned forty some years ago. As a young girl she became part of a
working class milieu of lesbians. She did not join the feminist or lesbian
political movement. She was familiar with the ‘old’ meeting-places, and
does not feel comfortable with the new arenas. This is what she says:
‘I have heard girls say that it is important to come simultaneously, but
that is spoiling sex for me. I would then have to concentrate on taking
the other person and at the same time that person is supposed to take me.
But of course, if we use 69 it happens that we come simultaneously, but
it is seldom, I would say’ (AR p11)
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‘I don’t masturbate together with anybody, no way. I have heard about
people who do, but I can’t see the point. I have heard friends
masturbating lying side by side. What is the point? Why couldn’t they
just take each other? ‘ (AR p12)
It becomes clear throughout the interview that AR’s preferred pattern of
lovemaking, in a technical sense, is orally or digitally making her
partners come. That, to her, is ‘taking’. As illustrated in the extract,
taking is equivalent, technically, to ‘giving’ another person an orgasm.
And, according to AR, to take and be taken can happen simultaneously.
But, as she considers this a bit too much to handle, one thing at the time
would be best.
GI is in her mid twenties, and an active participant in groups of young
gays and lesbians. GI is a student, now living with her third co-habitant,
J.
‘AB: Can you tell me about the last time when you had sex with J?
GI: Yes, I can. Or rather; the last time she had sex with me,
because she has her period. It was yesterday, or no, it was the day
before that. I had gone to bed and was reading. She came in too,
lay down and just started to kiss me. Then she went down on me
and wanted me.
AB: And you let her?
GI: Yes, I did.
AB: And then ... ?
GI: Well, I wanted her too, but I fully understand that she won’t
when she has her period. A painful stomach bothers her when she
has her period. She wouldn’t get as much out of it when she hurts
someplace. And that is fully understandable. But I’m not that keen
on being taken when I am not allowed to take her. Just taking her
can almost satisfy me.
A: By taking you mean…
GI: (interrupting) Well, having sex with her, then. ‘ (GI p9)
In this sequence GI is taken when her partner gives her an orgasm orally.
She wants to take her partner too, without being specific about what that
would actually mean. She is in any case not allowed because of her
partner’s period. GI as the taken one, reaches orgasm, while J who is the
taker does not. But as we see in the end: ‘take’ does not have the single
meaning of give orgasm to. To take can be understood as having sex with
somebody or, as we see at the beginning; to have sex with somebody who
does not necessarily have sex with you. This seems to be problematic. GI
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does not want to be selfish. She wants to receive by being taken by J, but
also to give by taking J.
ARR is a working class woman in her mid-thirties. She firstly came to
terms with her desire to be subordinate in sexual encounters, and
accepted some years later that she preferred female partners. ARR never
learned the heterosexual codes of flirtation, dating and the establishing of
relationships. She says that she feels totally unfamiliar with this subtle
level of communication also in a homosexual context and that the openly
negotiated agreements made in the s&m-milieu suit her perfectly. The
following sequence is part of a long story (3 pages, mainly ARR
talking). ARR reports from an s&m-party she attended. At one stage in
the course of events a heterosexual woman is ‘forced’ to masturbate her
with her hands and, as this lady knows where to touch, ARR has a
vigorous orgasm. This happens in one of the small adjacent rooms. As
part of the agreement her master leads her down the stairs and into the
main room, ARR hooded and with her hands tied behind her back.
‘ARR: I was totally helpless, it was all exciting. Then (we went)
upon the stage where this lady took me again. She wanted to be
forced to do it in public’ (AAR p22).
The un-known lady knows how to touch and gives ARR orgasms by
using her hands. Here, ‘taking’ is touching with hands. The taken party
reach orgasm, the taker does not as a taker at the actual point in the
story.
SJA is a middle-class woman in her mid-thirties and she loves to
dominate women sexually (and on request, also men) and has several
women with whom she regularly has sexual contact. Here, she is over to
have supper with one of her ‘regulars’ and sets up a scene on that
occasion. This is how she describes the closing of the session:
‘I then lowered her onto the floor, changed the cd-record, took off my clothes,
removed the gag, because she had a rubber-ball in her mouth, I sat down
astride her face and she started to lick. You’ll get a sexual kick when a
subservient «takes you» (SJA indicated quotation marks). After several
orgasms for her and me, ok, we could have supper’ (SJA p17).
SJA prefers to use quotation marks here. Something is obviously not
quite right about using the word ‘take’ for this situation. Compared to
my interpretation from a heterosexual context at least three aspects are
‘wrong’. Firstly, she as the dominant one is taken. Secondly, the one
who is taken is clearly also an active part in this, due to her direction of
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the scene and her orgasms to follow. Thirdly, no one is being penetrated
by this taking.
Discussion
It is fairly clear that the dictionaries presuppose an active male part and a
passive female part in the action of taking. Other interpretations are
possible, even if it is difficult to call up an image of an actively
participating woman according to the dictionary definitions. On the other
hand, the authors refrain from saying anything explicit about the
woman’s possible passivity. Most heterosexual women report that they
enjoy being taken in terms of enjoying penetration as part of a sexual
encounter (Hite 1980). One could say that merely enjoying penetration
implies being active, due to the bodily responses caused by this pleasure.
This will be the case for homosexual as well for heterosexual women.
What makes it further unproductive to advocate the binary opposition
between active (the taker) and passive (the taken) in my interview
material, is that the one who is taken reaches orgasm by it and that this is
the purpose of the act. To come in the sexual sense of the word implies
being physically and emotionally active (Masters and Johnson 1966).
There is another classic dichotomy in the realm of sexual activity that is
completely blurred in the examples from my interviews. This is the
dichotomy of taking versus giving. The ‘passive and taken’ is also active
in receiving, and the taker is at the same time a giver. This is a well
known perception of the role of the butch in the butch-femme dynamic,
as we know from historical material (Kennedy and Davis 1993, Lützen
1987). Joan Nestle is famous for her historical documentation of butch-
femme subcultures, not only by writing essays and articles. Her erotic
writing gives nerve through time and space to the butch-femme
attraction, as it does to the variations in this exchange.58 In the short
story The gift of Taking she portrays her joy in being taken by another
woman. Joan is digitally penetrated and brought to orgasm by the other
woman whose climax will come later as a result of oral stimulation. In
this short story, the distinction between giving and taking is erotically
significant at the same time as it is dissolved. In the narratives of my
informants, taking is giving in the sense that the taker pleasures the taken
with an orgasm.
58 In the short story A change of Life, a femme becomes a butch (at least for this one
relation) (Nestle 1987, p132). This is not typical for the literature about butches and
femmes. Typically, the roles are represented as more permanent.
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The one who is giving is also the one to be in control of the other one’s
orgasmic pleasure, that is; the giver has (taken) the power to give. One
could perhaps say that what we are talking about is productive control. I
have chosen not to relate this to the sociological or the even richer social
anthropological literature about ’the gift’, and the power on the behalf of
the giving part. Within sociology and social anthropology the focus is
on visible gifts, and the meaning attached is linked to the cultural and
social, distinctly different from a situation of intimacy and eroticity. A
materialized gift presupposes a giver and a receiver in a physical sense.
Giving the gift of sexual pleasure sometimes means first of all that the
giver is giving herself or himself a gift because it entails such an arousal
in the body of the giver. In other words, this is not a clear-cut act, even in
a physical sense. The Norwegian social anthropologist Marianne
Gullestad suggests that ’giving’ in some instances has the character of
’sharing’ (1997). This might have been a starting-point. One other reason
for not relating to the literature about ‘the gift’ is that in the case of a
concrete gift, ’taking’ is not an option at all because taking a gift makes
the gift no longer a gift. The focus for analysis is thereby gone. The
dynamics in giving and receiving concrete, visible gifts seem to be
qualitatively different from the dynamics of sexual service and erotic
exchange. For these reasons and others, it is not necessarily fruitful to
link my discussion to this strand of scientific literature.
I will argue that my informants’ use of the word ‘to take’ is also
connected to its erotic connotations. The cultural connotations of taking
are phallic. They indicate that sexual desire craves to be satisfied and
possesses the power to achieve satisfaction. By using it as my informants
do in a conversation about sex, desire becomes undeniable and intensity
is given to the narrative. And more than that, desire itself enters the
scene. This is not an imitation in accordance with a mainstream
heterosexual use of the term. Contemporary Norwegian heterosexuals
would probably have used the word differently and with other variations,
if they used it at all in a context of a dominant heterosexual discourse
marked by a political concern for equality. This would need to be
investigated separately. What is happening is that the lesbian use of
‘take’ operates to transfer sexual significance through language and in
the process ascribes new interpretations. The power aspect here lies not
in controlling the other person primarily to satisfy ones own needs, but in
controlling the situation with the purpose of sealing the partner’s
pleasure or, more concretely, to pleasure her with an orgasm.
Connotations of power from a heterosexual context are retained;
however, the sociality is different; power has taken a new form.
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A distinction can be made here between a level of doing and a level of
significance. On the level of doing, my informants break away from
what one could expect them to do according to heterosexual discourse.
The simplest suggestion is penetration with fingers or a dildo. On the
level of significance, an aspect of control is written into the story through
the taker’s control of the partner’s orgasm. It is also written in through
the symbolic marker of eroticity that in our culture is phallic, and in this
case connected to the distinction between having control and giving in to
the control that someone else is executing. One can say that power
relations are reinscribed. By this I mean that, when my informants use a
traditional heterosexual concept, heterosexuality is inscribed (some
would say imported, imitated). But this is not simply inscription. The
concept, with primary connotations of the conqueror’s gratification, is
given a different interpretation; the sexual gratification of ‘the taken’.
This is absolutely not to say that heterosexual practicing women and men
never practice penetrative activity with the gratification of the female
partner in focus. As I have said already, to investigate this has not been
my project. My analysis indicates both a reinscription of the heterosexual
hegemonic meaning of ‘to take’ and also the reworking of its meaning.
The concrete activity that the term is meant to cover in the interviews is
somewhat different from what I had expected. Perhaps if I had read the
language of lesbian erotic fiction more critically, I would not have been
surprised at all? What differences will we find between heterosexual
versus lesbian pornography and erotic writing regarding the use of the
term? I took a minor and rather arbitrary ‘dive’ into lesbian pornography
and erotic writing, by choosing from my own shelves texts that I thought
might contain the word. I came up with two stories from the magazine
On Our Backs, Helen Sandler’s Big Deal and Regine Sands’ Travels
with Diana Hunter.
In Toni Amato’s short-story published in the American magazine On
Our Backs, to take is to penetrate with a dildo, and the climax is a
penetration ‘for real’ (Amato 2000, p42), which is anal penetration. The
penetrator is the narrator. The short-story has s&m ingredients, and
exploits in every way possible the heterosexual power-potential which
the verb ‘to take’ happens to have. The dildo is a ‘he’ (p39), and the
penetrator herself wants to be ‘that girl’s back door man’ (p42). It is a
pretty rough encounter, and there is never any doubt that the taken is
going to get what she needs but has never previously experienced. The
taken girl climaxes from anal penetration, no other stimulation is needed
at that point. This is technically the same activity as in one of the stories
from heterosexual porn previously referred to (Gullrapport p41). In
another short-story in the same issue of On Our Backs, taking is
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penetration. However, it involves also other types of sexual stimulation,
oral as well as digital. Here the penetrated girl is the narrator, and the
technical aspects of bringing her to her orgasm are described in detail
(Nealon 2000). In neither of the stories does the penetrator reach
orgasm.
In Helen Sandler’s Big Deal (1999), recommended by the publisher to be
sold only to adults, ‘fucking’ is used innumerable times. According to
my count, ‘taking’ in terms of ‘taking someone’ is used four times; twice
about (gay) men penetrating a (lesbian) woman (p37, 40); and twice
when a woman penetrates another woman (p149, 209). I believe that it
was not Sandler’s intention to make a linguistic distinction here, but in
the case of the men taking the woman, the men’s orgasms are central and
the woman does not climax. In the cases of woman to woman taking,
both women in one case, and the taken in the other case reach orgasm.
In the reunion59 between Christina and Diana after ten years separation,
in the erotic novel Travels with Diana Hunter, both women are taken by
the other, in succession (Sands 1991). On the three first pages of this
fourteen-page encounter, ‘take’ is introduced as something mutual (‘to
take her, to be taken by her’, p162) and also as being a kind of sex that is
savage and rough. They do not care if their skin gets raw from the rocks
beneath them and whether they leave marks on each other’s body: ‘This
was not the time to care about such things. This was a time to take, to
have’ (p163). They want penetration: ‘Soon they would be inside of one
another’s rapacious bodies, soon. (...) They were approaching the fine
line between wanting to be inside of one another and needing to be.
Inside, deep inside’ (p164). Some pages later Christina says; ‘Let me
soothe you, lover, and get you ready to be taken’ (p168). And then Diana
is on her knees, with her head resting on her folded arms ‘poised for the
woman to take her’ (p171), which Christina does with her free hand. In
this novel the term works to eroticize the text, to make us understand the
desperate and consuming desire involved, an aim that is no different
from the heterosexual porn previously referred to. When it comes to
concrete action, taking means penetration, which is also not surprising.
One at a time, they reach orgasm by simultaneously being penetrated and
orally stimulated.
One similarity between those examples and the references to
heterosexual porn, is the penetration involved. But, lesbian penetration is
59 What Andrea Lewis, according to the back cover, calls ‘the fourteen-page
orgasmic finale’, that alone is worth the purchase price.
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executed with the help of non-orgasmic60 body parts or objects, and the
penetrator does not climax, or at least not only the penetrator. One other
difference is the centrality of the orgasm of the taken in the examples
from lesbian writing.61
The main difference between my interviews and the erotica of either
kind is that the orgasms provided by or for my informants are not
necessarily accompanied by penetration in the act of the ‘taking’. This
might be due to genre requirements in erotic writing; it seems that there
must be some penetration going on to arouse the reader, heterosexual or
not. This again bears witness to the phallocentrism of pornography and
erotic writing in our culture (Hardy 1998, Jeffreys 1990, Nagle 1997b).
The main similarity between lesbian porn/fiction and my interviews is
the orgasm that is given to a woman when she is being taken.
In the introduction to this chapter I asked why, how and what: why are
some lesbians using the term ‘to take’, how do they take and what does it
mean if it is not a plain imitation of heterosex? It is demonstrated, both
in my material and in lesbian porn, that a heterosexual connoted term
(here: ‘to take’) gives intensity to a narrative about lesbian sexual
practice. That is; phallic power is part of the presentation. However, it is
also shown that these lesbians do not just imitate in terms of using the
word as it is used in a hegemonic heterosexual discourse. They exploit
its erotic potential in a practice that has a sociality of its own.
Analytically I make a distinction between heterosexuality and
homosexuality, and here one might say that heterosexual discourse (the
practice and meaning of the verb ‘to take’) is also located inside lesbian
discourse. With Judith Butler, I call that ‘reinscription’ and ‘reworking’
of heterosexual discourse.
A comment is now appropriate as to how I have treated the question of
generalization in this chapter. As already mentioned, this is a challenge
that is met in a variety of ways in the four empirical chapters. Actually, it
is more correct to say five, since I discuss the ‘summary’ term ‘lesbian
specificity’ with regards to generalization also.
60 The term ‘non-orgasmic’ is derived from Cvetkovich 1995, p134.
61 An obvious and rather importunate difference in general between heterosexual and
lesbian erotic fiction, not only in the case of ‘taking’, is that the lesbians seem to
produce orgasms more faithful to the sexological and anatomical (‘scientific’)
knowledge about successful techniques for making women come. I guess that is a
sidetrack here, more appropriate for the debate of the educational aspects of
pornographic and erotic writing.
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On the basis of interviews and pornography I have highlighted a lesbian
practice of the verb ‘to take’. My interpretation is that the erotic meaning
of the verb in a heterosexual discourse is exploited by the women having
sex with other women, and at the same time the actual sexual behavior is
somewhat different from what one would have expected, given the
dominant heterosexual meaning of the word. Symbolic power is retained,
the social practice is noticeably different from heterosexual discourse as
pictured in dictionaries and pornography. I do not say that there are not
other linguistic practices regarding the word, or that this is the lesbian
practice, or that this is the Norwegian lesbian manner or a cross-cultural
manner. The potential for generalization is here embedded in the
treatment of heterosexual and lesbian discourse as interwoven. It is in the
analytical perspective and in the empirical demonstration of the
heterosexual inside the homosexual we should search for the general
result. I see this analytical case as an example of something general; in
some instances, heterosexual power domains are explicitly traceable
within a lesbian negotiation and reworking. As in this case, this is most
obvious in a symbolic sense, since the social aspect of power in the
lesbian case seems to differ considerably.
Let us return to the idea of seeing the power domains of a normative
heterosexuality as reinscribed, and lesbian specificity as established in
the modalities and effects of reinscription, that was referred to in the end
of the previous chapter as my analytical approach. This chapter contains
my interpretation of the mode of one such reinscription, namely in the
case of the heterosexually connoted term ‘to take someone’. I will
continue to analyze lesbian negotiations of power by the help of this
analytical approach in chapter 5, dealing with masculinity, and more
specifically the erotic meaning of masculinity. As in the case of taking, I
go on to seek out erotic significance of masculinity in a lesbian context.
Is masculinity traceable, and how is it negotiated?
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CHAPTER 5: MASCULINITY IN EROTIC PLAY
«I want to go to bed with you. And you know it». «I want that to.
Right now. What about a motel?» «Yes». «I’ll drive, you look»…
«Why did it take so long to think of this?» «Because we are both
used to having this initiative taken for us. I’ve never even been
physically aggressive before two nights ago. At least we learn
fast» (Katherine V. Forrest 1993, p113).
In the beginning of the 1970’s I became a young woman who ‘did it’
with young men. Many years later, I found that I also liked ‘to do it’ with
women. There were to me some striking differences between having sex
with men and women, and some of them have nourished my interest for
the function of masculinity in the erotic exchange between women. One
difference was that with a woman I could not always trust that we would
have sex when I wanted to. With young men, I typically was the one to
say yes or no to sex initiated by others. With women, I more actively had
to initiate, sometimes to persuade, to conquer, often not even knowing
whether she was used to engaging in sex with other women. It was a
considerable change in position and a challenge, and I must admit that
my sympathy with rejected men increased tremendously. In retrospect I
believe that what happened was that I had to learn one other approach to
flirting and initiating sex, an approach that are more typical of boys than
of girls. I had to start taking on the kind of responsibility that more men
than women do in negotiating the possibility of sexual exchange. To say
that I was adding a masculine edge to my femininity sounds apt to
describe what I found was needed (the term ‘masculine edge to
femininity’ is borrowed from Blackman and Perry 1990, p76). As time
went by, I came to appreciate women who socially, publicly, explicitly
signaled a sexual interest in women, and in my interviews I often heard
traces of the same story. Thus, in this chapter I ask, does it make sense to
treat those traces as significant? What are the manifestations and how
can we theoretically understand the presence of masculinity as an erotic
sign between lesbians? Or, to put the analytical approach in tandem with
that in the previous chapter: masculine sexual behavior is associated with
men. How do lesbians rework signs of masculinity in the realm of the
erotic?
This is previously thematized in the literature about the traditional
lesbian butch-femme constellation. The butch will signal sexual
competence and control, wear men’s clothes and have a masculine body
language. The femme contribute to the sexual exchange by appreciating
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that the butch take sexual responsibility, and by dressing and carrying
herself in such a way that perhaps only a butch can sense her as a woman
who takes sexual interest in other women and not in men. The butch-
femme couple is the lesbian relation that from the outside looks most
similar to the heterosexual couple. Butches were sometimes aggressive,
and did not talk much about emotions. They fought sometimes to protect
other women and their love relations with other women. Most often the
literature about butches and femmes is about subcultures in the USA
from the 1930’s until the late 1960’s or early 1970’s (Kennedy and
Davis 1993, Nestle 1987, 1992, Feinberg 1993).62 These women
exploited to their own advantage, gendered and erotic positions as they
were read and lived in that particular context and at that particular time
in history. Here I want to investigate the significance of masculinity in
erotic exchange between Norwegian lesbians by the end of the 1990’s,
more precisely, I want to find out if signs of masculinity are important,
and how. There are several empirical and theoretical approaches to the
question about masculinity in erotic exchange between women.
Theoretical and analytical approaches
The theoretical perspectives that are exploited in the theses I am
presenting are accounted for in Chapter 1: Sexuality - where inner and
outer worlds meet. I will just briefly point to those central elements from
the theoretical toolbox that are of special relevance in the present
chapter. First, however, I will refer to three other possible ways of
approaching my empirical questions.
One is what I will call androgyny and equality research. Lesbians are
here conceived of as having more freedom than heterosexual women, in
relation to exposing the masculine sides of their personalities. Or we
might find that the nexus of cause and effect is the opposite way around;
that is, exposing masculinity contributes to their lesbianism. No matter
which way round this is viewed, lesbians are read as more masculine
than heterosexual women. Since they are not less feminine, the
conclusion often is that there are proportionally more androgynous
women among lesbians. Related to this is the research that shows that
lesbian couples, more than gay male and heterosexual couples, search for
and achieve equality in the division of duties and pleasures in the
relationship. This research is for example accounted for in books written
62 Bera Ulstein Moseng wrote (1992) her master’s thesis in sociology about butch-
femme couples in Oslo in the 1950’s and 60’s. The thesis is subject to proviso, and I
have not been granted access to it.
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by the American psychotherapist Beverly Burch (1993, 1997). A
Norwegian standard reference is Anbjørg Ohnstad’s master’s thesis from
1984. Such studies are interesting and much needed, and are referred to
at several points in my work. The studies of more or less masculine and
feminine, more and less equality do not, in my opinion, offer a promising
theoretical starting point for an empirical investigation of erotic play
between women. In my case, this has little to offer when the erotic
significance of masculinity is in focus.
Another theoretical perspective, entailing another empirical approach, is
to understand signs of masculinity as a mimesis of heterosexuality. This
would be to perceive heterosexuality as the real and original. Women,
who, with an erotic purpose towards other women, make use of signs of
masculinity, could in this perspective only be pathetic, ridiculous and
laughable, in every manner an incomplete and inadequate copy of a man.
In my opinion, this ignores the manifold nature of human sexual
expressions and the documentation of it through history. Let us take as
an example Marlene Dietrich kissing another woman in the movie
Morocco.63 I do not think there are many who will state that Marlene
Dietrich is pathetic or comic in this movie. She is by most people,
regardless of individual sexual structuring, the seductress. The cigarette
and the tuxedo were not common for women at the time, and Dietrich
performed these signs of manliness in such a way that most viewers
understand that this is a woman who still wants to be understood as a
woman. The same goes for Joan Nestle when after many years as a
femme she meets a woman who needs her to be butch for her. Nestle
complies:
’My own body wants to be known only in the giving. I want to
come on top of her, moving my hips on her body, moving, moving
until I grow large and wet and then explode on her, my wetness
pouring out on her thighs, her belly, her cunt hair. I keep my pants
on, go barechested. I know I am trying to feel like something other
than the woman I usually am.(...) Let me be butch for you; I have
been femme for so long. I know what your body is calling for. I
know when I turn to you before the sun has broken through the
morning sky I will find you wet and open, as if you had been
waiting for a lover in a dream. And so it is. (...) I will be deep
inside of you before the sun hits the building tops, and by the time
it is glinting off the water towers, I will have brought you to your
63 Josef von Sternberg, USA, 1930
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pleasure. Then I will give you back your sleep again’ (Nestle
1987, p132).
To take the responsibility as a butch is here presented as something
Nestle seriously proceeds to take up in the state of sexual desire and
need. Few would deny the connection between this terminology and
erotic terminology that plays into cultural differences between women
and men. On the other hand, the dynamic is recognized as their own by
the two women. Nestle can feel a longing in her own body to ‘be known
only in the giving’, and she very strongly believes that she knows what
her partner’s body ‘is calling for’. The dynamic is portrayed in an
internal way, and seems to convey individual desire and pleasure.
Neither Dietrich nor Nestle wants to be seen as men.64 It seems
unreasonable for these reasons to read the above as copying.
A possible third theoretical approach is related to a historical dimension.
In the quotation from Nestle we can see several touches of manliness
(‘manliness’ in the sense of attributes that are associated with men more
than with women). She keeps her pants on when the other is undressed,
she wants to ‘come on top’ and to be ‘deep inside’ and she controls the
sleep of her female partner. One possibility is to analyze differences in
expressions of masculinity in the material I have from Norway by the
end of the 1990’s, with what we find in the descriptive literature that
presents the butch-femme dynamic within lesbian subcultures in USA
1930-1970. This might of course also be done as a comparative project
in a Norwegian context. In which ways have signs of eroticism changed,
and how is it linked to the relations between men and women in society?
It would have been a project that probably could have provided new
aspects not only on the development of lesbian subcultures through
changing times, but also on historically corresponding heterosexual
gender. This challenge goes to the historians, since I in my project want
to focus on the meaning of masculine-connoted expressions in eroticism
between women in a contemporary context. If I find that I can say that
masculine erotic signaling is important, how will I express its meaning?
The theoretical perspectives that resonate most with my previous
knowledge connect interpretation of culture with interpretation of
psychic processes.
64 In her last book to date, Nestle is more open to a perception that some of the
previous butches actually wanted to be men (1998). That Nestle herself did not
recognize or publicly admit this earlier, is explained by the fear of having both her
writing and the butch women dismissed (p112). As I interpret it, this was a
concession to lesbian political correctness and dominant lesbian discourse she felt
compelled to give at the time.
URN:NBN:no-2116
103
Heteronormativity and phallus as the major signifier
As shown in chapter 1 where I clarify my understanding of ‘sexuality’, I
understand the phallus as being the main signifier of sexual desire, in
public as well as in private fantasies, in the part of the world I come
from. Several decades of critique of phallocentrism have not changed
this as far as I can see. Competing symbolization is yet not defined and
refined enough, such that I could use it, which is also the main reason
why Freud is given a place in this text. Phallocentrism is essential in a
symbolic sense to my conception of the term ‘heteronormativity’. The
dominant position of heterosexual discourses makes it impossible to
escape from the influence of phallic signification (even when that is
understood as partly possible also). This will cause the presence of
phallic symbolism in lesbian sexual exchange, as already indicated in the
previous chapter about ‘to take’. In the present chapter, this point is
taken a bit further. Here it implies investigating the position of the major
symbol of heterosexual desire, which is the phallus as I understand it,
and its representation through signs of masculinity.
I have referred to Teresa de Lauretis and deployed masculinity as one
among several possible lesbian fetishes. I have also argued that one
might see the phallus as it is accounted for in psychoanalysis, as
transferable, plastic and possible to possess by women (cf Judith Butler).
In other words, phallus is not for men only. This fact contributes to an
understanding of lesbian sexuality as phallic, however, yet phallic in a
way that is detached from paternal law (de Lauretis’ ‘non-paternal
phallus’).
I have been ambivalent about whether to write this chapter or not. I hear
the critical voices of those who mean that lesbian sexuality has little or
nothing to do with penises or phalluses, that it is about loving women
and appreciating the female body. I also hear those who say that the
phallus is a term from psychoanalysis, and that a sociologist is not
trained to handle its meaning and representations, which obviously is
right. There are some very strong voices, not at least within heterosexual,
feminist academia, that state that the phallus is largely irrelevant to their
own heterosexual practices. It would be twice as meaningless to use the
phallus as part of an approach for the study of lesbian sexuality. Yet, I
have found no way around it, since signs of masculinity speaks so loud
in my material, and no scholarship has offered me analytical tools that
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represent a relevant and usable alternative. However, I will come back to
alternative symbolization in the epilogue.
The most central term in the empirical analysis is ‘masculinity’. I could
also have used the term ‘manliness’. I do not understand these concepts
as natural features, stable and unchanging. I perceive ‘masculinity’ as
culturally, bodily and psychologically negotiated in the process of
becoming readable men and women within the contexts where
individuals are located and act. According to Heidi Eng (2000) the term
‘masculinity’ is too often used to describe the continuous process of
becoming a man. Since men are not men in one specific manner, one has
developed the plural form ‘masculinities’ as an analytical term, which
does not solve the problem. There is a rich body of academic literature
discussing ‘masculinity’ and ‘masculinities’.65 Signs of masculinity will
here mean body language, clothing and behavior we usually connect
with boys and men in general. Of course this is an oversimplification,
and more important, it is in terms of definition, it plays into an
understanding of masculinity as something men do. Paradoxically then, I
investigate how women put masculinity into play. I do not look for
theoretical or empirical solutions to this dilemma in my project.
According to Eng (2000), Jeff Hearn suggests giving up the term in favor
of a more descriptive language. I choose the pragmatic solution indicated
above, and the main reason is that I in my analysis need ‘masculinity’ for
its symbolic erotic value. I will elaborate on this choice below.
Norway is a country where girls have had a tremendously increased
access to previous male expressions and professions. Nevertheless in
most cases we can be quite certain who are anatomical men and women
by traditional standards, by the way people dress, cut their hair, put on
their make-up, talk, move, etc. (There are crucial exceptions, of course).
It does not mean that all women look alike or that all men look alike. It
does mean, however, that for most women and men it is important to
make an appearance as a ‘reasonable example of the kind’ (Haavind
1998, p253). This also means that codes might be broken, and lesbians
have some sexually significant practices and appreciations in this
respect. I will let one of my informants try to explain what she means by
a notion of lesbian masculinity that is attractive to her. Language is a
trap here. She does not like to use the words masculine and feminine, but
it is hard to find other words.
65 Eng (2000) refers for instance to scholars like Bob Conell, Jeff Hearn and Patricia
Martin in her focus on how masculinity may be seen as available positions also for
women.
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GG: ‘You’ll have to talk about masculine and feminine, but you
must do it in another way. These words might carry a different
charge than in everyday life.
AB: ‘Everyday life, do you mean in a heterosexual ...
GG: (interrupts) ‘yes, world, in language and stuff. These words
might carry a different charge among lesbians. When you say
masculine, you don’t mean masculine, you mean more tough.
Lesbian radiance.
AB: ‘What you say about lesbian radiance ...
GG: (interrupts) ‘You want me to describe what that is?’
AB: ‘Yes’
GG: It is, like, ’it’, in a way. I have never become interested in a
hetero-girl, because they don’t have that radiance. That you are a
girl, and are interested in other girls’ (GG p14).
GG is talking about something that is masculine but not masculine, and
that to her is erotic. I am going to use my material to investigate what
this might be about, and I organize the empirical analysis around four
issues: dressing up to look attractive for other women, sexual
aggressiveness, what is recognized as being erotic about other women,
and finally; how does it sound when this masculinity that is not
masculine is not an issue in a conscious sense.
Dressing up for the night out
JC (24 years of age) is walking down the street on a summer day,
dressed as she usually prefers to be dressed, in jeans and a tight t-shirt.
She carries a backpack and her hair is cut very short. She meets two
boys, slightly younger than herself.:
‘They said as I was passing them: «Macho-Babe». I thought that
was a nifty66 term. I liked to be called that. That was a gigantic
compliment to me’ (JC p12).
We do not know how the comment was meant from the boys’ position,
and we do not know how it would have worked in relation to a young
girl wanting to be sexual attractive to young men. But JC likes being
labeled with a term that combines the extremely masculine with the
extremely feminine. This was not a confirmation from the gay and
66
‘stilig’ in Norwegian
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lesbian community. It was in a public area, and most likely came from
heterosexual young men. It was act of categorizing from outside the
‘scene’ where she goes to meet women for a possible relationship. I
asked her how she would dress if the intention were to get sexual
attention from other women. She says that she would have worn what
she usually wears, which we just saw activated the label ‘Macho-Babe’
from young men casually passing her on the street. In addition she would
have put on some make up (discretely) and a good perfume.
Another informant, CC, is in her middle thirties. A turbulent and
unfulfilling relationship is finally over; it is spring, Saturday night and
she wants to use her newly achieved freedom to get some pleasure out of
life:
CC: ‘That was when CC went out to pick up someone!67 And it
was in a very «jeans-and-boots-kind-of-way». It was wonderful. I
was in my apartment, drinking one beer after the other, feeling that
life was enjoyable. I didn’t call one single soul, I wanted to be all
by myself. I was not going to go home alone, that was my single
goal. I won’t hide the fact that sex was on my mind. I didn’t do
much, I danced and flirted a lot. (...) It was wonderful to sit in the
bar together with the other ‘hustlers’.68 I felt it was great’ (CC p8).
To me CC evokes the association of the stereotypical lonely hunter. In
jeans and boots, alone with her beer, having only one mission to
accomplish, one sole goal; to get a woman into her bed. She does not
commit socially to anyone. She wants to feel free to sit in the bar, in
control. CC feels good. This is overwhelmingly wonderful. She enjoys a
feeling of freedom she has not felt in a while. Indeed, this is also a
celebration of perhaps getting sex without romance and further
commitment. This issue is focused in chapter 6 about prostitution that
follows next. CC is lucky and finds a woman to spend the night with,
and perhaps she would not have told the story if it had a different
outcome. The lonely, slightly intoxicated hunter, sitting in the bar,
apparently in control, but actually having very little, may very fast
become pathetic. Both CC and I knew that. A lonely-hunter-story had to
be successful.
Some might object that CC does what also a heterosexual woman can do
in Norway at the end of the twentieth century, on a Saturday evening in
67 In Norwegian: ‘Da dro CC på sjekkern’.
68 In Norwegian: ‘sammen med de andre sjekkerne’
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May. This is both true and not true. Both the lesbian on the gay scene
and the heterosexual woman on a straight scene would be vulnerable,
facing the possibility of failure. However, the heterosexual woman
would have to take into consideration an issue that the lesbian simply
could ignore.
It is stated in court, time and time again, that single women who go to a
bar to pick up a man for the night are the authors of their own fate. It is
like asking for harassment and even rape. Not only adult women, but
also very young women are supposed to know that it can be very
dangerous to signal sexual interest in a public place. That CC chooses a
traditional masculine strategy and does it as a lesbian in a disco for gays
and lesbians, is crucial in terms of how to interpret her story. Dress codes
within the lesbian s&m scene can illustrate the fact that erotic strategy
must be read in context. Here a woman who is bare-breasted or only
partially clothed from the waist up, is most likely a ‘top’ (Blackman and
Perry 1990). That is; a woman in control. That would probably not have
been the case for a bare-breasted woman in a heterosexual bar.
In my analytic perspective, CC puts into play the lesbian phallus. She
utilizes masculinity for erotic purposes (Butler) or more Lauretisian: she
exploits the position masculinity has as a fetish for many lesbians. The
continuation of the story is that CC leaves her barstool, dances and flirts
without inhibition until a somewhat younger woman (‘with the kind of
shameless arrogance I seem to like’ (CC p9) comes up to her with
serious plans for the night. In bed, it is the younger woman who really
takes control, which might be seen as another story ('butch in the streets,
femme in the sheets’), but may also be understood in the light of Butler’s
theory about phallus and transferability.
Blackman and Perry (1990) discuss what they call Lesbian Fashion in an
article in Feminist Review. It is an interesting read for those who more
broadly take an interest in this issue. However, the authors make some
observations of importance to my argument here. They contrast Lesbian
Fashion of the 1990’s with what they call ‘revolutionary lesbian style in
the 1970’s’, which, according to them, was ‘flat shoes, baggy trousers,
unshaven legs and faces bare of makeup’ that would ‘reject those aspects
of woman’s fashion that signal the oppressive hierarchy of
heterosexuality’ (Blackman and Perry 1990, p68). Lesbians of the 1990’s
tend to take different routes:
‘Using the feminine to attract women rather than men, these
lesbians flirt with the symbols of heterosexuality, constantly
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changing their meaning within the context of a lesbian subculture’
(Blackman and Perry 1990, p69).
‘...to subvert her heterosexual femininity she may be cool with
men, she may have a severely short haircut and wear aftershave’
(p76).
‘I like that hard edge with my femininity. I will wear aftershave
because it gives that subtle indicator of my lesbianism. I also like
the clean-cut tailored look, which has the atmosphere of men’s
clothes’ (p76).
This is very similar to how I understand JC’s perception of her own
strategy for getting the sexual attention of other women. She is a ‘babe’,
a female, but there is more; she is a ‘macho-babe’. Basically, this is
about identifying as a woman, and at the same time creating a visible
sexual difference, or, as some would prefer to say, an erotic difference
between oneself and other women. The difference has to be recognizable
as erotic in a cultural context, to imply the erotic dynamic that these
women are in for. Flirting with symbols of heterosexuality, a woman
wearing aftershave, adding a hard edge to femininity, are notions used in
the exerpts from Blackman and Perry’s article, while from my interviews
it is boots, beer, and macho. I interpret this as an exploitation of the
erotic significance of masculinity. As will be demonstrated and
discussed later, it works (cf ‘What do I notice’ later in this chapter). Let
me first investigate another traditionally male-connoted feature, namely
active persuasion and aggressiveness in (the making of) sexual qonquest.
I have given the next paragraph the heading ‘sexual aggressiveness’, and
want to underline that unwanted sexual attention is not an issue here.
What I discuss is the aggressiveness that may be a part of the erotic
dynamic between adult, consenting and equal partners. In the first case to
be presented, the arousal of one, becomes the turn on for the other.
Sexual aggressiveness
KPK is in a long-term relationship with GG, and they agree that GG is
more frequently ready for sex than KPK is. As KPK puts it: ‘She could
have sex every day, and gladly several times a day, but for me it is very
much by fits and starts’ (KPK p7). As a result, KPK is the one who
rejects GG’s initiatives. However, sometimes, as they both proudly tells
me, GG is the one who rejects KPK. This is a turn on for KPK, who is
inclined to think: ‘”So, now, you don’t want to? I’ll make you want”
URN:NBN:no-2116
109
More like that. Not always, but sometimes. And I usually get it the way I
want to’ (KPK p7). It is part of the dynamics between the two that GG
will respond to this with sexual arousal.
AB: ‘Have you ever rejected her’?
GG: ‘Yes! (with obvious pride, my comment) But that is
something that arouses her, that I reject her. And then, I’ll be
game, because that arouses me. I’m turned on by seeing her
getting turned on’ (GG p12).
And from that point, GG wants KPK to say controlling things to her,
take her to wherever in the apartment KPK has decided the sexual
encounter is to take place, and also dominate her in other ways, until it is
time for GG herself to take more active control. KPK’s sexual arousal
and a following sexual aggressiveness from her, is for them the first
phase in a mutual sexual exchange.
GI and J are a couple, in their early twenties. While KPK and GG very
explicitly say that they are fascinated by s&m, this was not an issue in
the interviews with GI and J. And yet, sexual aggressiveness is
sometimes an element in the initiating of a sexual encounter between
them. Here is an excerpt from my conversation with GI, where she is
mentioning aggressive aspects of sexuality and also the effect on herself.
AB: If you want to do something extra to make her want you,
what will you usually do?
GI: I think I’d just show her. It would be more kind of assault and
the like. Usually, if I want her to want me, it is because I want her.
You’ll really go in for it, more intensely.
AB: By action?
GI: Yes, by action. Yes.
AB: Is that a turn on for her?
GI: It seems like it. And I am also like that: if she explicitly shows
me that she is turned on, that will turn me on too.
AB: That is the best thing to do for her…
GI: (interrupting) Yes, that is to show me that she wants me.
Simple as that.
AB: And how does she do that the best, shows you?
GI: That she is very direct. I like to hear it. She can just say that ‘I
want you’, or ‘I’m horny’ and simply do a shove-you-down-onto-
the-bed-kind-of-thing (GI p12).
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In both these cases the aggressiveness and the arousal of the one is used
to initiate a sexual encounter, that during the course of the event is a
positive mutual exchange. I do not say that this is always the case, that
sexual abuse never is part of lesbian relations. It obviously sometimes is
(Scherzer 1998). However, my point here is that sexual aggressiveness
most often is perceived as part of men’s sexual configuration rather than
that of women. In my interpretation of the cases just referred, sexual
aggressiveness is utilized as an ignition mechanism, and an opener for
sexual exchange between women. Yet, not necessarily a continuous part
of the dynamic of the encounter, as it proceeds.
I have shown that ‘a touch of masculinity’ is part of some of my
informants’ preparations for a night out. When I listen to what my
informants notice about the women they meet and get attracted to, it is
not strange at all; for all of them it is about women’s bodies, and for
most of them it is about women’s bodies that carry signs of toughness,
self-esteem, boyishness etc. I do not have material that is broadly
representative of Norwegian lesbians. Others would have to quantify this
as typical or not in a more general sense. I will again underline that in
my analytical perspective this is not about who is more or less masculine
or feminine, or who on a scale from 1 to 10 is more butch or more
femme. It is about a ‘masculine edge’ to femininity, a toughness to the
female body, that is picked up as being attractive for lesbians. Or to put
it another way: a masculine touch that the one can see in the other and
vice versa.
What do I notice?
Recall CC sitting in the bar, in the ‘jeans-and-boots-kind-of-way’. When
she later in the interview is asked what she noticed about one woman she
immediately found attractive in another kind of situation, she answers:
‘It was the type - she was elegant. …ordinary clothes, blouse, open, thin
blouse, a nice feminine pair of trousers, but very boyish…I don’t want
macho, but elegance’ (CC p12). And this from GG:
‘ She looked strong. And she had a well-trained body…long,
blonde hair, but it was not like (she mimes with a thin, high voice)
long, blond hair, …tough, however feminine’ (GG p3).
GG’s partner KPK, usually feels attracted to more feminine girls. But,
not typically feminine:
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‘I much more like the mix of tough and nice, like, masculine-
feminine mix. Girls that I would fall for are more feminine than
me, but not to an extent that it gets too apparent. But they are
different from me’ (KPK p4).
BA likes women’s bodies, they are the most beautiful. And she likes
women with plenty of backbone, but they must at the same time show
emotions, not be the rock-hard type. BA refers to a woman we both
know of, and she says that this woman is attractive to her. I ask BA how
she sees this woman as different from herself. I get this answer:
‘She is stronger in what she means about herself, where she
stands. And she has been open for a long time, and it is easier to
be in the community. I am more insecure, and I’m sure she has
had several partners, at least I think so. She has been together with
X, that’s for sure, and now she is dating someone else’ (BA p5).
BA herself, has cut her previously long, blond and curly hair short, and
her friends from her hometown say that she looks more masculine than
before. GI feels attracted to women with big thighs and asses. She was
young when that first happened and the other woman was her teacher. I
asked GI what it was that she wanted to do to her teacher. GI says:
‘It was, like, being naked together with her. Do you understand? I
remember I dreamt about it once, too. It had much to do with her
curves, her breasts, thighs, ass, belly, and things like that. I don’t
know, I just wanted to wallow in it. Do you understand? It was not
sexual, actually, even though it was that’ (GI p5).
However, it was the same GI who, waiting for the green light, spotted
the young woman on the opposite side of the street, also waiting for the
walk sign. GI fell in love there, with this boyish (GI’s term) young
woman, with short hair, dungaree-shorts and a tank-top, who ‘looked
purposeful. She knew where she was heading’. She went across the street
on the green light, ‘while I kept standing there, trembling’ (GI p3). GI’s
partner is fascinated, as GI is, with women’s bodies, thighs, asses and
breasts. When I asked her to tell me about the last time she knew that she
was sizing up a woman, she said it was the day before, a female police
officer on the street:
‘I don’t need to look much at her face when it is police women.
Then I will look at the curves in uniform’ (J p13).
URN:NBN:no-2116
112
I could provide more examples from the interview material, but I am
sure this is enough to illustrate my initial point, that many lesbians seem
to feel attracted to femaleness that has a touch of masculinity. From a
somewhat different realm, this is also a central point in Tone Kvenild’s
analysis of lesbians as receptors of film. Heroines most often have
something tough to them (1997). As a contrast I will demonstrate what it
sounds like when the sense of masculine signs is rejected, at least on a
verbal level.
When masculinity does not communicate
WR and NK are a conscious equality-oriented couple who have lived
together for quite some years. Masculinity apparently has not much
appeal. In separate interviews, they were both openly against erotic play
around a masculine-feminine distinction in terms of the butch-femme
dyad. They were both against the use of dildos for penetration, NK
because it does not look like fun, WR because then:
‘you might as well have dated a man. To me, to use a phallic
symbol in a lesbian relationship is far out. I won’t have it. I can’t
even imagine it. Regarding butch-femme, if you take that relation,
when I see a butch-femme couple, to me they are very special.
Even if I think it is ok to draw on masculine sides of myself,
regarding how I dress, how I move ... To make a role-play around
it, no, that’s far out’ (WR p14).
WR states that neither she nor her partner is distinctively feminine, but
on the other hand they are not distinctively masculine either: ‘I’m some
place in the middle, I guess’. This is to see masculinity as something of
which you can possess different quantities, not as something that women
might have that works for them or does something with them and for
them in terms of sexual desire. Or, at least, this is not what she is
expressing here. The couple are consistently maintained that they never
played with roles:
‘We don’t have it. I’ve never heard that she wants that, either. In
bed I want to be myself’ (NK p10).
WR tells me what she usually would do, if she wanted to get NK into
bed for sex.
URN:NBN:no-2116
113
‘I would have turned off the TV. Then I would have suggested that
we go to bed early and I would have said: «I want to have sex with
you. I want that very much, do you?» And if she said that she
wouldn’t consider this, I would get very disappointed’ (WR p15).
End of story, according to WR. She would be disappointed, but probably
not push the matter any further by resorting to sexual aggressiveness,
talking, or touching to try to get what she wanted. And that makes sense:
WR wanted no signs of the phallus to bring erotic significance into her
lesbian relationship. And that was how she differentiated from the other
informants referred to earlier in this paragraph, who were aware of and
appreciated, what I would call, the masculine or phallic aspect of their
sexual attraction to other women.
The starting-point for my analysis was an interest in the meaning of
masculine-connoted signs for some contemporary Norwegian lesbians. I
asked if and how masculinity can be seen as being important in a sexual
exchange between women. I have found that masculine signs are
significant, indeed. Some lesbians both recognize and appreciate
masculine, phallic aspects of lesbian desire and practices of desire. I
have argued that this is not an aspect or consequence of a sexual
dynamic between two androgynous personalities. My interpretation is
based on the erotic significance of masculinity in the dominant
heterosexual culture. As I previously have argued theoretically, no one is
unaffected by this in the process of becoming a sexual person. Here I
have demonstrated that lesbians relate to the phallic erotic by putting it
into play for their own purposes. The ‘reworking’ is here linked, not to
the inversion of taking to giving as in the ‘take’-chapter, but to the
flexibility in the use of masculine signals. Masculinity can be operative
on both sides of the exchange; it is transferable.
Discussion
In one respect, the question of generalization is here handled in the same
manner as in the previous chapter: the potential for generalization is
embedded in the way one analyzes the interwovenness of heterosexual
and lesbian discourse. I have demonstrated how the major signifier for
desire in our culture, masculinity (or the phallus, if you like) is exploited
in the erotic exchange between women. A symbolic aspect of
heterosexual discourse, what is recognizable as sexually potent, is
pointed to as operative in lesbian discourse as well. However, there is an
extra layer to the general statement: the question of the eroticism of
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masculinity has been important in the lesbian subcultures we know of in
the Western world over the past century. Eroticism is most easily
mediated through masculinity, through the phallic. My analysis is
different from most, as I see it as erotically significant and at the same
time transferable, flexible and exchangeable. Yet, the phenomenon in
itself is not new.
The documentation of masculinity (and femininity) as being central to
the practices and debates within lesbian subcultures is overwhelming. As
already mentioned with reference to Burch and Ohnstad, it is often
treated as an identity question; are you a butch or a femme? On a scale
from 1 to 10 how masculine are you? On a scale from 1 to 10 how
androgynous are you? Why are we talking about this anyway? (for
further illustration see among others, Loulan 1990, Weston 1996). I have
here analyzed masculinity with reference to its erotic significance, which
was also an important aspect of the butch-femme cultures between the
1930’s and 1970’s. I will elaborate a bit on this historical connection,
even if this was dismissed as an analytical approach in the outset of this
chapter.
That which communicates socially as phallic erotic signals, is culturally
dependent and historically changeable (Rosenberg 2000). From Nestle,
Davis and Kennedy, Feinberg, and Lord among others, we have
information about the USA from the 1930’s up until the 1970’s. There,
at that time, one could distinguish between the butches and the femmes
with the naked eye, as was also probably the case in Norway at the same
period. Among my informants there are no longer such distinctive ways
of dressing and behaving, and the terms ‘butch’ and ‘femme’ are not
even known in most instances. Those signs and signals that we have seen
as communicators between some Norwegian women at the end of the
1990’s may be the athletic body, a tank top, boots, short hair, knowing
where you are heading,69 being sexually experienced - some are similar,
some are new. It is an important point here that lesbian erotic play is
related to a broader heterosexually gendered historical context. It is my
opinion that culturally hegemonic heterosexual gender relations will be
recognizable within lesbian subcultures, and that lesbians relate to and
rework:
• what heterosexual gender ‘looks like’ (fashion, body norms),
69 I do not mean that women in general do not know where they are heading. It is
when this is interpreted by my informant as a difference between herself and the
other that it starts to work for her in an erotic sense in this particular situation.
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• how heterosexual gender is lived and negotiated (related to for
instance the labor market, welfare state issues, the debates about
equality between women and men),
• how the erotic is reflected in public fantasies about ‘she’ and ‘he’
One well-documented and particularly descriptive example on how this
exchange between hetero and homo works, is the fact that the butch-
femme couple disappeared from the lesbian scene with the feminist
movement in the 1970’s. Again, the documentation is in North American
and also British literature, but there is no reason to believe that
Norwegian lesbian history is different in this respect. We have
disappointingly little documentation though. The butch-femme couple
could not survive the feminist critique of heterosexual sex-roles. Also,
sexual practices that involved penetration of some sort became
politically incorrect in certain lesbian circles, as penetration was seen as
part of the power that men executed over women (Stein 1993, 1997). I
have argued that the lesbian use of masculinity is transferable and
exchangeable, it floats between the partners. With hindsight, the 1970’s
seem to have been a period of lesbian history where this was an even
more crucial question than now, and the pain and personal costs are well
documented in the works already mentioned. One read that is
particularly informative on this issue is Leslie Feinberg’s Stone Butch
Blues (1993).
The exchangeability of phallic symbolic power in heterosexual
encounters has to be investigated in particular. I would expect that an
investigation among heterosexual informants in the ‘general’ population
would show that there is an extra agenda; the man and the woman will
still need to see each other within available discourses of masculinities
and femininities. Sexual identity is at stake in this case (which is not the
same as to say that it is impossible to more or less break out of these
discourses). However, it is also well known that some lesbians object to
giving over phallic power to their lovers. This is not merely a
phenomenon from past times. This will be discussed to some extent in
the next chapter.
The analytical approach has worked satisfactorily for this empirical
analysis and also in the previous chapter about ’to take’; Lesbians
rework heterosexuality in a symbolic sense; heterosexuality is inside
homosexuality. In the next chapter, chapter 6 about prostitution, I also
use this approach; however, less explicitly. Among other things, since
commercial sex between women is a rare phenomenon compared to
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transactions in which men are buyers, it occasions some reflections about
the discursive fields to which female customers are opposed.
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CHAPTER 6: HIRE A WOMAN! WHAT WOMAN WOULD?
When the protagonist in Robbi Sommers’ short-story ‘Marie’ finds the
personal ad; Escorts. Women for Women. Discrete, she is hesitant:
‘Hire a woman? I laughed at the absurdity. Hire a woman? What
woman would! And yet, I couldn’t seem to pull my focus from
those five unembellished words. What harm in calling the number,
just to see, just to have a feel for how these things work? Not that I
would ever consider, not that I would have an interest ...’
(Sommers 1997, p20)
One of my informants, OP, told me that sometimes, many years ago, she
and a girlfriend would meet women at a cafe downtown and go with
them to these women’s homes and have sex with them. For this they
sometimes received gifts or money. Some years later she had a
relationship with a woman who paid her so well that she needed no other
job than being with her. The Norwegian literature about the sex industry
has almost nothing about women as customers, let alone women
servicing other women. OP and her ‘customers’ are obviously not a
common representation of female sexual practice. They might be seen as
the exception that proves the rule: usually, women do not buy sex. At the
same time, OP’s story represents a promising analytical potential for
discussing power and sexuality. That was the reason that this chapter
came to be written at all.
The chapter is thematically divided into two parts:
• Discursive fields within a heterosexual culture that makes the female
customer fairly impossible or invisible. Why did OP’s story surprise
me? I discuss three separate but overlapping discursive fields; ‘the
customer’, ‘sex and romance’, ‘decent women’
• Features of lesbian commercial exchange. A classical feminist
evaluation of commercial sex directs the focal points for the analysis,
and power differences and psychic health will be discussed. Some of
us are used to looking for power imbalance in commercial heterosex,
and easily find it. What happens with the power imbalance when only
women are involved? Does the sociality revolve around the same
issues? How are these issues reworked?
Commercial sex is represented by just one case in my interview material.
I base the analysis on additional sources to a large extent; narratives that
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are already published about the issue, a Swedish discussion list for
lesbians,70 and previous research.
Why is commercial sex between women hard to conceive of?
Or; why did OP’s story surprise me? It might of course be that I had not
been culturally observant enough, but I believe it is far more relevant to
search in the variety of discourses and linguistic binaries that operate in
the understanding of men and women regarding sexuality in our culture.
Let us start with the historically visible male customer.
Research and public debate: the customer is a man
On the streets, in the hotels and brothels, in film, literature and in the
public debate, men are the customers of the industry. Women are not
present other than as providers of sexual services.71 Female clients on
the more or less open and known sex market are rare. A comprehensive
and voluminous Swedish study of prostitution from 1981 does not
elaborate on the question since ‘it has very limited scope in Sweden’
(Borg et al 1981, p52, my translation). This is supposedly also the reason
why the major study on Norwegian prostitution is about male-female and
male-male transactions. The female prostitutes in the study confirm that
female customers are infrequent and the male prostitutes do not once
mention female customers (Høigård and Finstad 1986).72 There is one
example where a lesbian couple mentions that a rich lesbian ‘lavished’
100,000 Nkr on them during a short but apparently wild stay in
Copenhagen (p138). Female clients are not mentioned in a major Finnish
70 The participants on this list have in every instance given their permission for me to
use their statements.
71 John Irving is an author who often challenges taboos in the area of sexuality. In an
interview about his book A Widow for One Year from 1998 he says that there is a
huge gender bias in how it is conceived to have a ‘sexual past’. It enhances a man’s
image, but a woman should rather keep quiet about it (John Irving with Harvey
Ginsberg on the publisher’s web-side, November 1st, 1999). In Irving’s book a
woman’s visit to a prostitute is described through Ruth Cole, who is obsessed of
writing about it in a novel. A woman is visiting a prostitute together with her young,
male lover. The purpose is not to be gratified in the encounter herself, but to arouse
the young man sufficiently so that he will sleep with her afterwards, of which he has
been reluctant. That is; in this case the woman is only a client indirectly through a
man’s desire. Later in the interview he says that he does not disapprove of prostitutes
or the men who go to them (my Italics).
72 The chapter about boys as prostitutes, which was part of the Norwegian original
edition from 1986, is not in the English edition from 1992.
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study (Järvinen 1993). There are no female customers in a Norwegian
study of customers in prostitution (Prieur and Taksdal 1989). This is a
feature of Scandinavian studies as well as studies from other regions.
Male lovers who are kept by women on a long-term basis have
traditionally never understood themselves to be prostitutes, according to
the Norwegian historian Nils Johan Ringdal. That would have been a
threat to their masculine ego. Historically, only men with male clients
have identified as being ‘whores’ (1997, p462). Probably this implies
that the women’s status as ‘customers’ is equally rejected. This has
changed. There is a small group of Western women who have become
used to detached and rational sex, and that makes it easier to buy the
service, still, according to Ringdal.
‘Female demands for casual sex with men is almost exclusively a
phenomenon among women in leading positions in the corporate
sector, politics and management, and is to be found only among
women who also in other significant respects have taken over what
has been the more traditional man’s role’ (Ringdal 1997, p463, my
translation).
Ringdal states that a lesbian demand for sexual services is seen as so
politically incorrect, that the mediation has to be extremely discrete.
Referring to the unions of prostitutes, he says that for this aspect of the
trade, it is impossible to catch, analyze or give numbers concerning such
a demand (p463). He does not thematize why it would be more incorrect
among lesbians than among the heterosexual women in leading positions
mentioned above. That it probably is politically problematic in lesbian
subcultures is confirmed by a debate on a Swedish lesbian discussion list
on the Internet. Andrea was very lonely. She was so lonely that she
would have become a customer in commercial sex, had prostitution not
been degrading for the prostitute. She is very ashamed that she even
thought of it:
‘I was more naive back then, you know. But, even to think about it
makes me feel ashamed. I feel that I have dirtied myself. I did not
have that thought very often, twice at most, and it was only the
thought, but I still feel somewhat ashamed about it. It is indeed
strange ... You do understand that it was a woman that I wanted to
pay for ... I just say ... what the hell’ (Andrea, Lesbiske Listan,
April 2nd, 2001 my translation from Swedish).
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Chantal understands Andrea and writes the same day:
‘One’s own human worth is degraded just by thinking about it. If
one has seen the conditions prostitutes are offered, one will
probably not want to be enrolled in that world or economically
contribute to its maintenance’ (Chantal, Lesbiske Listan, April 2nd,
2001, my translation from Swedish).
These are the only two out of a large number of active participants on the
list who have something they want to say in this discussion. If there are
other political positions among the participants, they do not air them.
Another important aspect of Andrea and Chantal’s contributions is that
they, even when they find prostitution degrading and shameful, also
perceive it as tempting (Andrea), or that quick sex without emotional
commitment ought to be an opportunity for women as well as it is for
men (Chantal, as will be shown later). I will return to this point at the
end of the chapter.
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, women opposed
prostitution because it was immoral and a threat to the family. The
feminist campaigns in Europe and USA attacked double standard and
male vice (Agerholdt 1937, Vogt 1991, Walkowitz 1996). The feminist
critique from the 1970’s and still valid in mainstream feminism, focuses
on power relations between men and women in the arena of sexuality.
Here prostitution means women servicing men, with women in the
position of (powerless) dependency and their sexual needs unrecognized.
Women are exploited as objects for men’s sexual gratification, a
gratification gained without any considerations towards the physical and
emotional needs on behalf of women. Or as the Norwegian researchers
Prieur and Taksdal put it: ‘Prostitution is one of several expressions,
where many men’s problems in terms of empathy and mutuality is
exposed’ (1989, p256, my translation). The classic feminist critique of
prostitution understands the heterosexual sex trade as a reflection of the
gendered power relations in society (Finstad and Høigård 1983, Jeffreys
1990). In a study of Finnish prostitution Margaretha Järvinen gives a
more detailed account for different approaches under the label ‘A
Feminist View’ (Järvinen 1993, p22). Several recent studies do not draw
the same political conclusions, especially regarding women as victims.
Social interactionist and constructionist perspectives within feminist
studies advocate variation, prostitution as work and therefore worker’s
rights, the shady landscape between paid and unpaid sexual service, the
sociality and historical constructedness of concepts such as prostitute,
whore and hooker, and the question of identity and professionalism. We
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are asked to rethink prostitution. New perspectives notwithstanding,
some things have not changed. The customers are men, the sex workers
are women, some of them have bad living conditions and they are all
constantly protecting themselves against becoming emotionally
wounded, especially when it comes to their own sexual feelings (Jennes
1993, Järvinen 1993, McKeganey and Barnard 1996, Scambler and
Scambler 1997, Skilbrei 1998). I will return to this in the analysis of my
case interview.
In contrast to a picture of men who are able to seek sexual satisfaction in
a transaction without emotional love, even when it is recognized that the
prostitute in many cases has a poor life, we find the romance-seeking
women. Men as customers in prostitution fit neatly into a distinction
between technical sexuality and sexuality with loving emotions, where
the women are associated with the latter. This is a most productive
distinction in comedy production (key-words: the man who always wants
sex, the unfaithful man and the angry wife, the man who wants to bed
the blonde even if she has no brains). It serves as an often-used
distinction in research.
Sex as technique versus sex as love and romance
A couple of years ago, I could read in my local newspaper reports from
the summer holiday of two separate couples, one heterosexual and one
lesbian. Both couples had recently come home from a trip to the southern
parts of Europe. The heterosexual couple had been a bit unlucky,
because he had met two buddies on the flight to Greece from Norway.
He and his buddies started to drink and celebrate and their party lasted
the whole week. It had been raining and she had been in their hotel room
most of the time. She was even without a sheet on her bed at one
occasion, because he was attending a Toga-party with his friends. The
lesbian couple however, had been enjoying their Greek island and each
other to the core for two weeks. They loved to lie pitching in the water’s
edge together and to walk on the beach looking for small stones with the
shape of a heart (Adresseavisen, July 12, 1999). If the journalist had
interviewed other couples or asked other questions, she would perhaps
have got another story to tell about men, women and vacation, or at least
she could have brought some nuance to the picture. When I nevertheless
find this feature interesting (and amusing) it is because it reflects some
standard research findings about gender, relating, and romance.
Women’s sexual interest is perceived as being more deeply rooted in
love and romance than men’s. The difference between women and men
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regarding the capability for having sex without emotional involvement,
is repeatedly demonstrated in surveys (Blumstein and Schwarz 1983,
Hite 1980, Kinsey 1948, Træen 1995, Townsend 1998). The British
sociologist Anthony Giddens observes major changes especially in
women’s orientation towards sex and love during the recent decades, due
to increased equality between the sexes. He draws the picture of a
possible ‘pure relationship’, where romantic love and the demand of both
men and women for a fulfilling sexual relationship is integrated. This is
now to a large extent achieved outside marriage, and without the
marriage as a stabilizing institution for maintenance of the relation. He is
uncertain where this will lead, and says that ‘nobody knows if sexual
relationships will become a wasteland of impermanent liaisons, marked
by emotional antipathy as much as by love, and scarred by violence’
(Giddens 1992, p196). I agree that there has been an increase in
women’s expectations for a fulfilling sexual life during the last 30 years,
and that this will have an impact on how, when and where young women
settle in long-term relationships. However, the changes (or the
‘transformation’ as Giddens calls it) should not be overstated.
Research on the sexual practice and expectations of young persons in
Western cultures, confirms that sexual relating between men and women
is ‘business as usual’ in some important senses of the term. This is
obvious in Bente Træen’s study of Norwegian adolescents, where young
men are more willing to go for a quick thrill without further emotional
involvement than are young women (Træen 1995). Lynn Segal (1994)
and Stevi Jackson (1999) refer to similar studies from other countries. In
the anthology Romance Revisited it is thoroughly demonstrated and
discussed in nineteen contributions how, for feminists and others,
romance still exists, even if in contemporary culture, ‘its ‘scripts’ are
being radically challenged, fractured and transformed’ (Pearce and Stacy
1995, p10). In her discussion of the topic in the same book, Stevi
Jackson argues that some of the recent studies that claim that the changes
are profound over-estimate the changes. Including the work of Anthony
Giddens, she states that they are predicting the future on the basis of
current trends regarding sexual morality. According to her, more sex
without emotional involvement does not automatically mean that
romance has lost its grip on our culture, and that the grip still is
gendered. She finds no evidence that women’s romantic ambitions have
declined, or that they are met to a larger extent: ‘Given the lack of
evidence that women’s demands are currently being met, claims that a
more egalitarian form of love is emerging seems absurdly over-
optimistic and willfully neglectful of the continued patriarchal
structuring of heterosexuality (Jackson 1995, p59). In their article Can
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men love? based on interviews with long-term heterosexual couples, Jean
Duncombe and Dennis Marsden demonstrate the complicated gendered
emotionality surrounding different attitudes to the romantic (Duncombe
and Marsden 1995).
The negotiation of the discourse of romantic sex and love has a
particular agenda among sex workers. In the two main Norwegian
studies, most of the sex workers define themselves as heterosexual, but
there are also lesbians. The heterosexual women are very clear that there
is no romance in the transaction that takes place between them and the
customer. They have also exposed men, and consider themselves to be
less naive than other women when it comes to what one can expect from
men. On the other hand, and paradoxically, it is very important for them
to protect themselves against the feeling of serving a customer when they
are having sex with male lovers and husbands (Høigård and Finstad
1992, Skilbrei 1998). One measure could be to work less and avoid
penetration in periods when they are having male partners outside
prostitution. Skilbrei goes on:
‘The girls distinguish between clients and lovers by introducing
bodily limits. The client may not kiss them or brush their hair
because they conceive this to be too romantic. They also avoid the
clients’ touching of their genitalia, for among other reasons,
preventing their own sexual arousal. A majority of the women I
interviewed said that they must never like to have sex with
customers, and that they do not want to like it either. Alex once
executed “French” on a customer she liked and that made her sick.
Suzy said: “Some are just too decent to go here, and so I loose my
professional attitude, which is not proper”. By blocking out
enjoyment when they are having sex with customers, they make
impersonal something they otherwise see as very close and
intimate. Together with boyfriends it might be difficult to turn off
this impersonality’ (Skilbrei 1998, p68, my translation).
Like most people, these prostitutes want to experience the romantic
aspect of sex. Perhaps it is easier to change attitude from customer to
lover if you are a lesbian having male clients and a female lover? This is
what Høigård and Finstad suggest (1992), and this may be the reason
why lesbians do not take on female customers (Høigård and Finstad
1992, Skilbrei by e-mail, October 15, 1999). I note that neither
heterosexual nor lesbian prostitutes expect men to defend the distinction
between sex and romance. It is quite the opposite; they will know men as
pitiful creatures that are willing to pay for an illusion. At the same time,
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heterosexual prostitutes want everlasting romantic relations with men. It
is obvious that this dilemma must be hard to handle, and as will later be
shown, some of them search for love within the commercial sex market.
The main point here is not whether women are more romantic than men
are in being sexual intimate. What I want to highlight is the fact that the
public debate goes steadily on, and from time to time at an extremely
high temperature. Men’s supposedly technical approach versus women’s
supposedly more romantic approach to sex and relating is still a hot issue
and more importantly: the binary comparison still sets the agenda for
public debate, in research and for negotiations within heterosexual
couples. Some examples: inequality and power differences are often
central in Nordic research on heterosexual couples (Moxnes 1981,
Haavind 1982, Nordisk Ministerråd 1990, Holmberg 1993). Usually,
Nordic feminist studies do not draw the direct line between power issues
of daily life and sexual expectations, as sexologists sometimes do
(Dallos and Dallos 1997). In the public debate, however, the fulcrum is
often equality, inequality and differences between men and women when
it comes to sex and romantic love. It is obviously a central issue in the
books written by young women in Sweden and Norway, Fittstim and
Råtekst respectively - putting feminism on the public agenda once again
(Solheim and Vaagland 1999, Skugge et al 1999). As a comment, two
Norwegian men wrote a boys’ guide, where it is confirmed that men
most of the time simply are thinking of football, booze and pussy, and
that this is quite natural (Bjelke and Friis 1999).
There is no room for money transfer in the discourse of heterosexual
romantic love.73 The integration of sex and love is dependent on the
73 Sex might be considered as work in at least two ways. First, work as the energy
involved by individuals to keep up sexual interest and live up to their ideas about
what sex might and should be. That would be my understanding of the concept as
Jean Duncombe and Dennise Marsden use it in the article Whose orgasm is this
anyway? (Duncombe and Marsden 1996). Here they use the term to contain the work
heterosexual longterm couples do ‘to bring their sexual feelings more into line with
how they suspect sex “ought to be” experienced‘ (p 220), ‘to try to attain or simulate
– for themselves and/or their partners- a sexual fulfillment they would not feel
“spontaneously”’ (p 221), ‘to simulate desire and suppress distaste’ (p 224). Second,
sex work can mean the energy put into one specific sexual encounter to achieve
sexual gratification for one person or more involved. (This is not to claim that
everyone who performs sex work is a sex worker, as little as someone who cooks is a
cook). In the second meaning of the word, sex work can be paid or unpaid work. The
term ‘payment’ can carry a meaning beyond being supported by money or gifts. The
reward might be the feeling of loving somebody and being loved, a baby, social
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relation to a significant other person who is object for one’s loving
emotions as well as one’s sexual desire. A friend or a casual sex-worker
cannot replace him or her. The integration of sex and love is
fundamentally a relational matter; there are some things that most people
in the Western world would say are not available in exchange for money,
and this integrated phenomenon is indeed one of them. It is too simple to
say that women in general are most central to the maintenance of the
discourse of heterosexual romantic love, even if they more explicitly
than men socially ‘confess’ to it. Men and women carry the burden as a
joint project, but from different positions (Jackson 1999). Resting in the
shades of romantic love, are the several possibilities of failing. As a
woman you make a big mistake if you get the reputation of being
‘loose’. A young man will not marry a loose woman. Well, Richard
Greer married Julia Roberts in the American movie Pretty Woman. But,
Julia was different. She was a hooker at the time he met her, but she was
intelligent, had academic ambitions, was the one who tried to keep up
the standards in the apartment she shared with another hooker, she knew
more than him about the technical details of Richard’s car etc. They did
not meet as client and customer. Richard was lost, and asked Julia for
directions. Most important; when Richard in the final scene rides in on
his white horse to pick her up and bring her with him, she has quit street
life, and is on her way to college. Jorun Solheim asks whether sexual
accessibility is what modernity ultimately implies for women (Solheim
1998). That is a good question. However, women probably still have a
purification process to deal with to get ready for marriage. At least Julia
Roberts did.
The distinction between decent and loose plays an important role in the
fascination many people had for this film, where Julia luckily is saved
from indecency and the poor life she otherwise could expect in the
future. I claim that there is still a distinction between decent and loose
women, even if the morality of sex has changed profoundly in recent
decades. Of course, hookers are loose women. However, a woman
paying for sex work executed on her body by another woman, risks
being interpreted as loose too. At least, she fails regarding the script of
romantic love.
security and domestic peace, a reduction of the fear of being frigid or impotent,
avoidance of the accusation for being uptight etc. This makes it difficult to draw the
line between prostitution and sex as it some times is performed, for example in
marriage (Delphy and Leonard 1992), among young and unmarried people
(Rasmussen 1984) and also as we will see; in my material (in the chapter Usually, I
will start with her).
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Decent versus loose women
One might object to this, arguing that by the turn of the millennium we
no longer seriously could talk about decent or loose women.74 It is
obvious that the concrete meaning of the terms are changing. There is no
longer, in the West, specified guidelines for how young women should
dress, behave and all together perform their gender, or that they are not
free to have casual sex. Nowadays it is subtler, but women in Norway
still know when they do sex wrong, or they will have a vague feeling that
something is not right. The latter is what Anne Britt Flemmen calls
experiences with ‘spaces in between’ (Flemmen 1999). The final place
for judgment is the courtroom, where her short skirt, her tipsiness and
inviting attitude, contribute to minimum penalty for what also the jury
understands was not consensual sex. August 21, 1999, one could read in
Adresseavisen that four Scandinavian boys (aged 16-18) had been levied
mild penalties (fines) for gross indecency against a sixteen-year-old
Swedish girl. The abuse was committed in Greece, and the Norwegian
boys involved had a Norwegian speaking lawyer in addition to the Greek
one. The Norwegian lawyer declared to the newspaper that ‘I suppose
the judge has emphasized that the boys on trial were ordinary, decent and
with sensible plans for the future. A suspended sentence would have
been very destructive to them’. Furthermore, he explained the position of
the Greek lawyer: ‘He underlined that the Swedish girl herself initiated
what happened in the hotel room. In so far as this was an abuse, it
happened because the boys did not catch signals from the girl, indicating
that they were going too far’ (my translation). The message is clear; as a
woman one might get abused, and in the beginning one played along,
and one should know that it is difficult to enforce one’s stop signal. The
court will understand that boys and men often have difficulties in reading
signals. This girl has learned the hard way that she should administer her
sexual initiatives more carefully.
Most women learn the lesson outside the courtroom, in their everyday
arenas. ‘As many women have discovered, the balance is subtle; not too
prudish, but not too vulgar either’ (Frøberg and Sørensen 1992, p30, my
translation). Frøberg and Sørensen did their study at different working
places. Karin Widerberg, discusses the challenges for women when they
want to combine academic ambitions with sexual activity, and at the
same time having to handle the balance between too much and too little.
Widerberg describes how the binary whore versus Madonna is put into
74 Other binaries with a similar meaning are whore versus Madonna and bad girls
versus good girls.
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play in her own strivings. She says; ‘The difference between me, and the
boys, later the men, is that I to a less extent - than I conceive as true of
men – allow myself to follow my desires. The picture of the whore is far
too threatening for that’ (Widerberg 1995, p68, my translation). The
picture of the whore is also central in Anne Rasmussen’s work, where
young women have to handle ‘the reputation’ (Rasmussen 1984). Bente
Træen uses the term ‘social stigmatization’ as a risk for girls but not for
boys (Træen 1995, p95). Harriet Bjerrum-Nielsen confirms that young
Norwegian women (interviews executed in Oslo, 1991/92), still have a
reputation to protect. The young girls are aware of, and annoyed at, the
different standards by which the above-avarage-sexually-active young
men and women are estimated (Bjerrum-Nielsen, informal conversation,
October 1999). This is also confirmed in the books written by young
Scandinavian women, mentioned above (Solheim and Vaagland 1999,
Skugge et al 199), and is also central in literature from other Western
countries (Holland et al 1996).
The risk of being understood as a loose girl is a hindrance for demanding
that the boy use a condom during casual sex. A nice girl would not bring
condoms to a party (Langeggen 1996). Actually, in some groups of
adolescents, nice girls and nice boys do not have sex the first night if
they have serious intentions. According to Langeggen’s study from
meeting places in Oslo, first-night sex between a young man and a young
woman might destroy the possibilities of establishing a lasting
relationship. With reference to Broch-Due and Ødegård (1994) and
Sørensen (1992), Langeggen reflects upon the importance of the whore-
Madonna dichotomy. She argues that neither the young woman nor the
young man wants to start a relationship with a semi-intimate encounter,
both parts understanding the affair as being ‘cheap’. The responsibility
for avoiding this lies especially with the women (Langeggen 1996).75
Heterosexual practice between young people the first night they meet
seems to have the potential for producing a ‘loose’ woman. In Skilbrei’s
study of prostitution in massage studios, some prostitutes started regular
relationships with clients (1998). These tended not to work, according to
the informants, because of the circumstances under which the
participants met. The decent-loose binary is still alive and kicking.
75 One might expect that in an arrangement where two women meet, there would be
not only one but also two persons seeing this as her special responsibility. That is not
the case in my material. The women I interviewed were not concerned about
avoiding sex the first night. The question of chastity probably carries a different
charge in lesbian relations compared to heterosexual relations.
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I have tried to illustrate why woman-to-woman sex sales are difficult to
conceive of in our culture, and also that the woman-to-woman sex sale
implies a break with certain discourses in the field of sexuality. The
woman who sells sex is obviously a loose woman. But is she a loose
woman when she sells sex to another woman? The woman who buys
services from another woman is hardly understood as being decent. She
actively seeks sexual gratification through paid service, and a decent
woman would not dismiss the romantic aspect of sex. Is the decent-loose
distinction only working in a heterosexual context? And here I have
come to the main point to be made in this section: we operate with a
distinction between decent and loose, but within that perspective there is
no room for the relation where one woman is selling sexual services to
the other. In the commercial heterosexual sex market, the client is not
‘loose’. He might be a lecher and he might be understood as unfaithful to
another woman, but a fallen man he is not. The ultimate indecent woman
is a whore. One can say that a woman buying sex will be culturally
understood as a whore as much as a customer, and the client-whore
distinction also breaks down, since we could say that here we have two
whores.
However, the sexually technically oriented person, who pays for sexual
gratification, is sometimes a woman. Very briefly and under the heading
‘Female customers in the market designed for men’, I will illustrate the
struggle some women have, related to the customer-discourse and
discourses of romance. The analytical focus will however, be to
investigate the question of power in lesbian prostitution, and relate this a
feminist critique. How are the classical power issues negotiated in
lesbian prostitution? This is the general issue in the last part of the
chapter.
From Nils Johan Ringdal’s (1997) world history of prostitution, we saw
that if one is a woman who wishes to buy another woman’s sexual
services, one would probably be very discrete. Now, what can one do? It
is always possible to start with the most visible part of the sex market,
the market designed for heterosexual men. The discussion is based on
material from a North American context, but there is no reason to believe
that the European market for sex sales is different for lesbian customers.
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Female customers in the market designed for men
Veronica Monét emphasizes the emotional dilemma in the narration
from her visit to a brothel in Nevada, as a customer.76 Monèt was herself
working in the sex industry in San Francisco at the time. After having
paid $400 for herself and her husband, and after being thoroughly
sexually gratified following one hour with a prostitute who ‘like me and
all the other whores I know, is very good at what she does’, she states:
‘Yes, working in the sex industry is different from being a
customer. I couldn’t believe how involved in the fantasy I became
as a customer. I felt affection for the woman I spent an hour with,
even though I knew it was just business for her. I felt that I was
special, and I had a hard time accepting that we were just another
appointment to her’ (Monét 1997, p169).
Jane Goldman, a lesbian also visiting a brothel in Nevada, shares the
same difficulty about accepting to be ‘another appointment’. She and her
friend Sue, a butch-looking lesbian, try as much as three different
brothels. In the end of their ‘tour’ Jane returns to the first brothel where
she some days earlier she had paid for Renee’s sexual services. Once
more Jane buys time with Renee.
‘Renee and I went to her room. Embarrassing as it was, I knew
what I wanted. I wanted to talk. She stripped – out of habit, I guess
– and I found out all about her, about her kids, her ex-husband, her
work. I suppose I wanted to establish some kind of relationship, to
retroactively make sense of the sex we had had. Looks like I may
be a lesbian after all’ (Goldman 1998, p27).77
Both Jane Goldman and Veronica Monét were apparently capable of co-
creating a fantasy according to which they could act, or more
specifically, manage to climax, in the brothels of Nevada. However, it
was not simple. They had to defeat an inclination to connect sex and
romance. It is also clear that neither of them believe that they are special
or that this means something sexually for the sex-worker. Perhaps the
fantasies and scripts of the heterosexual prostitution market are more
accessible to women than to men. It is women’s supposed femaleness
76 In some counties of Nevada prostitution is legal.
77 To Goldman a lesbian is a woman who wants to have a kind of relationship with
the woman she is having sex with. Probably she is here referring to a political
correctness that is part of many lesbian subcultures. Or is she referring to the
romantic discourse and woman’s inclination to romance as well?
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that is repeated, and it is not very venturesome to suggest that it is more
likely women than men who reveal the game.
Vicky Funari illustrates this when she describes her first encounter with
a peepshow stage:78
‘The sign outside advertises “naked, naughty, nasty, live girls” at
25 cents for each half-minute. Some months ago I put a quarter in
a slot, visiting a friend who works here. The first time I looked
into the stage, I had to laugh. It’s an absurd vision: contemporary
women, some clearly marked with the tattoos and piercings of
radical urban feminism, here moving with indifference through
predetermined “sexual” maneuvers. Their shaven heads/purple
streaks/crew cuts are hidden by obligatory long hair, Cher/Dolly
Parton/Cleopatra-style. Their feet, which outside carry these
bodies through art making, law school, mothering, and other hard
labors, here balance on spike heels for four-hour to six-hour shifts.
Behind their heavy makeup their eyes are dull with boredom. It’s
unmistakable: these ladies punch a time clock’ (Funary 1997, p20)
Funary elaborates her feminist ideas about predetermination and the
‘plugging (of) her body into a predetermined slot’ (p25), as do one other
sex worker, Eva Pendleton:
‘Much of what sex workers do can be described in terms of
mimetic play, an overt assumption of the feminine role in order to
exploit it. When sex workers perform femininity, we purposefully
engage in an endless repetition of heteronormative gender codes
for economic gain.’ (Pendleton 1997, p79).
These examples and considerations make it unlikely that a woman would
search for sexual gratification in the traditional heterosexual market for
commercial sex.79 If a lesbian or a bi-sexual woman nevertheless should
try to buy sex from another woman, she would probably experience it
hard to get on the traditional heterosexual sex market.80 Neither the
78 A peepshow is often organized as follows: The customer (most likely a man)
enters a booth, places money in a machine, a window covering lifts and makes the
customer able to see (and probably masturbate to the sight of) one or several women
dancing. There is no physical contact between the dancers and the customers.
79 Pornography is an exception (Lumby 1997).
80 The only events that are advertised in public would probably be parties and other
events thrown by organizers in s&m milieus, and the very few establishments
designed for women. Of the latter I know only one worldwide.
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heterosexual prostitutes nor the lesbian prostitutes seem to want her as a
customer.81 Among the prostitutes in the central areas of Norway’s
capitol, Oslo, there are women who identify as lesbians, as it is in other
parts of the world (see for instance Feinberg, 1993). In the major study
of prostitution in Oslo, 8 out of 26 interviewed are lesbians. The rate is
assumed to be lower in general, according to the authors due to the
weaknesses in the method of snowballing (Høigård and Finstad 1992,
p73). None of the eight lesbians in that study ever take on women as
customers. This is part of a whole set of defense mechanisms, as we have
already seen. In the anthology Whores and Other Feminists edited by Jill
Nagel (1997), referred to above, Veronica Monét tells her story about the
obstacles when she went together with her husband from San Francisco
up to Nevada to visit a brothel she had heard about in her adolescence.
Her birthday wish was to experience the brothel as a customer. She
complains about the reception she received as a woman. Firstly, women
were not allowed in alone, but had to be in company of a male.
Secondly, she was not allowed to go into the bar to ‘pick from the
lineup’. Thirdly, some of the prostitutes were very hostile toward her.
(Monét 1997, p168). The hostility towards female customers is also
reflected in Vicky Funari’s contribution in the same anthology (Funari
1997, p28), and Stacy Reed has yet another demonstration of the
rejection of women without male accompaniment, which she finds
undemocratic (Reed 1997).82
We can see how romantic expectations, revelation of the heterosexual
script and the expectation from the market that the customer is a man,
are major stumbling blocks for women. After this, it is not surprising that
in the one case in my material where a lesbian is selling sexual services
to other women, the arrangements are made outside the conventional sex
market.
One woman selling sexual services
In the interview with OP she mentioned an episode where an upper-class
woman surprised her with her sexual requests. In that connection OP
also mentioned that other women with good manners had been generous.
Later in the interview we were talking about being sexually dominated.
81 Except some of ‘the feminist whores’ who see themselves as sex educators also for
women (Queen C. 1997)
82 In an informal discussion on e-mail October 15, 1999, May-Len Skilbrei stated
that there were no reasons to believe that there was any overlapping in Oslo between
the market for heterosexual prostitution and transactions between women.
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Again she reflected on a relationship in which she had been paid for sex.
OP obviously considered these as relations along the road, not
qualitatively different from the others, or perhaps to some degree, but;
the money involved was not the most important feature at the time. Now,
let us listen to OP.
For about one year in 1968-1969 OP and a friend used to connect with
upper-class women in a coffee shop down town. OP was nineteen years
old and new in the lesbian community. After having eaten and drunk at
the ladies’ expense, they went to these women’s homes in the best part
of town to have sex. Occasionally she was given money or presents.
AB: ‘How was that sex to you?’
OP: ‘It didn’t give me anything, but I felt that I was hell of a girl. I
was so self-confident, that it could make you sick’
AB: ‘You just pleasured these ladies?’
OP: ‘Yes’
:
OP: ‘The ladies would be drinking wine. I suppose they had to, to
feel the courage. However, we (OP and her friend, my comment)
were reckless’.
:
AB: ‘The women paid the bill at the coffee shop, you said. Did
they put money in your pockets as well?’
OP: ‘That would happen now and then, and they bought us stuff’.
AB: ‘Did you see the same persons more than once?’
OP: ‘Yes, that would happen. Then I got a girlfriend on a more
regular basis. And that was the end of it’ (OP 4).
At my request she gives an example. It was one of the first times, and
she was very nervous.
OP: ’I was nervous. It was one of the first times. Alone (without
her friend, my comment), I was not that uppish. There was a lot of
talking and she drank. And I talked wildly, because actually I
didn’t want this. You know, curtains down and so on. And we
went to bed. She wanted me to have oral sex with her. A stranger,
it was not exactly what… not to strangers. But I wanted to try, so
we went to take a shower. I thought it might be easier after a
shower, and there we had a very pleasant time. She wanted a lot of
things. She wanted me to talk dirty to her. Fantasies. What I did to
other people. Of all I told her, I hadn’t done half of it. ( ... ) She
came and I did not. She didn’t touch me. I didn’t want that’ (OP 5)
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This first experiences in sex trade is presented as kicks she had as a
young lesbian, socially shared with a friend, both new to the lesbian
community. Eventually OP established more permanent relations with
women, and quit trading sex. In a second period, however, she dated a
woman who held an advantageous position in terms of social status. She
earned a considerable amount of money and gave OP material benefits
such as money, the right to use her car and house. OP defined it as a
relationship, as she was telling me about it as an example of a relation
where she was not admitted to be dominant in bed. The other woman
wanted to be the boss on all scores. OP had to be ‘totally girl, you know.
I was supposed to just be lying on my back’ (OP p8). The other woman
was on top, climaxing by rubbing her body against OP’s. OP would
usually not enjoy this, and took pleasure in it only a couple of times. OP
dated the woman for half a year and they socialized with OP’s friends.
Her friends knew that OP was paid, actually very well paid, and they had
great fun about it. OP had no other regular work at the time. OP makes it
clear that this was an unequal relation. However, she perceives the
woman with the money, the nice car and big house to have been the
exploited party in the relationship:
“It was not nice. She was terribly exploited, and she knew it. I
don’t think it caused any harm. She was supposed to move to
another town in a couple of months, the time was limited and
expiring” (OP 8)
OP’s proceedings can be analyzed with the analytical tools provided by
Margaretha Järvinen to analyze heterosexual prostitution. With reference
to several other studies in the field of sex trade, Järvinen does not
operate with a strict difference between prostitution and non-prostitution.
Sexual transaction, she declares, ‘is hazy and is dependent on the criteria
used in the definitional process’ (Järvinen 1993, p24). She outlines five
criteria for the classification: commerciality, promiscuity, non-
selectivity, temporariness and emotional indifference, of which
commerciality is the basic criterion. OP does not have a high score on
the commerciality criteria. She was not always paid in the first period. In
the second period she is well paid, however, she had other job
alternatives. This indicates a limited economic dependency on the trade.
She was promiscuous in the first period, but not when she was living
together with the rich woman. OP was selective, and temporality varied
from high in the first period till low in the second. She was not
emotionally indifferent in either of the relations. She remembers the
women she pleasured as nice women, and she felt sympathy for them
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because of the loneliness she saw. She even had some sexually enjoyable
moments. Järvinen discusses professionalism of the individual
prostitutes. I shall not go far into the discussion, but sum up that OP was
a semi-professional sex worker, not self-identified as such, and operating
outside the market for heterosexual sex trade. I will do an analysis of
OP’s story, and first a comment to my way of understanding the
interview with OP.
In the methodology chapter I said that I took my informants’ stories at
face value and made my own story out of them. The story I want to write
here is a suggestion about the power relations as OP experienced them.
That is, I want to contribute with my ‘true’ story about power relations in
lesbian commercial sex, based partly on OP’s story. Another approach
could have been to do a discourse analysis of identity, as Davina Swan
and Carol Linehan do in their article Positioning as a means of
understanding the narrative construction of self: a story of lesbian
escorting (2000). They deconstruct an interview in a magazine where a
lesbian escort, Rachel, talks about her work as an escort and about her
sexual identity. The authors demonstrate how Rachel constructs herself
by positioning herself in relation to dominant narratives (talked of also as
‘discourses’). According to the authors, Rachel creates ‘a unique and
coherent self’ by using ‘a narrative self construction’, based on available
discourses (p403). The analysis is interesting, even if I do not always
agree with their interpretations (I cannot see that romantic discourse
means much to Rachel in her positioning, when Swan and Linehan treat
Rachel’s positioning to this particular narrative as a pillar in their
analysis). Such an approach could have been used in the case of OP’s
story also. I could for instance have chosen narratives or discourses
‘about being kind’, ‘about being a bad girl’, ‘about being butch’, and
there is also a class perspective in OP’s story that I could call ‘people
with money as they are seen from a position where there is much less’.
OP relates to feminism, and that would also be a discourse to consider in
telling the story about how OP constructs herself through narration. I do
refer to those discourses in my analysis of the interview with OP, but I
do not use the reference as a means to draw a picture of OP’s
construction of herself and her identity. I have chosen another analytical
strategy. One reason is that identity is not my focus in this thesis.
Another is that it seems a bit too ambitious to deconstruct an interview
and construct the ‘self’ of another person.
The analysis will show that there are significant differences, due to the
homosexuality of the actual encounters described. I will elaborate on
this.
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What is special when the seller and the buyer both are women?
Two women engaged in sex marks the encounter as a homosexual
encounter. Homosexuality is still recognized as a subordinate sexuality,
and secrecy surrounds it.
The Closet
‘The closet’ is important in both periods of sex sale that OP describes.
None of the women OP was servicing were known in their surroundings
as women wanting sex with other women. Actually, they were all
extremely afraid that it should be known. It would have been a threat to
their social positions and job security. This is of course a card in every
sex worker’s hand: the clients do not want to be exposed to significant
others and are thereby vulnerable. In this case, the participation in the
sex market would be exposed, but also the homosexual desire. ‘The
closet’ makes the female client extraordinary vulnerable. Homosexual
subculture is a direct offspring of ‘the closet’. OP enjoyed the benefit of
being a member of a lesbian group of friends, who socialized a lot. The
client in OP’s second period of sex sales had access to the same social
circles as OP, which means that the gay character of the relationship
implied that parts of her social life were subcultural and closeted also.
She was even dependent upon OP for a social life. OP very quickly
became a publicly open lesbian. Here OP had an advantage compared to
her client.
Untouchability
OP did not let the upper-class clients touch her, or at least touch her
genitalia, and she did not like the sexual habit of the last client, who
would rub herself off on OP’s body. When the client wanted to use a
dildo on OP, she did not want it and managed to prevent it from
happening. OP says about herself that she is rather dominant in bed, that
in bed she always has been more dominant than her partners, except in
the paid affair with the one woman she had in the second period of sex
sales. I could argue that OP has some features of an ‘untouchable butch’
(stone butch), known from lesbian fiction and lesbian studies (Feinberg
1993, Kennedy and Davis 1993, Nestle 1987, 1992). OP signals the taste
for the sexual dynamics of the dyad butch-femme, without identifying
with the concepts. She describes herself as boyish as a young girl, and
that her lovers always would be more feminine. She willingly uses the
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dildo on others, but never let it happen the other way round. She tries to
stick up for her partners (but feels that it is only in bed that she manages
to dominate). And she is also very clear about the satisfaction she feels
by contributing to her partner’s pleasure, even without climaxing herself.
As a stone butch or untouchable butch, her own sexual gratification
would primarily depend on her capability to pleasure a femme. Or as
Kennedy and Davis put it: ‘A stone butch does all the “doin” and does
not ever allow her lover to reciprocate in kind. To be untouchable meant
to gain pleasure solely from giving pleasure’ (1993, p192). This might
make service more easy to perform and the step from unpaid to paid
service shorter than if reciprocity were important. It is very easy to turn
this argument the other way round. The husband-like butch, who profits
from masculine power, find herself ‘caught in a logic of inversion
whereby that “providingness” turns to self-sacrifice, which implicates
her in the most ancient trap of feminine self-abnegation’ (Butler 1993b,
p315). I will not argue that OP fits with the descriptions of a stone butch
lesbian, but genital untouchability is anyway read as ‘protection’ within
a feminist critique of prostitution.
Service-orientation
What I am trying to make logical is that ‘service-orientation’ puts one in
a good disposition for getting paid; the more specifically (as with the
stone-butch) a lesbian’s sexuality is connected to the wish of gratifying
another woman, the more easy it would also be to receive money for the
service. And since this is part of the way she herself is sexually gratified,
it is hard to see that she will be exploited in this structure of sexual
exchange. And the less vulnerable she would be, the less wounded she
would become. And why does this sound horrifying in the case of
women servicing men?83 The explanation will as far as I am concerned
go like this: for a hundred years feminists have opposed the view that the
main purpose of women’s sexuality should be to please men. The idea is
still alive for instance in pornography and other parts of the mainstream
sex industry, and feminists of all kinds still fight it.84 Most feminists will
not approve when a woman says that her main pleasure is to gratify her
husband; what about her own gratification, her orgasms? To me this
plays slightly differently within a lesbian context. It is usually hard for
83 I am fully aware that some will find it horrifying also in the case of women
servicing women, and that some would not in either situation.
84 There are some self-defined feminists in the industry, whose ambition it is to
create pornography that does not reflect ‘this sexuality shame-based society and its
negative attitude towards women’ (Nagle 1997 b, p156)
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homosexuals to acknowledge and accept their homosexual desire and
longing. ‘The closet’ and ‘the coming out process’ are still important
social structures in the lives of homosexuals. When a woman says that
she loves to pleasure other women, that she finds it pleasurable herself, I
will tend to accept it; she has fought to make a break with the
mainstream practices, and found a sexual practice that gives her
pleasure. It implies a consciousness about sexual pleasures that makes it
easier to accept that a woman ‘really wants’ to pleasure another woman
and can enjoy her ‘doing’, than it would be in a heterosexual transaction
in which a woman serves a man. OP says: ‘I don’t always need to come
myself, as long as my partner comes. It’s not always orgasm that is the
big thing for me, because we like to play. But I make sure that my
partner comes, because that is so good for me’ (OP p9). In the event of
servicing women, one could even think of it as a kind of ‘gentleman’s
behviour’, since more women than men report to have orgasm problems
(Almås and Benestad 1997). A butch who talks from a feminist
standpoint about pleasuring women for money is the one who tried to
start a business in San Francisco:
‘The issue that motivated me into action in my twenty-third year
was the lack of fuel for the fire of women’s sexual imagination. As
a butch lesbian who sexually desires femme women, I saw a great
deal more sexual entertainment (both from within and outside the
lesbian world) geared to my tastes than to those of women who
desire butch sexual energy. I believe that the nurturance of sexual
pleasure provides a necessary respite from other exhausting tasks
of advancing the lot of humanity. The sad yet pervasive notion
that the feminine should always be at the sexual service of the
masculine and never the opposite disturbed me to the very core of
my feminist sensibilities. The answer was not to eliminate the
feminine as cultural sexual icon – that would be an exercise in
futility. The only viable solution I could find was to offer myself
as a sexual object and become a butch gigolette’ (Zoticus 1997,
p170).
OP does not formulate such superstructural ideology, and I do not know
what she would say if she was asked about it. Her service-orientation
towards female partners in general could probably function positively for
OP, in the sense that it helped her handle the transactions in the first
period. Not in the second period, though, since OP here was pacified.
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Exploring sexual identity
OP was a newcomer on the lesbian scene when she dated the upper-class
women, and one could ask if she were trying to find out about her own
sexual identity. Another of my informants used a period of extensive
sexual service towards her girlfriend to develop security in a lesbian
identity. This is also what Rachel’s says about her motives for starting
escorting; she was curious what sex would be with a woman (Swan and
Linehan 2000, p413).85 Was OP studying sexuality, studying identity by
experiencing? That might be, but it does not explain why she took the
money. Could she not avoid that, as with Rachel who took the money
when the woman said ‘I’d pay someone else’ (p413)? Maybe the money
is the sophisticated women’s way to say that they are not up to it for love
or with longterm ambitions, since money is an important cultural marker
between technical sex and romantic love? Maybe they felt that OP and
her friend were vulnerable? These are questions, not answers. It is
interesting though, to compare these cases with the lesbian prostitutes in
Høigård and Finstad’s study (1992) (and Skilbrei, informal discussion, e-
mail October 18, 1999). Here the lesbian sexworkers are very clear that
to take on female clients would destroy what they had left of their
positive feelings for sexuality. OP does not comment upon this, but she
seems to operate with a rather blurred division between paid and unpaid
sex. It may be that the question of developing a lesbian identity, or at
least being with women sexually, was so important those years, that it
overshadowed the commercial aspects of the actual relations.86 It is also
possible that OP’s clients had their identity project at the time. If this
was the situation, it might have balanced the relation in terms of power.
The two parts would both have been vulnerable in the transaction, and
they would have shared the reason for being so.
Sexual techniques
The last point to be made with regards to specificities that may be in play
when two women engage in the commercial exchange of sexual services,
85 In Swan and Linehan’s words: ‘The event is portrayed as the consummation of
sexual passion (...) Rachel evaluates her experience in a familiar move of
generalization by comparing the prototypical female lover and prototypical male
lover. The female lover is positioned as more superior (more gentle)’ (2000, p414).
86 In the conversation I had with OP about this text one year later (cf the
methodology chapter), she said that it was not very likely that the search for a lesbian
identity had anything to do with it. She had already identified herself as a lesbian,
and she felt comfortable and happy about it. It was more that the women saw her as a
fine girl, she experienced being wanted and that she could be good at something.
And it was very exciting, like jumping with an elastic band, a kick.
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is a question connected with sexual technique. In an article with the pre-
text ‘Jane Goldman visits a Nevada brothel to see whether lesbians
would want to’, Jane Goldman shares her experiences as a customer
(1998, p24). Several dilemmas occur, and here is one:
‘Here was the dilemma: With woman-to-woman sex, you can’t
just stick it in and get off while your partner lays there and
pretends to participate. When you have got one woman who’s
being paid to give pleasure and another who’s paid to get it, the
one who’s giving it can’t take a passive position. And sure, I like
giving pleasure to someone else, but that’s not exactly feasible
with somebody who turns 10 tricks a shift’ (Goldman 1998, p26).
What Goldman probably says here is that as a female customer one does
not have the option of putting a penis inside a woman’s vagina, pumping
and then reaching orgasm.87 The prostitute would in most cases have to
be more active than simply to offer her vagina, if the sexologists are to
be trusted on the question of how most women reach orgasm. (Some
women are capable of climaxing against an uninvolved and perhaps
unmoving body. In OP’s case this was her partner’s practice in the
second period of commercial sex). From the description of one of her
first meetings with an upper-class woman it seems as though OP had to
do the work, and I believe that would be the more typical. She had to
produce the fantasy, possess the technical skills required and she took no
service in return. The point is that with most female customers the mere
availability of a woman’s body is not enough. In most cases the female
client will have to ask for skills and physical work to be executed. I do
not mean that male customers never ask for skills and physical work.
What I mean is that in heterosexual prostitution the woman’s available
(unmoving) body is more of an option in the act of satisfying the
customer, than in the case of lesbian prostitution. Moreover, a lesbian
who possesses such skills has more status than a woman who is available
for men in heterosexual prostitution. OP confirmed this point when I
talked with her the second time. She said that she had been thinking
since I was there for the interview, and that she had talked with the
friend that she had been with in the first period of sex sales. They had
talked and recalled that they looked down on a third friend who also
would take on male clients. That definitely gave her the low rank, while
they themselves were reckless, handsome, capable and wanted. OP
would use the term ‘damned fine girls’ (‘helsikes fine jenter’) to describe
87 That Goldman is underestimating the diversity of activities prostitutes are involved
in when they execute their services for male clients, is another story.
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herself and her friend, and I believe that means the same in English as in
Norwegian; you’ve got it.
In this section88 about the consequences of the homosexuality of the
transaction, I have already discussed aspects of power. The question
about economic dependency is central in the feminist literature about
prostitution and power.
Economy
OP was socially in a less beneficial position than the women she served.
Most likely, this was the case already from childhood, but quite
obviously at the time OP met these women. OP was an unskilled worker,
lousy paid in unstable jobs. She was younger than those who paid. This
difference in social position is well known from research, especially
regarding prostitution off the streets, which also is the category here
(Järvinen 1993, Faugier and Sargeant 1997, Prieur and Taksdal 1989).
Women with high social status pay for the sexual service from a woman
of far less status. On the basis of the way OP talks about these affairs,
she was not dependent upon the money and gifts she got from her
women. She quit the trade when she started to date a woman more
regularly (unpaid). In the period with the woman who soon would move,
OP had another job at hand. This was at the beginning of the 1970’s and
the labor market was good. OP preferred over conventional unskilled
work to pleasure the woman, live in a big house and have a nice car at
her disposal. This was one option among others, and OP found it to be
the best option at the time. She was not economically dependent on this
particular activity. Skilbrei points to the same finding in a study of
prostitution in studios.89 The women see prostitution as a good
alternative to low paid unskilled work (1998).
However, OP does not leave commercial sex because other sources of
income have become more important. First she quit because she had a
relationship, then she quit because her client left town. Could this mean
that a love affair was what OP actually wanted in the paid relations?
Heterosexual semi-professionals in Järvinen’s study slept with the men
because they ‘wanted to’, because he was ‘the love of my life…. at that
88 Consisting of the paragraphs; The Closet, Untouchability, Service-orientation,
Exploring sexual identity, Sexual techniques.
89 A studio is a place where the customers can receive massage and sexual services.
The studios usually have a reception where the customer waits, and he is usually
expected to take a shower before he gets his treatment (Skilbrei 1998).
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time’, because they ‘wanted to themselves’, because ‘the guys interested
them’ (Järvinen 1993, p147). This is commonly understood as a very
vulnerable position to be in for a woman who is selling her sexual
services, potentially emotionally damaging.
Damages
I do not know, but it could be that the thought of a permanent
relationship with a client was not alien to OP either. That she quit the
traffic from the coffee shop when she became involved with a girlfriend,
might be a sign of some kind of emotional involvement. On the other
hand, OP seems to know very distinctly that the sex she had in these
relations was not particularly enjoyable for her, and that the women were
married in the first period, and that she would leave in the last period. At
least the way OP talks about it now, many years later, indicates an
emotionally distance in these relations. So, if she wanted a relationship
within the trade, she was not conscious about it, or she does not want to
present herself as being so vulnerable. The heterosexual amateurs and
semi-professionals in Järvinen’s study say that they search for and find
the wanted relationship within the trade. That OP does not, could be seen
as a psychological advantage for OP compared to women in semi-
professional heterosexual prostitution. On the other hand, it implies that
OP divides her bodily activities off from her emotions, which is usually
perceived as a harmful effect of prostitution.
OP does not evaluate this as harmful. Taken at face value, OP’s narration
implies that she played around, had fun and got paid for it as well. In the
second conversation she calls it a ‘kick’. In the first period of sex sales
she felt confident, great, women wanted her; OP might even be
understood as a conqueror of women. Reflecting upon the upper-class
and married women she was pleasuring, OP says that some were
bisexuals wanting someone to talk with as well as the sex, and some
were closeted lesbians having married fortunes they could not afford to
divorce. Several of the women were very lonely. OP feels ashamed that
she had such a big ego at the time, but she comforts herself remembering
that she at least felt sympathy for them. The woman she dated for half a
year is described as a very kind person, and OP feels a bit ashamed that
she exploited her, however, it did not matter that much, since the woman
soon would be leaving in any case. OP’s doubts are not what it did to her
own feelings and her relation to her own body. That is often the report
from heterosexual prostitution. Her possible regrets are connected to the
loneliness in the other women, loneliness she has exploited. It may be, of
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course, that OP is not able to take in and reflect upon the damages the
trade had for her own psychological health. OP was in therapy for some
years, which was a positive experience according to her. She never
thought of prostitution as an issue for the sessions.
OP was not genitally touched in the first period of commercial exchange.
In the second period in the relation that lasted half a year, she avoided
being penetrated by a dildo, which she did not want. OP controlled to a
large extent what was for sale by distinguishing between ‘allowed’ and
‘not allowed’. Compared to literature on heterosexual prostitution, OP
was here using a common means of defense. A parallel to this is a
distinction the Norwegian Department of Social Affairs makes with
regards to child sexual abuse. Penetration of body-orifices is considered
the most serious (Poulsson 1992, p17).90 According to the Norwegian
social anthropologist Jorun Solheim, the symbolic meaning of the female
body is that it is ‘an open body’, unlike men’s bodies that are closed,
containing itself. This is thematized to a large extent with reference to
the female body, overflowing its banks as milk, children and blood. She
continues:
‘The sexual openness of a woman’s body and the heterosexual
coitus as such seems not to have gained the same attention as a
symbolic structure of meaning, as gestalt. The pathologies of rape,
abuse and incest have here been focused. However, that we might
say that men through common, ordinary intercourse, the
heterosexual sex-act, “invades” women’s bodies from outside, and
that women “enclose” men and bring them inside themselves, is to
a little extent scrutinized as a symbolic paradigm of meaning. It is
my assessment that this body-configuration probably more than
anything else, is settling the question of bodily limits as an
absolute contrast between sexes,91 as a relation between the
“open” and the “closed”’ (Solheim 1998, p74, my translation).
If we ascribe this meaning to the bodies of men and women in our
culture, a sexual act between two women would be a meeting between
two ‘open’ bodies. The possibility of being ‘opened up, penetrated, filled
up with manliness92 as one’s absolute opposite’ (Solheim 1998, p74)
90 See the discussion about power and penetration in the chapter When women take.
91 The Norwegian ‘kjønn’ here translated to ‘sex’ and not ‘gender’ since its is likely
that she deals with the anatomical differences in the paragraph quoted.
92 Solheim’s term in Norwegian: ‘mannlighet’.
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might be perceived as non-existent according to this argumentation.93
This might be part of the explanation why sex workers servicing men
refuse penetration in some cases as an emotional defense mechanism. It
might also serve as an argument for OP’s permanently limited
vulnerability. The consequences of this line of argument for the analysis
of women receiving sexual service from men will not be discussed in
this thesis. One could speculate though, whether symbolic aspects of
penetration are part of the explanation why (according to Ringdal 1997)
men who serve women do not call themselves whores, while the ones
who serve men do.
One of the most profiled feminist sex workers in the USA, Carol Queen,
claims to have met more sex workers than most anti-sex work activists
and sex researchers. She says that one factor distinguishes those who live
well and with no loss of self-esteem due to sex work, from those for
whom this is damaging; the main protection is being a ‘sex informed’
and ‘sex positive’ feminist (Queen C. 1997, p129). If you are not, you
should probably find the fastest route out of the industry. OP seems to be
sex-informed (she knows what she likes, she has a lot of experience with
different kinds of sexual practices), sex positive (she does not condemn
any kind of practice, except that she does not want to be penetrated with
a dildo) and would probably not protest if she were labeled ‘feminist’
(she is very critical to what she understands as male sexual practices in
bed). This could, according to Queen, have had a positive impact in
terms of psychic health. I do not, however, have proper interview
material to elaborate further on that argument.
Before I discuss my results further, I will make a summary of the
analysis so far.
A summary about female homosexual sex sales
I base this chapter on a very limited empirical material, which
nevertheless is what I have been able to find; a few narratives from the
industry that are already published, one of my own interviews and
contributions on a lesbian discussion list on the Internet. The material
seen in the light of theory and other empirical investigations could be
summarized as follows:
93 I can agree with this to a certain extent. However, I will also claim that two women
have more of an opportunity to let go both ways if they want to, since most women
have hands. Cf. also the theoretical considerations regarding the exchangeability and
flexibility of the ‘lesbian phallus’.
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• The market for heterosexual transactions is not the place for women
who want sexual services from other women. There are reasons to
believe that there is very limited overlap between the markets for
heterosexual and lesbian sex sales, if they overlap at all.
• ‘The closet’ might have an impact on the power structure in favor of
the prostitute if the prostitute is an open lesbian and the client is
closeted.
• According to the research about the butch-femme sexual dynamics,
some lesbians place their main or even sole focus on pleasuring their
partners. I have argued that in a homophobic society, it is
ideologically easier to accept that these lesbians ‘really’ will take
great pleasure in ‘doing the doing’. The step from unpaid to paid
service might be short in some cases. The (untouchable) butch sex-
worker can be understood as a sex worker who takes sexual pleasure
in her work.
• The available body-orifice (the open body) is of limited interest in
lesbian commercial sexual exchange, since women do not usually
climax from penetrating another person with hands or an item. This
could imply a reduction of the risk for psychological damage, if we
transfer the results from research about sexual abuse to prostitution.
And if we take literally the ideas about the symbolism connected to
bodily penetration in our culture, it would mean decreased
vulnerability for the woman who offered her services to other
women. The female client’s lack of ability to penetrate with an
orgasmic object would probably mean a power-advantage for the
prostitute.
• Connected to the previous point, equality in physical strength makes
woman-to-woman prostitution less risky in terms of physical abuse.
And compared to men, women are known potentially to be less
sexually violent, statistically speaking.
• The promiscuous lesbian, who is known for her skills in pleasuring
another woman, is not seen as a ‘loose’ and available woman. In the
lesbian subculture this rather tends to connote positively. This would
imply a less stigmatized social position for the female sex-worker
who is in the service of women compared to sexworkers in the
service of men.
What does this mean in terms of reworking heterosexual power
domains? What happened to power when there are two women instead of
one woman and one man? The power imbalance is there; the client is, in
OP’s case, upper-class and the client has in any case the money. The
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balance between emotional involvement and the lack of romance in paid
affairs, has to be handled. It is my view that the lesbianism that marks
the trade ‘smooths’ the edges of the client’s control to a considerable
extent. The female customers I have found reported, struggle with their
emotional involvement. In OP’s case they were closeted and afraid that
their homosexual needs should be exposed. There was apparently a very
low risk that the relationships would be violent. The prostitute’s body is
not at the client’s disposal. The client asks for skills, which probably
gives some kind of status to the skilled. The lesbian sex sales seem not to
find a place within the traditional heterosexual market. That the
dynamics are different could be part of the explanation. And one could
certainly ask; if you were a lesbian, which one would you rather be? The
heterosexually married woman, with a husband she cannot afford to
divorce, with sexual needs she has to pay for; the lesbian with a high
social position, who cannot afford to be honest about her sexuality? Or
does it sound more appealing to be the young lesbian cruising the field
together with a friend, meeting women, risking emotional wounds, but
having a large group of friends to share it all with?
The answer from most people would probably be that they do not want
to be either. They do not want to buy sexual service, nor do they want to
sell it. The reasons are manifold for wanting to be in neither position.
One might be linked to the discourse of prostitution. Selling and buying
sexual pleasure is not understood as proper social activity in Western
societies in general, even when it is legalized. It is easier when the
transaction is understood independent of a notion of sexual pleasure. By
the end of the 1800’s – beginning of the 1900’s, hundred thousands of
women got the diagnosis of ‘Hysteria’. When European and North
American male physicians produced a hysterical sudden outburst in their
female patients, they did not understand this as the production of an
orgasm, which is what we today would call it. This was conceived of as
medical treatment, and the women paid for it.
Orgasm as therapy in the treatment of ‘Hysteria’
The technology historian Rachel P. Maines has written a most
pleasurable book about vibrators in the treatment of ‘Hysteria’. This
‘disease’ is in certain periods of history a very common ailment among
women (Maines 1999), something that had been known from the time of
Hippocrates (460-377 BC). However, the frequency of its diagnostic use
culminated at the nineteenth century. Middle and upper class women
were especially inclined to have the symptoms. Ancient, Renaissance
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and modern medical authorities before Sigmund Freud described these
symptoms ‘as those of chronic arousal: anxiety, sleeplessness,
irritability, nervousness, erotic fantasy, sensations of heaviness in the
abdomen, lower pelvic edema, and vaginal lubrication’ (Maines 1999,
p8). Around the turn of the century lots of serious, well established, male
physicians in Europe and USA were treating their female patients with
the production of an orgasm, not known as such, but as ‘hysterical
paroxysm’.94 Since as much as ¾ of all women were supposed to suffer
from this disease and other similar ailments (neurasthenia, chlorosis),
treatment was economically important for the medical profession. The
physicians are not known to have taken pleasure in the treatment, and
would try to hire midwives and other assistants to do the practical work
required. The electric vibrator first emerged as an electromechanical
instrument to lift some of the burden from the physicians. The
instrument was used in the treatment of several diseases, but the
physicians particularly found the treatment of ‘Hysteria’ very time
consuming. The use of new technology reduced the average treatment
time from about one hour to ten minutes. According to Maines, the
women who got this kind of therapy was lucky compared to those who
got other kinds of treatment:
‘Furthermore, orgasmic treatment could have done few patients
any harm, whether they were sick or well, thus contrasting
favorably with such “heroic” nineteenth-century therapies as
clitoridectomy to prevent masturbation. It is certainly not
necessary to perceive the recipients of orgasmic therapy as
victims: some of them almost certainly must have known what
was really going on’ (Maines 1999, p5).
Karin Johannisson’s account for treatment of ‘Hysteria’ pictures it as
‘often notably aggressive’ (Johannisson 1996, p151, my translation).
However, there were physicians who preferred what she calls ‘the soft
way’: different kinds of abdominal massage. This entails a high degree
of intimacy between the male physician and the female patient, and
becomes an object of debate within the medical profession at the time.
According to the Norwegian historian Jan Grande, physicians were
aware that some of the techniques for treatment entailed sexual pleasure
for the female patients. Some stated that the women came for repeated
treatment for ‘their own perverse pleasure’, and that the treatment was
‘more pleasurable than useful’ (Grande 2001, p20, my translation).
94 According to Webster’s dictionary, ‘paroxysm’ means any sudden, violent
outburst.
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In the US popular culture of the 1920’, the vibrator began to be
presented as a device to increase sexual pleasure. The ‘decades of
innocence’ were over. When the vibrators appeared again in advertising
in the 1960’s everyone would know that this was a sex toy.95
These public physicians produced orgasms in thousands of women and
took money for it. Their work is strikingly similar to that of prostitutes,
whose main task is to produce male orgasms. The difference is of course
that the male physicians never were understood as exploited, degraded
and socially deviant. The activities of the Western physicians were
camouflaged by two socio-cultural phenomena: the disease paradigm
constructed around female sexuality and the ‘comforting belief that only
penetration was sexually stimulating to women’ (Maines 1999, p113).
Female sex-workers servicing men are culturally understood as being
quite differently positioned in the hegemonic discourses of sex, sexuality
and deviance. The point I will draw from this example, is that large
groups of women seemed to be perfectly capable of sexually climaxing
under the hands of a skilled person, even when sexuality and romance
were detached and the skilled person was paid. That it was not seen as
sexual activity probably helped.
Concluding remarks
The market I have been dealing with here is small, and as Nils Johan
Ringdal formulates it, it seems to be very ‘discrete’ (Ringdal 1997,
p463). Probably the clients are not only lesbians but also women who
live with or prefer men in romantic relationships. Will we see an increase
in this activity in the future? According to Ringdal, it is among the
women in advanced positions in the society that we find those women
who buy sex from men. Perhaps that is the case in woman-to-woman-
prostitution also (in the first period of sex sales, OP’s ‘clients’ were
housewives, married to husbands who made decent money, in the second
period her client was pretty well off on her own). And perhaps increased
differences between women due to education and occupation, provide
conditions for a market for commercial sexual exchange between
95 Maines observes that when such devices appear nowadays, they are not the ‘true’
vibrators. No, they are phallus-shaped vibrating dildos, suggesting that they are just
substitutes for a penis. She comments dryly: ‘For most women, however, these
under-powered battery-operated toys are more visually than physiologically
stimulating; it is the AC-powered vibrator with at least one working surface at a right
angle to the handle that is best designed for application to the clitoral area’ (p122).
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women. This does, however, presuppose that more women than for the
time being, let go of the romantic ambitions in sex and in addition give it
this particular social shaping. Perhaps after a while we will have
variations in woman-to-woman prostitution, in line with what we see in
the heterosexual market. Or; perhaps women at large will operate more
decently than men do as customers, and that women who serve other
women will be protected from damages to a larger extent than within the
heterosexual market, if this is to become a business of any considerable
size. Some will probably say that we will soon enough be able to do
research on such questions.
At the beginning of this chapter I referred to an exchange of opinions on
a Swedish lesbian discussion list on the Internet. Andrea and Chantal
were both disgusted by the thought of buying sexual services from
women. At the same time Andrea had felt tempted to buy sexual services
from another woman, and Chantal felt that paid sexual service should be
an option for women as well as for men (who always have had it).
Chantal also says that prostitution often is considered ‘disgusting and
dirty, while its ultimate force is pure and beautiful’ (Lesbiska Listan,
April 2, 2001, my translation from Swedish). My interpretation of the
statements of Andrea and Chantal is that there is both temptation and
sense of justice behind a future lesbian market for commercial sex.
However, their political reflections indicate that the time for such a
market is not yet near.96
I had two errands in this chapter. One was to deconstruct the discursive
fields that make the female customer impossible or invisible. Paid sexual
service from woman to woman is disruptive to main discourses in the
realm of the sexual. The other errand was to analyze lesbian prostitution
related to power negotiations. I do not have an extended empirical
material. My conclusions refer to the material I actually got and this
material related to feminist critique. I will not speculate that it is valid
for lesbian prostitution in general. It can of course take forms I have no
information about. The most general aspect of these results as I perceive
them is to see this as an example where power problems within
heterosexual discourse are modified because of the lesbianism of the
relationship. That does not mean that my advice in situations of power
96 That Andrea and Chantal are the only two participants in the debate might signal
that this issue is awkward to discuss and that it is still a taboo among lesbians. It
certainly does not mean that there are not different opinions about it. The list
contains lively debates with many participants on issues like pornography and
prostitution in general (‘general’ here meaning ‘heterosexual’).
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problems is to replace each man with a woman. Far from it; it only
means that in the case of a socio-technical sexual arrangement, as
prostitution is, I dare suggest that women in general are more considerate
than men, given the gendered features of sexual culture we are part of.
This is elaborated further as part of lesbian specificity, in chapter 8.
The next chapter is also about an issue that in some sense can be
perceived as a socio-technical sexual arrangement: the production of an
orgasm. This time: unpaid for.
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CHAPTER 7: ‘USUALLY, I WILL START WITH HER’ –
EQUALITY ISSUES IN THE PRODUCTION OF AN ORGASM
‘After a while Lane said, “Let’s find music to make love to.
All I want now is to make love to you”. “With me, not to
me”. Her head on Lane’s shoulder, penetrated by the
warmth of her arms, Diana said blissfully, “You make love
with the person, not to them, when it’s equal. Am I ever
going to get you trained?”’ (Forrest 1993, p159).
Diana is trying to make Lane understand that there is a crucial difference
between making love ‘to’ and ‘with’, and that the latter is more equal.
The Norwegian language does not contain this particular linguistic
distinction.97 However, some of my informants said that they sometimes
have sex with women who do not have sex with them.98 This seems to
convey a similar distinction in meaning. ‘Making love (with)’ and
‘Having sex with’ indicates mutuality and a two-ways encounter. Both
parts are involved in lovemaking, it is a joint project. Compared to this
the alternative sounds like sex is executed by one to pleasure the other.
Diana in Katherine Forrests’ popular novel sets a standard of equality,
and one-sidedness is not correct. Are my informants not living up to a
lesbian standard of equality? Are they into one-sided sexual service?
What is the dominant heterosexual discourse on this issue? Is mutuality
the ideal? What is the dominant practice? What are the feminists saying?
Let me narrow this down to a possible analytical focus.
As we will see later, ‘I have sex with someone who does not have sex
with me’, means in my interviews that ‘I’ provides her partner with an
orgasm. The woman who is not having sex, climaxes, which sounds
paradoxical for a person who is not having sex. This has directed my
attention toward the power to pleasure a partner with an orgasm. Or also;
the power to make a partner pleasure you with one. The topic of this
chapter is thus the sociality of the production of orgasm. I addressed this
issue within the frameworks of prostitution in the previous chapter. Here
it will be in unpaid relations.
Some would object to my choice of focus and argue that orgasms are all
right, but highly overrated as a sexual expression, outcome or measure.
97 As far as my information goes, English does not either. Richard Daly who
‘washed’ this manuscript, comments that it sounds ‘created politically by Forrest’.
98 In Norwegian: ‘Jeg hadde sex med henne, hun hadde ikke sex med meg’
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Sex, they would say, is about more than orgasms. It is about feeling
connected, loved, etc. Others would argue that it is an important issue for
women, but sometimes over-emphasized as an empowering
achievement. Lynn Segal is one among the latter:
‘ ... having orgasms – however plentiful – does not mean that we have
learned to love ourselves, does not give us power over our partners, does
not give us power in the world. Indeed, it has little to do with either love
or power. Orgasms are the one thing, perhaps the only thing, that even
the most fearful, the most alienated, the most distressed, desolate,
enslaved and wretched person (or beast), may manage to obtain’ (Segal
1994, p44).
I cannot but agree with all the above; the cultural position of orgasm as a
measure of success, or perhaps even as an obsession, should obviously
be further deconstructed. For such analysis, see for example Annie Potts’
article ‘Coming, Coming, Gone’ (2000). I agree with Anthony Giddens
who states that to measure sexual pleasure by orgasmic response is ‘a
dubious index, as many have said, but surely not devoid of value when
placed against the sexual deprivations suffered by women in the past ...’
(Giddens 1992, p142). The sensational aspects of orgasm combined with
the gender aspect of its cultural history, makes orgasm as social practice
worth scrutiny. Some points from the socio-cultural history of orgasm in
females should be mentioned. Women’s orgasmic potential has not
always been recognized (see Chalker 2000, Hawkes 1996, Segal 1994,
Wolf 1998). Modern sexology has made clear that orgasms are also for
women. Since Alfred Kinsey (1948), Masters and Johnson (1966), and
Shere Hite (1980, first published 1976) it has also been a ‘truth’ that
stimulation of the clitoris and the clitorial area is the main source of
orgasm for most women.99 Anne Koedt’s essay ‘The Myth of the
Vaginal Orgasm’, was of vital importance to the feminist debate (1996,
first published 1968). Koedt expostulates with Freud, the ‘Father of the
Vaginal orgasm’, and assesses that the recognition of clitorial orgasms is
a threat to the heterosexual institution. This was probably to overrate the
significance of orgasm (cf Segal above), but Koedt’s contribution to
feminist consciousness-raising in the realm of sexuality was nevertheless
indubitable. However, in spite of the painstaking work of sexologists and
99 The significance of clitoris was known before that. According to Naomi Wolf
(1998) a Venetian scientist identified clitoris as the seat of female sexual pleasure in
1559. I am sure that even before that, lay men and women have been well aware of
this in their own sexual practice. It just did not reach it into the written. See also
Rebecca Chalker’s book The Clitorial Truth (2000).
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feminists in the last half of the twentieth century, the female orgasm is
not as self-evident as one should wish in a culture marked by an ideal of
equality. This is obvious from question columns in popular media, and
from medical, sexological and feminist discourse (Almås and Benestad
1997, Chalker 2000, Dallos and Dallos 1997, McPhillips, Braun and
Gavey 2001, Thompson 1990, Skugge et all 1999, Solheim and
Vaagland 1999).100
Seen as a whole, and put simply, my analytical approach in this thesis
seen as a whole is to examine lesbianism as a reworking of
heterosexuality. Power issues in heterosexual discourse as they are
pointed to within feminism, are my backdrop. Contemporary Norwegian
heterosexual discourse regarding orgasm has at least the following two
elements: the woman as well as the man should expect orgasm, and the
men’s are commonly understood as ‘simpler’.
The feminist critique of heterosexual discourse in this area is not as easy
to grasp as it has been in the three previous chapters. That might be
because we here approach more closely the practices of heterosexuals
than in the previous chapters, and that heterosexual practices are
distinctively diverse regarding orgasms. A considerable amount of men
are not ‘simple’, as is shown for instance in the debate about Viagra. On
the other hand, some women are more ‘simple’ than others. About 30%
will achieve orgasm in coitus without clitorial stimulation (Kinsey 1948,
Masters and Johnson 1966, Hite 1980). This number might even have
increased in recent years.101 And in general, heterosexual couples find
techniques that are productive in an orgasmic sense for both participants.
These considerations in mind, my impression is that the feminist critique
revolves around three issues:
• men in general should be more considerate, think less of themselves
and focus more on the needs of their female partners.
• women in general should get to know their own bodies better, find out
what really pleases them and ask for it instead of giving over
responsibility to her partner.
100 In this text I assume that an orgasm is an orgasm; that we are talking about the
same thing. It is more complicated than that. Most people will know when they are
experiencing one, however, some are not sure and some may fake them and lie about
them to please their partners (or a researcher). These will be possible sources of error
in every study of human sexuality, where the physicality of orgasm is not measured,
and even then.
101 I have not been able to find new and comparable statistics from Norway.
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• coitus should not have the sole position as ‘real sex’.
The targets for the critique are individual men and women who should
change their habits, institutions that have the responsibility for teaching
young persons about sex (family, educational and health system), and
also institutions that are considered to have a negative influence (porn
and prostitution industries).
It is difficult to see a direct way of using my interviews to investigate a
lesbian reworking of the feminist issues raised above. Regarding the first
point, I can hardly find any representations in my material that make it
seem productive to use an approach where one partner is understood as
‘the man’. Regarding the second and the third, I did not talk with my
informants about anatomical and sexual knowledge connected to orgasm,
and I did not talk with them about coitus and the meaning of coitus. To
be honest, I did not think of sexual knowledge and coitus as part of
feminist critique and possible issues for analysis at the time when I did
the interviewing. But, I talked with the women about orgasms, and I
have chosen to be more explorative in the search through of my material
than in the other analytical chapters. There are passages in the
conversations I had, where I find the question of equality relevant to ask
in connection with the orgasm. It would have narrowed my perspective
too much, though, if I had let the analysis be too closely linked to the
aspects of feminist critique mentioned above. The analytical question
will therefore be of a general character; this will be an analysis of the
parts of the interviews that in a general sense directed my thoughts
towards equality issues in the production of orgasms. By the end of the
chapter I will nevertheless come back to the feminist critique that is
specified above, and discuss what I have found. This will then be taken
further in the next chapter, chapter 8 that is a summary but also a
synthesis of the analytical chapters. And also; the aim of the project is to
contribute to a debate about sexuality and equality issues within a
heterosexual context. The project should therefore relate to the questions
that are on the agenda.
The core of the analysis will be the question of giving and receiving
sexual attention from a partner, where orgasm is one result. I will start
this explorative analysis with a discussion of the formulation ‘I had sex
with her, she did not have sex with me’, and continue under the headline:
‘If she’s aroused, then she’ll get’. The third focus will be on a practice of
‘taking turns’. Power and possible subordination will be discussed for
each issue addressed, and will also be focused in a particular section.
Practices concerning power aspects of penetration will be the outset for
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addressing the coitus imperative. I will use my interview material as a
prime basis for the analysis. However, lesbian romantic and erotic fiction
will also be exploited, and I will give an argumentation for that later.
I had sex with her – she did not have sex with me
‘Having sex with’ indicates mutuality and sharing. What my informants
say seems to be a contradiction in terms. What is actually going on when
a woman is having sex with her female partner, and the partner is not
having sex with her? Is this an example of women’s inclination to
service other people, and in this case service other women sexually? Is
this non-consent sex, or is there at least a subservient part?
ATI has had two separate relationships in which she seems to have been
in a permanent position of being the one to gratify her partner without
reciprocity. This is ATI about her first girlfriend:
ATI: ‘In retrospect I would say that she treated me more coldly
than I did her. She enjoyed me being together with her and
enjoyed that … I suppose she didn’t have much sex with me. I was
the one having sex with her’.
AB: ‘You pleasured her, or ...’
ATI: ‘Yes. Yes. But I felt great about it. I didn’t need the … that
… At that point I was so exhausted and gave so much that …’
(ATI p6).
She considers this to be a relationship where she primarily gives when
having sex. Her partner will take pleasure in it, and their sexual meetings
are orgasmic to the partner but not to ATI. ATI’s dividend is feeling
great and needing no more. Besides, she is exhausted. ATI unties the
expected mutuality attributed to the phrase having sex with. Concretely
in this case the phrase means that one participant executes all the work
necessary to contribute to the sexual pleasure of her partner. I label this
‘one-sidedness’ when orgasm is the measure, as it is here. This was for
ATI a relation where she was dominated in every other part of the
relationship. Who was the dominant one in bed is not obvious, and will
be discussed.
ATI turned 50 some years ago and has reflected thoroughly upon her
previous attractions to women who eventually laid claim to her. It is not
my goal to understand her attractions or her process of changing her
practice in this respect, but the sexual aspects of her experiences
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interested me. The second relationship that was one-sided in terms of
orgasmic pleasure was again to a woman that she felt controlled her.102
ATI: ‘She controlled me totally. People can’t understand that.
They see me as a very strong person. I was absolutely obsessed by
her. She did not touch me. She did not relate to me at all. She
bewitched me. I went home during working-hours to have sex
with her’ (ATI p16, 17).
By the end of the interview I ask ATI whether she has ever felt ‘cheap’
together with another woman. She talks about this for a while before she
returns to the relation with the woman mentioned above:
ATI: ‘… No, really, I can’t say that. Well, the one I lived together
with, one could say that I prostituted myself in a way because she
did not have sex with me. But I didn’t actually think of it along
such lines. You wouldn’t endure it if you got nothing back. It
would not be fair to her to say that she didn’t give me anything.
She gave me something … I did not feel cheap afterwards. Some
call it prostitution when you don’t get anything back, but you do
get something, in a way. I was very fond of her’ (ATI p21).
I am not able to distinguish the way ATI speaks here from the way some
heterosexual women speak when they are in relationships where the
great passion or orgasm is for him and not for her. Sex is pleasurable for
other reasons. This experience with sex is documented in the Hite-report
(1980, see for instance p147), and also part of how women talk about sex
in popular culture. Women find pleasure in sex for different reasons, and
I will not question that. The above is problematic only when orgasm is
seen as the bonus for both participants, which is my perspective here.
What ATI expresses here is thus problematic.
When ATI talkes about making love to women, she becomes very
excited and talks of it as if it were an art. Her joy was not connected to a
relationship with a particular woman. To ATI the sexual female body as
such seems to be a challenge and a thrill. I will illustrate this with a
couple of excerpts from the interview with her. ATI wants to talk during
sex.
‘I talk a lot, tell them that they have a beautiful body, I do, and I
have never got negative responses to that… I do it automatically
102 ATI uses the term ‘psychopath’.
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because I enjoy this so much I have to tell them how beautiful,
gorgeous and delightful they are. I don’t talk all the time. I don’t.
But I do talk’. (ATI p19)
In a passage of the interview when we are talking about domination, she
returns to this joy. Today she would run away from women who were
trying to dominate her, and I ask her whether she is talking about
domination in bed or in daily life:
AB: ‘To be dominated’, you say, do you mean in bed or in daily
life?’
ATI: ‘In daily life. Dominating me in bed; it would certainly take
a lot to manage that. I would rather say that it is quite the opposite.
I do enjoy women, I enjoy women’s bodies…It is has just been
growing year by year and it is absolutely fantastic’ (ATI p18).
ATI presents herself as a woman taking intense pleasure in the female
body, and she apparently actively expresses this to her female lovers. A
lot of heterosexual women do enjoy men’s bodies. I seldom see a
heterosexual woman talk this devotedly about being in a position of
pleasuring a man though, perhaps not since I read Anis Niin. It might be
that in contemporary Norway feminist discourse ‘forbids’ it: modern
women are equal in sex, only prostitutes can take pleasure in servicing
men. It might also be due to language. The female body and the male
body have different positions in language. ATI says that it would be hard
to dominate her in bed. Would a woman who talks, adores, enjoys, like
ATI does, tend to have a dominant position? Is it objectifying, the
language that is available for talking about (and to) the female body?
Will most heterosexual men and women feel uncomfortable if the same
language were used by a woman to a man during sex? Would language
strip him of his manliness and her for her femaleness? How much can a
woman admire, adore, enjoy and talk, and make the man an object of
active attention? I really do not have the answer. In the previous chapter
I referred to Wendy Hollway (1995) who inquires a liberating
heterosexual discourse for women. I suggest that one aspect of that
liberating discourse will be an eroticizing language that is empowering
(also) for women who are with men. My analytical point is that I believe
ATI’s excitement did something to the power structure when she served
the other woman. She was not only servicing her, she was also
objectifying her, and by that she could be understood as having control.
On the other hand, ATI said that is was possible to dominate her in daily
life. It seems possible for ATI to have controlled the pleasure of the
other in bed, and have enjoyed it, and at the same time have felt
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dominated in other realms of life. This is hard to accept, I believe, within
a feminist contemporary understanding of equality and sexuality. There
is something so traditionally feminine and trapped about ATI’s service
orientation, and at the same time the sexual pleasure on her own behalf is
so clearly and explicitly formulated.103
ATI started to relate sexually to other women in her late thirties. She is
very happy for the capability that she possesses in terms of pleasuring
other women sexually. Major parts of the interview are ATI talking
about her fascination over her access to another woman’s body and the
exciting possibilities. However, ATI has not become stuck in the
position of being the one who is ‘doing the doing’. She met C and liked
it a lot when it went both ways and she got attention in return:
ATI: ‘I was shaky, I was jelly, I was absolutely ... ‘
AB: ‘She took the lead?’
ATI: ‘Yes, entirely. This was her having sex with me. It was a
pretty unfamiliar feeling to me. I was not used to it, so I became
shy.’
AB: ‘She served you?’104
ATI: ‘Yes, entirely. She was incredibly vehement, a passionate
lady. It was the maximum ... It was intense. I have never had ... I
remember that I had three or four orgasms ... She was tender, she
was determined.’
AB: ‘Were you allowed to touch her?’
ATI: ‘Oh, yes. Yes. I felt that she trained me a bit’ (ATI p12).
In this relation they alternately took the position of having sex with the
other. They took turns being the one to be gratified. And still, the
moments of the most ultimate pleasure for ATI was connected to ‘doing
the doing’. C wanted ATI to fist her,105 which ATI was happy to do. ATI
experienced that she herself was able to reach orgasm without being
103 ATI did not express any need whatsoever for having a masochist position. I
perceive masochism and sadism as sexualities that must be understood within a
different analytical framework than the one I use in this thesis.
104 In Norwegian: Hun vartet deg opp?
105 Fisting (fist-fucking, handballing) is the term for inserting the whole hand or fist
into the vagina or anus. For many associated with gay male practice, but known
through history as an occult discipline of all sexualities (Schramm-Evans 1995).
Schramm-Evans has obviously other sources of information than the authors referred
to in Halperin’s book about Foucault, where fist-fucking is considered the only
sexual practice invented in the twentieth century (Halperin 1995, p92). I think I put
my money on Schramm-Evans here.
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directly genitally stimulated, while fisting her partner. For most people
this would have been an exotic way of climaxing, and it certainly was
special to ATI too. She says that it represented ‘chemical releases that
were absolutely complete’ (ATI p12). In my understanding of ATI as a
lover, this is one more expression of the genuine pleasure ATI takes in
pleasuring women. ATI seems passionate and consumed in sex, whether
she is giving or receiving. I cannot conceive of ATI’s service-orientation
as one where she represses her own needs for the needs of the other.
J is the second informant who used the term ‘I with her, but not she with
me’. J had not had boyfriends before she was with her first lover, a more
experienced girl. They were both young, but J was the younger.
Everything was new to her and she wanted to take it slowly.
‘It started with me having sex with her, but she did not have sex
with me in the beginning … I think it was partly because I wanted
to become more self-confident. I was quite sure that I was lesbian,
nevertheless, you may want to prove it to yourself, and I wanted to
become more confident’ (J p4).
J technically supports her partner with an orgasm, using her hands,
tongue and other parts of her body. J characterizes it as a dynamic in
which she is the one giving and her partner is receiving. In the beginning
this was the way she wanted it. I asked her why it took a month before
she decided to change the arrangement:
‘ ... I actually felt comfortable in the situation of giving, I felt
comfortable. I think that’s the reason why, and that I took pleasure
in giving. Of course, she wanted terribly to give to me too, but … I
have thought of this a lot. I am honest towards myself. I was not in
a hurry’ (J p6).
J pleasured her partner and says that she gained confidence in a lesbian
identity in return. It could also be that J here disguises an actual wish to
reject having sex; she is servicing sex because she is a good girl.106 A
few factors make this unlikely. Talking about rejection in general, she
says that she is not afraid of taking sexual initiatives and being rejected,
because she herself feels free to reject her partners. She knows by herself
that it is not a big deal when she rejects:
106
‘Good girl’ here as different from a ‘bad girl’, cf the prostitution chapter. For the
good girl the emotional and romantic aspects are more important. Sex is not
necessarily for her, and she will go a long way to make her partner happy.
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‘I know how it is from my perspective. It’s nothing more to it. It’s
not like I don’t want because I don’t want anything to do with you,
it’s more about myself’ (J p11).
J’s partner seems to have been the more impatient of the two. While J
takes her time and is in no hurry to be touched, her partner ‘terribly’
wants to give to her. Unlike the untouchable stone-butch (who,
according to the femmes Kennedy and Davis (1993) interviewed, is a
myth) J is temporarilyy untouchable. She finally let her first girlfriend
make love to her. I ask her whether she liked it. She responds: ‘Oh, yes, I
liked it, it was nothing to complain about’ (J p6). This is obviously an
understatement and she laughs before she adds that it was better than she
ever could have imagined. J is now in a relationship where sex is very
important, but she still believes that she could be turned on by her first
lover.
AB: ‘Do you think that you still could want her sexually?’
J: ‘No, not now. I don’t know. I have to be honest, so I need to
think. That question was a bit smart. I think I might.’
AB: ‘In a given situation?’
J: ‘Yes, in a given situation. I know what I’d get and I still find her
attractive and like her as a person, but I’m not walking around
thinking of her. And I don’t think of her when I have sex with my
partner. I am really absorbed in my present partner’ (J p9).
This can be read as a confirmation of the appropriateness of J’s strategy;
waiting until she felt ready for being made love to. She liked it when it
first happened, she liked the sexual exchange with this woman during
their relationship and J is still familiar with the thought of having sex
with her. Instead of being afraid of rejecting her partner and thus
participating in activities she actually was not ready for, the one-
sidedness in the initial phase of J’s first relationship seems to have
worked as a proper strategy for J.
I want to point to two aspects of the analysis of ‘I had sex with her, she
did not have sex with me’. 107 One is that the woman who most clearly is
107 Three of my informants used the term. The third one is OP who used it with a
similar meaning attached. ‘If I have sex with someone I never give in, but if someone
has sex with me and it slips away, I will tell her this is futile' (OP p12). By this, OP
means that she will never give up an attempt to bring her partner to orgasm, but
knows on the other hand exactly when her partner will not be able to make her come.
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aroused and even climaxes is presented as not having sex. It is the
provider who is having sex, not the one who climaxes. This is a break
with a common understanding of sexual service. In situations where one
person is served by another, as for example in prostitution and in abusive
sexual acts, the prostitute, the child, the forced person is not commonly
perceived as being in a situation of ‘having sex’. They will be seen as the
provider who’s sexual desire is not involved.108 This has been an
important position to take within feminist critique of prostitution and
sexual abuse.109 In my analytical case the providers understand
themselves as ‘having sex’ and I find it hard to question that they take
pleasure in it. It seems to me so obvious that they do enjoy it. And this
brings me to the second point I want to make: I miss a notion of
providing pleasure as a one-sided project, that can also meet the scrutiny
from a feminist perspective; a provider position that is not implicitly
subordinate. Language fail here, though, since it is difficult to speak of a
sexual service that is compatible with feminism and the ideal of equality
in sexual relations.
In the narratives about having and not having sex, the term is used to
describe situations in a certain period in the lives of ATI and J. My
material indicates however, that some think of service as a more
permanent policy.
If she’s aroused, then she’ll get it
Some informants have a very explicit understanding of sex as something
that could be done to one participant at the time. AR does not hesitate to
give her partners what she thinks they want, even if she is not aroused or
feels able to receive directly herself:
AR: ‘No, I never reject anybody. If I can’t sleep with them, I can
at least take them. That’s the way I think.’
AB: ‘You gratify them, then?’
AR: ‘Yes.’
108 I will not take the discussion about the effects of abuse on the victim’s structure
of desire, and the feeling of shame when abusive situations are arousing for the
victim. It does not mean that I consider it not important.
109 One example is when Norwegian authorities, media as well as the judicial system
use the term samleie (intercourse) to describe what happens when an abuser
penetrates a child. The staff at the center against incest in Trondheim criticizes this
for indicating consent, thereby being conceptually misleading (Senter mot Incest,
Sør-Trøndelag 1998).
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AB: ‘Even if you don’t get anything yourself?’
AR: ‘Yes, I don’t bother. If I have my period or something like
that. When I notice that they are horny, it’s enough for me. So, I’m
not the one to reject anybody. Mind you, I’m talking about the
ones I’m dating’ (AR 12).
When AR has a relationship, she will always meet her partner’s desire
positively, even if she is not aroused herself or has her period. In her first
and second sexual relation with women, she was not allowed to touch
her partner’s genitalia. The second woman was her partner for four
years. AR was on one occasion unfaithful to her, having sex with a
heterosexual female friend during a sports tournament. This was the first
time AR experienced sex where she was permitted to actively bring
another woman to orgasm, and she found it very joyous. After that event
she broke up with her partner, and decided never to date an untouchable
woman again. If she wants to get aroused and there are no special
reasons why she should not, she will see to it:
‘If you are not horny, you can do things, use oil and…and you’ll
get horny. If the other person lusts after you, and you have no
particular reason not to want to get horny, sort of. There are
always possibilities’ (AR p12).
AR does not reject partners in permanent relationships. However, she is
not only pleasuring them, she is also taking care of herself through her
own arousal. By that means she gets her pleasure. Is this only an
adjustment to another person’s wants? Would she rather have refused to
participate in this sexual activity? That may be the case. At one occasion
a one-night-stand penetrated her in a way that did not suit her. AR did
not stop her partner because she did not dare to, and she felt cowardly in
the situation. Had she continued to date this woman, AR is quite sure
that she would have been able to let her know. And may be AR would,
but it may also be that to AR, rejection is a more difficult part of the
game. A sign of this is that AR finds it hard to deal with the feeling of
being rejected:
AR: ‘You are lying there, necking, you have become a bit horny
and think that the other one is a bit horny too, and you breathe into
her ear and she breathes into your ear, and then you take the
initiative, and suddenly it doesn’t suit her right now! That’s when
you are pretty tight. I’ll have to get up for a walk. I’ll have
problems then, I’ll get very angry and moody, because I think she
can let me know before she starts. Because, starting to touch each
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other in a certain manner, is kind of an opening to something, and
then you take the initiative, and then you are turned down ... it’s
obvious that it’s very… it’s a trip down. I don’t understand things
like that. If it was me, I would have said that ‘it isn’t convenient
today’ or something. And then we can rather cuddle and kiss a bit,
knowing that nothing more will come of it.’
:
AB: ‘She allowed it to go too far before she stopped it?’
AR: ‘Yes, it happened a couple of times. And I feel that as a kind
of power demonstration or something…I’d never make a scene,
I’d let her fall asleep, and then I’d get up’ (AR p11-12).
It might be that both rejecting and being rejected are a bit problematic
for AR. She has strong opinions concerning rejection and the proper time
for it, and she will do much before she rejects her partner. AR has her
compensating strategy in terms of turning herself on. She is not
presenting herself as a sacrificing woman. She tends to answer positively
to her partner’s sexual initiatives and needs, and she seems to be well
aware of her own degree of arousal and what she wants.
NK has lived together with her partner for ten years, and has the same
matter-of-fact attitude towards one-sidedness. I interviewed both of them
and they give the same impression of a relatively harmonic relationship
where things are sorted out in an open discussion. They are well
educated, have stable jobs and income, are equality-oriented and find
their relationship satisfactory. They do sometimes reject sexual
initiatives, but according to NK, this is not a habit.
AB: ‘Which of you two is the one to initiate sex more often?’
NK: ‘I think that’s pretty equal. We have evening rituals where we
talk in bed before we go to sleep. Sexual desire can arise out of
that … I feel that it’s often equal. Sometimes it happens that one
of us is more aroused than the other one, and you’ll just have to set
about.’
AB: ‘If she’s aroused and you are not…?’
NK: ‘Then she’ll get it’ (NK p7).
As we can see, even a couple that stresses equality, offers sexual service
from time to time. So also with BA and her partner. BA is in her
twenties, living together with her lover. Both have previously had
several male sexual partners, and for both, this is the first relationship
with another woman.
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AB: ‘Can you say something about the difference for you between
having sex with a boy and another girl?’
BA: ‘If I can use the word «softer». I don’t know, but my
experience is that she understands me much better than a guy,
because they tend to paddle their own canoe and that’s it, and if
they had a great time they are very pleased. The way we (BA and
her female lover) have it we’re almost more concerned about the
other one than ourselves. Not so concentrated upon ourselves,
more interplay, softer’ (BA p11)
BA emphasizes the softness and the communication, but also that the
focus is upon the other person, perhaps primarily.
JC is in her late twenties. She met a girl on the Internet who came to visit
her one weekend. They had sex and when I talked with JC this was still
the one and only lesbian sexual encounter for her. JC considers this her
sexual debut. I will refer a major part of the interview that dealt with this
encounter.
AB: ‘You are saying that the weekend was short and poignant.
Was it also sexual?’
JC: ‘Yes, absolutely. I would never have believed that I would
dare, at least not sober. However, you knew that this was what you
wanted and we spent Friday and Saturday together without
touching until Saturday evening, and sex wasn’t until Sunday
morning. You can say that it was not the first thing.’
AB: ‘Did you like it?’
JC: ‘Yes, definitely. That made me realize what I want.
Absolutely. The fantasy had been there, but you know, to make it
come true….’
:
AB: ‘Could you tell in more detail about what happened, what you
did and what she did?’
JC: ‘It started on Saturday evening. I was the one who initiated it.
… I said to her on Saturday evening that I wanted to kiss her, and
she let me. So, we cuddled and stroked in bed on Saturday
evening. We slept late on Sunday morning and we resumed the
cuddling. I remember stroking her belly. And I did not mean to let
it take that course. It was not quite the intention. However, it was
obvious that she had reactions I hadn’t imagined that she would
get, and ... ’ (stops)
AB: ‘Did she start touching you, may be?’
URN:NBN:no-2116
164
JC: ‘No, actually I was the one who continued. She said: «Jesus,
you make me crazy». I understood that she needed more, or
wanted more or would be game for more, I don’t know quite what
to call it. … I knew I could continue. And I don’t think I should
give you further details. I should leave something to your fantasy’
(laughter)
AB: ‘I’m not supposed to be sitting here fantasizing’
(more laughter)
:
AB: ‘Did you both come?’
JC: ‘No, only she. Simply because I didn’t admit her…I never
gave her the chance. I didn’t need it. Pleasuring her gratified me.
That was what I wanted.’
AB: ‘And you succeeded?’
JC: ‘Yes.’
AB: ‘Not bad.’
JC: ‘No.’
(laughter)’ (JC p5-6)
I want to pay attention to three points in the rather long excerpt from the
interview with JC, firstly that pleasuring the other girl was far the most
important feature. JC took her time. We do not know whether the girl
said ‘Jesus, you make me crazy’ primarily because she was so turned on
by JC or because of JC’s hesitancy, which she may have found
frustrating and annoying. Perhaps it was both. In any case, it seems like
JC had her focus on her lover, and not on herself. She did not allow
reciprocity, she says that she did not need or want it. Secondly, JC is
astonished over her own courage, surprised over her partner’s reactions
to stimulation, and I am not sure that she always knows quite what to do.
That is, to JC this represented excitement in more than one respect. She
was not only with her first female lover, she also got reactions from her
partner that she had not expected. She tried to cope with it as the events
developed. Thirdly, making love to another girl was crucial with regards
to the recognition of her own lesbian identity. It was a fantasy come true,
and it confirmed that she wanted to have sex with other women and not
with men. This is a parallel to J, who, as we have seen already, got a
stronger feeling of being a lesbian by pleasuring her lover for a period.
JC is pleasuring her first lover as, in an orgasmic sense, one-sided
service. She is focused, she is excited and she is living a fantasy she has
had for a while. It is difficult to read any kind of subordination out of
this situation that I have chosen to call sexual service. One could perhaps
say that the other woman is exploiting JC’s curiosity, but we could as
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well turn it the other way and say that JC was taking advantage of the
other woman’s sexual arousal.
In this paragraph we have met yet another three women who give sexual
pleasure in terms of orgasm to other women. For J and ATI is was a first
step towards a sexual practice where they also receive. NK and AR are
also ‘receivers’. In the case of JC I cannot say, since the event she told
me about was the first and only lesbian encounter at the time of the
interview. I got an indication, though, that JC at least imagined
mutuality. The day after the interview she sent me an erotic short story
she had written. The young protagonist of the story is seduced by another
girl, and rapidly brought to orgasm. In the end the protagonist regrets the
state of affairs, and complains that she never got to ‘taste’ the other. The
girl who has just seduced her replies that she will take a rain check. JC
by this seem to imagine what I have come to understand as a very
common practice between women who makes love to/with each other. In
the next paragraph I will take a look at mutual one-sidedness, that is;
you-do-this to-me-and-then-I-shall-do-that-to-you.
One at a time
GOE and her partner are equality oriented with regards to everyday life
and its emotional and practical challenges. And since they are
experimenting with expressions of domination and submission in their
sex-life, they talk about equality matters a lot. However, as far as I can
tell from interviews with both of them, they are not engaged in sexual
activity where only one of them reaches orgasm. They were not asked
directly, but as we shall see, GOE has a rather sophisticated way to avoid
sexual activity when she herself is not motivated. She is not servicing
anyone. Her rejection implies that her partner would have to start
working, to make GOE interested.
GOE: ‘…when we have gone to bed and she wants sex, and I’ll
notice that and pretend like I haven’t noticed. And she’ll
understand that and become annoyed, and usually we talk about it.
And then I’ll say, «well, you can start with me, then!» And then
she’ll be too tired for that, and then it’ll be OK’ (GOE p7).
If her partner were asked, she would perhaps say that she still would be
frustrated. They agree that she wants sex considerably more often than
GOE, and this is also an issue they pay much attention. However, let me
follow up on GOE’s version of ‘one-at-a-time’:
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‘When we have sex, usually I’ll start with her. …That’s sort of
typical, and then we shift and it’s my turn’ (GOE p8)
Her partner will normally want more than one orgasm in a sexual
encounter and they do not shift until her partner is ready, or as GOE put
it, not until her partner is:
‘ ... totally finished and wants no more’ (GOE p8).
The ideal of the simultaneous orgasm during intercourse is still around as
a measure of success, according to counseling literature (Almås and
Benestad 1997). GOE and her partner has dismissed the idea all together.
Of all the descriptions I got of sexual encounters I received, GN and AR
were the only ones who ever explicitly mentioned that the simultaneous
orgasm might be a goal.
GN: ‘We did research on that, how do we fix it, how do we do it.
We are not all alike. Some comes easier than others do. So, we had
to find out; who is ………I come easily… I had to learn to keep it
back’ (GN p8).
GN and her partner at that time tried to be creative also in extending the
number of ways to make each other come. The efforts they made to
reach orgasm simultaneously are presented as something they would do
occasionally to increase the excitement. Perhaps the idea about
simultaneity came from heterosexual discourse, where some still see the
ultimate orgasm as the one where the man and the woman reaches
climax at the same moment during coitus. However, in this case a lack of
success does not seem to cause a feeling of failure.
AR is another informant who talked about simultaneity. I have cited her
in the analysis of the term ’to take’ where she says that she is not able to
concentrate on her own orgasm and her partner’s at the same time.
Simultaneity happens occasionally when she and her lover use the 69-
position, and such occurrences are coincidental. In her book Making Out.
The Book of Lesbian Sex and Sexuality’ (‘the first ever fully illustrated
guide to lesbian sexuality’, cited from the cover) Zoe Schramm-Evans
has thought of the problem of simultaneity and concentration. In one
passage from the book she gives some advisory remarks about the giving
and receiving cunnilingus at the same time, what we could call ‘69’. She
seems to agree with AR.
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‘Try imitating each other’s actions until you get the feeling that
you are actually licking yourself – it can be mind-blowing,
particularly if you enjoy coming at the same time (although it can
be difficult to concentrate on your partner when you are
experiencing bliss!’ (Schramm-Evans 1995, p130).
The Swedish author Louise Boije af Gennäs has a scene in her novel
‘Stjärnor utan svindel’ where two women experience this mind-blowing
bliss (1996, p240-242). Boije af Gennäs is no less sacral in her
description of the unifying element in orgasmic simultaneity, than are
authors who describe heterosexual intercourse and the simultaneous
climax. The idea of simultaneity is absolutely around in the lesbian
circuits. Could it be, perhaps, that as in the heterosexual discourse, it is
in pulp fiction where this notion is most prevalent?
As I have already made clear, I am not trying to deconstruct the orgasm
in this chapter. When I read lesbian pulp fiction I do not examine the
ways the author speaks orgasm into existence and the meaning she
ascribes to the orgasm. I am interested in what practices the author lets
her characters play out regarding orgasmic service, reciprocity and
simultaneity. The books will usually have a romantic script similar to
heterosexual pulp fiction: girl meets girl, they fall in love, there are many
obstacles so the reader becomes concerned whether it will be a happy
ending or not, which of course it will be in the end. As in heterosexual
romantic erotic pulp fiction, the characters are very much in love, very
happy or unhappy, and the sexual desire is strong and constant. What I
do here is to read out the social, organizational aspect of the orgasmic
processes as they are described in an arbitrary selection of books. As
motivated and argued in chapter 3 about methods and methodology, I
use the pulp fiction to extend my own interview material. I find extended
sexual service and the production of orgasms as a one-after-the-other
arrangement among my informants. How do the protagonists in lesbian
pulp fiction relate to these issues?
Orgasm in lesbian pulp fiction
I will start with Lane in Helen Sandler’s lesbian erotic novel Big Deal.
She is penetrating her lover Carol with a dildo. Lane directs the
encounter and decides what is to happen.
‘At that moment Lane felt her strength and love pumping through
her. Her job now was to fuck Carol without getting so excited
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herself that they became distracted from what was important: that
Carol should come while Lane filled her. Carol was already so
aroused that Lane knew she needed her clit to be touched. «You
can touch yourself soon, but not yet», she told her’ (Sandler 1999,
p8).
This passage illustrates that Lane requires total concentration to make
her lover come. She cannot let herself, or Carol, be distracted by her own
arousal. Lane conceives of this as a ‘job’. It is not that Lane will do all
the work. Carol will do her part in due course. Lane is important in
different respects; technical skills and self-control is obvious, but also
her capability of eroticizing a situation. It is important for the dynamics
between them that Lane demonstrates her control. That Lane does not
allow Carol to touch herself, that Carol will have to wait, thereby
postponing Carol’s orgasm makes Carol even more aroused and eager to
climax. It is not shown in the excerpt above, but after Carol’s coming it
is Lane’s turn.
When Valerie and Jackie finally reach bed after 100 pages of lust and
obstacles, their sexual encounter is feverish and after a rather short while
they climax in the same moment. Valerie is quite clear that this is not the
preferable way to make love to the woman she has been waiting for. She
says after a while ‘I think I’ve recovered enough now to give you the
attention you deserve’ (Herring 1998, p64). Rosemary and Kate in a
novel written by Lynn Denison are a bit more prosaic, but then, they are
not meant for each other either. Here Rosemary has just provided Kate
with an orgasm, and Kate is grateful:
‘You are very talented’, she said when she’d caught her breath.
Rosemary chuckled. ‘You are not so bad yourself’. She took
Kate’s hand and drew her to her feet. ‘Let’s get more comfortable,
and you can return the favor’ (Denison 1999, p25).
The main romance here is the one between Kate and a girlfriend from
childhood. When Kate finally comes together with Ashley, her childhood
girlfriend and meant-to-be-partner, it is still a one-after-the other-
procedure, this time however with considerably more romantic
wrapping. I will also have to correct the self-righteous Diana quoted in
the very beginning of this chapter. She is complaining over Lane who,
according to her, has a much too one-sided attitude towards sex. Diana is
however herself absorbed in one-after-the-other-sex throughout this book
(Forrest 1993).
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In Legacy of Love (Martin 1997) we meet Sage Bristo, a rich New York
businesswoman who has moved to a small town in Michigan. After two
years she has a reputation for being a ladykiller and a wonderful lover.
She can get every woman she wants, except the only one who really
counts; Deanne Demore. They are partners at the card-table, but that is
all. When Deanne finally gives in, Sage turns out to be untouchable.
Deanne is not allowed to ‘complete their lovemaking’ (p181). That is,
Deanne is not allowed to return the orgasmic pleasure by direct genital
stimulation. Sage Bristo has gained the reputation of being a wonderful
lover even if she brings her lovers to orgasm as an absolutely one-sided
activity. In our culture there is little room for an understanding of men as
wonderful lovers if they do not potently climax. Far from being
inadequate for her female lovers because she does not climax herself,
Sage is by the other lesbians in the community seen as a very potent
woman. Deanne, who after all is the woman who is meant for Sage, will
eventually manage to turn the situation and make Sage receive as well as
give. This is of course preferable within an equality discourse.
Reciprocity in terms of giving and receiving is important, but
simultaneity is again not a question.
Untouchability among lesbians seems to be a real problem for the one
who is not allowed to touch. We remember AR who broke up with her
untouchable lover after having had sex with a heterosexual woman
whom she was allowed to touch. And we also remember J’s first lover
who so ‘terribly’ wanted to make love to J while J wanted to wait. One
of OP’s customers was untouchable. OP’s was not happy about this: ‘It
did not give me anything to have someone on top that I was not allowed
to touch. I like to touch people all over. I was allowed to touch her on
her back. Wasn’t I lucky!’ (OP p12). In lesbian romantic fiction the
female lovers of the untouchable women struggle to find a way around
the resistance against touching. It would have been a break of the
equality discourse of the genre if they did not succeed. Sage is already
mentioned. Ellen in Nancy Little’s Thin Fire (1993) and Victoria in Clair
McNabs Silent Heart (1993) will also be tempted, persuaded and
seduced into reciprocity. Sage, Ellen and Victoria have all been sexually
abused. Love and ability to receive sexually, or more specifically admit
their lovers to touch and make them come, is part of the healing process.
That this is an issue of interest among lesbians was demonstrated when I
gave a talk to 40-50 gay men and women, mostly women. The women in
the audience kept returning to the reasons for wanting to be untouchable.
Sexual abuse was mentioned in particular. It is interesting though, that
the lesbian community seems to represent a sexual arena where a woman
can be understood as being a competent lover even if she is untouchable
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in a genital sense. In most heterosexual contexts she would be
considered a failure. She does not live up to the standards of equality,
however, and should, according to romantic fiction, let herself be made
love to.
From my interviews I see two main forms of one-sidedness in the
production of orgasms: on one hand, one woman provides the other’s
orgasm in a relatively permanent pattern, and the other, two women
pleasure each other by turns. The latter form might be labeled one-sided
mutuality. This is also how I will sum up what I find in contemporary
lesbian romantic and erotic pulp fiction on this issue. It is my
understanding that this feature of lesbian literature reflects that the
procedure of ‘one at a time’ is not only general for my material on
Norwegian lesbians, but is a prevailing practice between women in
contemporary Western societies. I here use the protagonists and the
authors as informants. The reasoning behind that is linked to genre
breaks. Sex is important in lesbian pulp fiction as in heterosexual pulp
fiction. The author makes a distinctive break with similar heterosexual
literature regarding sexual practices leading to orgasm. The (lesbian)
authors of this genre are often very concrete and detailed when they
describe how female orgasms are produced. This is a feature of lesbian
pulp fiction that I find different from heterosexual pulp fiction, where
coitus in an unspecified way tends to bring both participants to climax in
the same second. My suggestion is that the lesbian author is conscious
about what she is doing. She wants the sex scenes to be detailed and
recognizable for her lesbian readers. She can only occasionally let the
sex scenes end in an idealized orgasmic union with religious overtones.
It is not that the Norwegian lesbians whom I have interviewed have read
this kind of literature. Few, if any of them at all, know these books or
how they can get them, since there is close to nothing published in
Norwegian.110 I believe this is more the other way around: a dominant
lesbian practice is reflected in pulp fiction. One could object that the
genre ‘lesbian romantic erotic’ is dominated by middle-class women.
Both the authors and the women they write about are middle-class. I
have on the other hand seen no evidence in my material that makes it
productive to draw a class distinction on this particular issue. I here
claim generality on a level that in Dorte Marie Søndergaard’s opinion,
‘absolutely not represents a central focus for generalization’ in research
based on poststructural theory (Søndergaard 1996, p62, my translation).
The level is the ‘concrete level, close to the empirical’ (p62).111
110 I associate Anne Holt’s novel Mea Culpa with the genre (1997).
111 In Danish: ’det konkrete empirinære niveau’ (Søndergaard 1996, p62).
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I said in the beginning of the chapter, that a more in-depth discussion of
possible subordination attached to sexual service would be taken in a
special section towards the end of this chapter. My question is: do I have
women in my material who express reluctance against sexual one-
sidedness? How do they handle it?
Providing without joy
GN and PO have sometimes provided one-sided sexual service without
being aroused themselves, and also without the matter-of-fact wish to
pleasure the partner. GN and OP usually understands themselves to be
more dominant than their partners in sexual encounters. Yet this does not
seem to prevent unwanted one-sidedness in sex with other women. Both
will sometimes be involved in sex that they do not want. Feeling
dominant and yet subordinate sounds like a paradox.
GN was married to a man once, and in her marriage she sometimes felt
that she had to be ready for her husband. She has also felt obliged to
make love to her female partner, and not being aroused herself, she
actually has not wanted it.
AB: ‘Did you eventually feel aroused?’
GN: ‘No. It has been difficult along the way, but afterwards I have
been glad that I did it. Because I saw that it did her good and the
strong need she had there and then. But it has been difficult along
the way’ (GN p15).
The problem for GN has several aspects. At the occasions when she does
not want to engage in sex and her partner wants to, GN is usually tired,
not mentally in the mood for having sex and her partner has perhaps
been drinking. GN says that it feels as thoug her partner is saying; ‘If
you don’t want to, you will do it anyway’, and GN will decide to
participate in what she calls ‘a game’.112 Sometimes she feels good by
the control it gives her (she is calm while the other is needy), but if it
always goes one way, and the emotional climate is not right, it will not
work in the long run. She will then feel emotional distance, unwanted
pressure and a growing distaste. GN says it is hard to know what comes
first and what last. She has had relationships where she stopped ‘offering
112 This may sound similar to an s&m play, but should not be seen as one since GN is
uncomfortable with this situation (Califia and Sweeney 1996). For a critique of
lesbian s&m related to feminism, see Linden et al 1982, Soble (ed) 1997.
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service’ because the deep feelings required of her had faded. GN says
that ‘something died, and I did not bother doing it anymore’.113
While GN is primarily concerned about her partner’s strong need, OP
emphasizes the problems related to rejection of sexual initiatives. OP
does not like to be rejected herself and she will sometimes leave bed in a
very bad mood. Especially if she is rejected because ‘ ... three hours
earlier I said the wrong thing’.
AB: ‘Have you ever rejected somebody?’
OP: ‘Yes, and I don’t like it much, because I can’t stand to be
rejected myself. I don’t like to do it. It is not always I want to, or it
doesn’t suit me. You are not aroused at all. But sometimes I have
done it, and I’ve got the feeling of being used, that I have to sleep
with somebody. I don’t want to, but I do it because of the other
one.’
AB: ‘How do you feel afterwards?’
OP: ‘I don’t like it afterwards. But it passes off’.
AB: ‘Is this happening in long-term relationships?’
OP: ‘Yes, in casual sex, both usually want it. That’s the reason
why the one go home with the other. However, it has happened
that you go home with somebody because you think that
something is going to happen, and then it turns out to be nothing.
That’s when I go home. And I’ll be very grumpy’ (OP p10).
As also shown in the case of AR, OP can become grumpy when she is
turned down, and might at the same time have problems when it comes
to rejecting someone herself. Half way through her first reply, OP shifts
from talking about her dislike of rejecting somebody, to talk about her
dislike of sleeping with somebody she actually does not want to sleep
with. ‘I don’t like to do it’ refers to her attitude towards rejecting
somebody. The next sentence is about having sex when she does not
want to: ‘It is not always I want to, or it does not suit me. You are not
aroused at all’. As we saw in the chapter about commercial sex, OP was
trading sex for gifts and money, pleasuring upper-class women at the end
of the 1960’s. This was a time when she pleasured women without
necessarily being aroused herself. Later in the interview OP says that she
113 I do not have reference to a page in an interview transcription here. I went back to
GN a second time, to discuss what more concretely the difficulty she refers to in the
interview could consist of. I did not use a tape recorder, and this was more of a
conversation than a research interview. I did however take two pages of handwritten
notes.
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has also tried to force another woman to have sex with her. She had been
drinking too much, and did not stop her attempts until her partner started
to cry. This happened in a long-term relationship. OP assures me that it
has not happened more than once, but these narratives make it likely that
rejection is difficult to handle, either way.
Possible exploitation and subordination
One-sidedness in sexual servicing may develop in such a way that the
provider does not feel like giving. I do not have the material or the
competence to analyze the individual psychologies and power balances
involved in the two cases of obvious reluctance I have in my material.
OP and GN both report parents who failed as such, which may have
contributed to an inclination to engage in activity where they
emotionally are not fully present. One could say that by this behavior
they are in a subordinate position, a subordinate position that again is
blurred by the dominance they claim to have in bed and the very firm
conditions they are launching in their present relationships. Today OP
has a girlfriend with whom she has sex regularly. This girlfriend would
rather have liked a more permanent relationship, but OP is not ready for
this right now. OP finds that she has a good life as it is. GN is in a
relationship with a woman who has a drinking problem. GN is quite
clear about some indispensable conditions for a continued relationship,
and both she and her partner knows that GN has other options, especially
since GN is in a secure economic situation. OP will not take on more
obligations while her present partner is pressing in that direction, and
GN is well aware of the economic freedom she has on her own if her
partner does not change her drinking habits. Both OP and GN clearly
express what pleases them sexually and what does not. I cannot see that
they have given in to a service-orientation that means no sexual
gratification for themselves, at least not permanently.
I said at the beginning of this chapter that I would relate to feminist
concerns in general. OP, GN and also ATI, who was in a relationship
with permanent provisions from her side, are the ones who first of all
raised my feminist concern about equality issues. At the same time, the
three of them very clearly understand themselves as the more dominant
part in sexual exchange with other women; that is, I am challenged by
the data to discuss possible subordination for three women who usually
conduct the sexual encounters they engage in, and who experience
themselves as being dominant in bed. OP, GN and ATI all show signs of
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traditional butchness, and I have chosen to analyze this question in the
light of existing texts about the butch-femme dyad.
The butch did not fit the lesbian feminist discourse in the 1970’s. They
disappeared from the streets and did not join the feminist lesbian
movement. However, in bed they were not easily captivated by a
traditional feminist critique. The butches were focused on the
gratification of their femme partners, who well knew what they wanted.
The femme would often be frustrated when she was not allowed to
pleasure or even touch her butch partner, but the butch was proud of her
own capability to pleasure the femme (Kennedy and Davis 1993). The
femmes not only knew their own needs, they also demanded and
expected to have them met. Thus, sexual gratification or orgasm could
not solely take the character of a gift given by the butch. One-sidedness
nevertheless ‘benefited’ the more feminine part, in contrast to the
heterosexual couples of the time in which the man benefited.
Kennedy and Davis (1993) also discuss the satisfaction that butches
achieved through lovemaking. Kennedy and Davis seem to imply that
orgasm, or rather, plain physical instead of mental satisfaction, was not
on the butches agenda until the 1960’ and 1970’s, when butches became
more experimental and the community norms began to change. Even
when physical satisfaction for butches was a non-topic in the
community, Joan Nestle was aware of butch physical pleasures. In her
short story ‘Margaret’ we meet a young butch lover, who makes love in
‘the old way’:
‘The first time we were ever together, on a warm summer night in
Michigan surrounded by hundreds of new-time Lesbians, this
young woman came on me in the old butch way- on top of me,
moving on my leg. My body and her dreams driving out her roar
of pleasure. Now a year later, my leg trembles under the power of
her concentrated movement, and then her body becomes a single
wave. She comes heaving against my leg, collapsing onto me. I
hold her so dear, waiting for the pounding of her heart to quiet. I
had thought this gift of a woman coming on top of me had fled the
world, but Margaret, who wears feathers and dreams of goddesses,
carries the old ways of women loving deep within her’ (Nestle
1987, p156).
This is a description given by a woman who in the late 1950’s and 60’s
had sex with butches that she mainly met in the bars of Buffalo, New
York. This young butch might have been untouchable, reaching her
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climax by rubbing herself off against her lover’s leg. Nestle is calling it
‘the old butch way’. Contemporary lesbians who are not socialized in a
butch-femme context would probably perceive this as one way of
reaching orgasm among others. The point I want to make is, however,
that traditional butches, at least some of them, would climax without
being touched and with their main focus on their femme lovers.
OP, GN and ATI are not untouchable and I do not know if they ever
have reached orgasm ‘the old butch way’. The features that remind me of
butchness are, first, the dominance they are claiming to have in sexual
encounters with other women; second, the attitude towards giving
pleasure to their partners and, as I read them, finally, their subtle
masculine signaling. Moreover, they are all nearly fifty years of age or
older, and OP and GN were identified as lesbians in ‘the old days’ before
feminism really challenged the lesbian community characteristics. If we
can ascribe butchness on the basis of this, which I think we can, OP and
GN would most likely also have been benefiting on the higher prestige
connected to the butch role in lesbian communities compared to the role
of the femme. To conclude this passage: OP, GN and ATI are or were
perhaps ‘too kind’ and would sometimes reach their limits when it came
to pleasuring other women. Their ‘kindness’ was exploited. However,
they seem to be aware when the limits are reached, they know what they
like and they know how to climax when that is important to them.
Combined with the control they take over sexual encounters and their
profits from butch power, I doubt the permanence of subordination on
their behalf.
In general, one-sidedness, and most often mutual one-sidedness in the
production of orgasms is the common lesbian practice. With reference to
my interview material I cannot see that the risk of producing one
subordinate part in any way is characteristic of sexual exchange between
the women when it comes to the question of orgasm. Sometimes service
is given to an extent in which the limits of the provider are reached and
even passed. From my material it seems that the lesbians who are in the
subordinate servicing ‘risk-zone’ at the same time profit from the power
that masculine signaling can give. This reasoning might of course be
naive.114 My interview material may not contain a broad range of
dynamics on this issue, and romantic erotic fiction certainly does not
114 Violence in lesbian relationships is documented in previous research; however, as
far as I know not as sexual violence.
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address it.115 I have shown here that some lesbians are ‘too kind’ and are
sexually exploited by other women. I do not want to excuse this.
However, I have argued for a lesbian specificity of ‘exploitation’ that is
connected to the use of masculine strategies, which give power to the
provider.
The last issue addressed here is penetration, and here I will finally relate
to the third point of the feminist critique that I mentioned at the
beginning: the coital imperative.
Penetration
To study the lesbian reworking of a heterosexual discourse that defines
coitus as the most important sexual act (‘the coitus imperative’
McPhillips, Braun and Gavey 2001), is not as unreasonable as it might
sound. It was probably not unusual between butches in the 1950’s and
1960’s that the older and more experienced taught the young and new
how to handle a dildo. In Leslie Feinberg’s novel Stone Butch Blues
there is a rather touching scene where the old butch Al is educating the
then inexperienced and young Jess about how to penetrate a femme to
make it good for the femme partner. Al’s femme, Jacqueline, is also
contributing to the education (Feinberg 1993, p30-31). Penetration with
dildos was an important part of the ‘doing’, and as a butch one should do
it right. In an analysis of this practice it would probably been apt to
approach the issue as a lesbian reworking of the coitus imperative. The
scenes with Al and Jess, and later Jacqueline and Jess, indicate that they
related directly to a hegemonic coital practice in the heterosexual sphere,
but also that coitus was negotiated and practiced with certain
specificities within a lesbian context. The dildo lost its hold within most
lesbian circles in the 1970’s, and is now subculturally visible mainly on
the lesbian s&m scene and in lesbian pornography, here representing
phallic power on behalf of the one who is in control of the tool. As we
will see, my informants relate to the use of the dildo in a variety of ways,
and I will use these attitudes and practices to discuss the coitus
imperative. To see lesbian negotiations of the coitus imperative, not as
miming but as a reworking, can raise new questions about the culturality,
115 I can find the ‘butch subordination’ in s&m fiction, though. See for instance
Kathleen E. Morris’ shortstory ‘Lesson’ (1996) and Karlyn Lotney’s shortstory
‘Clash of the Titans’ (1998). A script of subordination of the dominant is here
exploited. It is important that this is wanted and enjoyed as a negotiated deal between
the two women. Whereas in my cases it is not part of a s&m play and unwanted by
the ‘dominant’ partner.
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the politics and historicity of this particular sexual practice in a
heterosexual context. I will return to this, but first demonstrate in a
broader sense my material in this field, and start with ‘penetration’.
Penetration has a central position in lesbian sexual practice, and is
executed with fingers, fists, or dildos or other tools – that is, with ‘non-
orgasmic’ objects (Ann Cvetkovich 1995, previously referred to in the
‘take-chapter’). Among my informants there are two who will not let
themselves be penetrated in any way, and I will come back to that. The
rest of them appreciate penetration when their partners use their hands.
Penetration goes both ways, with variations due to individual preferences
(when, how deep, for how long, etc). In chapter 4 about ’taking’
especially, and also in chapter 6 about prostitution, I thematized the
symbolic meaning of penetration. It is my impression that the penetration
I am talking about here, is mainly about penetration for physical
pleasure. I cannot see that the eroticizing effect of the phallic that might
be connected to penetration is central. My data is admittedly not ‘thick’
on this issue. I did not ask directly for narratives about penetration and
its physical and fantasy-producing aspects, which I can only regret. I am
convinced that some of this penetration has overtones linked to control
on behalf of the penetrator, the one who demonstrates that she possesses
the main signifier of desire. However, it is not verbalized in the
interviews, and I believe that it is of minor importance.116 I will equally
argue that the power aspect is of major importance for the two
informants who never accept penetration. One is an s&m top, and the
other is in the transition from being socially understood as a lesbian to
being understood as heterosexual man. As I understand them, neither of
them can handle the loss of control, the feminization, that being
penetrated represents in a symbolic sense.
For the rest, it is when the dildo is the subject of conversation that the
symbolic comes into frame in my interviews. The dildo seems not to be
central in the sex-life of any of the informants I have, neither
symbolically nor physically. However, there are dildos in circulation in
the lesbian subcultures represented in my data. My informants either
own one themselves, or they have had partners who did.
GN understands herself as being dominant in bed, but she enjoys being
penetrated when her partner uses her hands. Usually GN will use her
116 It is of course impossible to totally disconnect physically motivated penetration
from the cultural and symbolic meaning attached to it. I construct this binary
opposition as an analytical tool.
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hands too, but has recently got a lover who is ‘much more bisexual’.
According to GN, her partner would, at the beginning of their
relationship, ‘miss the dick’, and they purchased a dildo. They thought it
less necessary as their relationship developed. BA has a female lover
who is not a lesbian. She simply has not met the right guy yet. For them,
penetration with hands goes both ways; the girlfriend however likes the
dildo better. ‘But’, BA says, ‘she is also the one who would rather have a
man’ (BA p8). CC was active in the gay and lesbian movement in the
beginning of the 1980’s, and sex toys were discussed within the
movement. She was annoyed by all the political objections to sex toys.
She took the position that some women, especially those with
heterosexual experiences, want something penis-like. A dildo may be a
good ‘relief worker’ (CC p6). In these women’s understanding of the
dildo, it represents an anatomical man. The dildo is literally a stand-in
for the penis. Again this sounds as if it first of all is about physicality;
the dildo represents the physical man. I think it is more here; the dildo
also represents the symbolic meaning of masculinity and control, to the
extent that the separation of the symbolic and physical aspects of
penetration can be justified. It would probably have been productive here
to record the narratives of the lovers of GN, BN and CC, to get their
views on the issue. What does this penetration represent for them? I do
not have their narratives.117 My reasoning is connected to the fact that
GN, BA and CC express resistance to being penetrated by a dildo. I see
no evidence that this is because they would not enjoy the physical aspect
of this. My position is that it is connected to a distaste for the masculinity
associated with being penetrated with a penis-like item. There is a
similarity between GN, BA and CC not wanting to be penetrated with a
dildo, compared to the two informants who do not want to be penetrated
at all; a distaste for being the object of the power that is symbolically
executed in penetration (with a dildo). The difference is that hands do
not carry a connotation of power for GN, BA and CC. The conclusion of
this is that some women with female lovers express the need for the
physical sexual pleasures of the penis and the phallic signification
attached. Their female lovers are adequate with the help of a dildo. They
replace the man in a symbolic as well as an anatomical sense.
For some informants, the presence of a man that the dildo may
symbolize, is exactly what they do not want. We heard WR in chapter 5,
117 The only sort of indication is what I took from the interview with GN. I asked her
about ‘dirty talking’. GN says that she talks dirty to her latest partner (the one who
needed a dildo). Her partner wants her to say things like ‘You’re so good’ and ‘I’m
gonna fuck you’ (p11), and GN is happy to comply.
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the ‘masculinity-chapter’; she might as well have dated a man if the
dildo was in play. ATI has tried it, but she did not feel comfortable. She
felt clumsy, and it was not arousing to her:
‘It was the most ridiculous thing I have ever experienced….It
doesn’t turn me on. And I barely see the difference between
having sex with a man and having sex with a woman….To use sex
remedies is unnatural to me, it is much more delightful to use my
hands…To me, to use my hands and my mouth is so wonderful,
that I can’t think of anything else. The other is pathetic by
comparison’ (ATI p19-20).
It is what she can do with her own body parts that is wonderful to ATI.
And, to use a dildo does not turn her on, which means that it does not
have the eroticizing effect that it can have for others. The feeling of
trying to be a man, but not being one or not wanting to be one, feels
unnatural and pathetic. I do not know whether this is linked to a feeling
of inadequacy. Could it be that ATI is so unhappy without a penis that
she rejects the item that resembles it? I do not think so ( cf the reasoning
about ATI and the pleasure she takes in making love to a woman). The
feeling of inadequacy is more of a problem for AR. If her women
partners needed a dildo, she would oblige them. But, she would see it as
a defeat:
‘ ... dildos, I’ve never got into contact with that, but of course I
know that some need them, and why not? I think it would have
been a defeat for me. I don’t know. I have managed (with my own
body) till now. And I have dated women who have been married.
X was married before I met her, and she never thought about that
(a dildo). I am strong, you know. I think that will do just as well as
a dildo. I have been together with girls who normally would
require a dildo, but they didn’t need that with me.’ (AR p14).
Penetration with a dildo is something some women might need for
physical relief, as AR sees it. She does not need to use a dildo on her
lovers, because she is strong. That is: what these women might need is
not the dildo as a representation for a fantasy, but for proper penetration.
She is able to penetrate women properly with her hands because of her
strength. If a woman expressed a wish for a dildo, AR would probably
feel that she was not strong enough or good enough as a female lover.
This is to let the dildo go in to replace, not a penis/man, but a hand. AR
here thematizes the physical aspect of what her lovers might want. She
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does not question that for some, the dildo has fantasy aspects that could
be as important.118
There is only one informant in my material who is clear about her
positive evaluation of the signification of the dildo. IKL says that she
and her partner are excited about playing with it.
IKL: ‘I wanted to try a dildo, and we bought one and tried it. That
was fun, we laughed, it was stimulating, different. Both of us had
it on. It worked better on her when I had it, than on me. It was too
long for me’ (laughter)
AB: ‘Did it do anything to the eroticity of the situation that she or
you had it on, was it a turn on for you?’
IKL: ‘Yes, I think so. It was exciting, and at the same time we got
more of a play out of it. And we would laugh in between’.
Again, my interview is not adequate since I did not pay enough attention
to the issue at that time. It seems though, that this is a playful experiment
for both of them. The presence of the dildo adds excitement to the
encounter. It is my qualified guess that this is not due to its materiality
only, but has also something to do with what the dildo erotically
represents in our culture. It carries phallic erotic meaning, but the dildo
is also a fake penis. The latter opens up for a drag-like situation and
some fun. To IKL and her partner this is also about physical pleasure,
even if it is too long for her and physically more suitable for her partner.
All in all, among my informants, dildos are sometimes used, but not
often. In my interviews, the dildo is closely associated with the physical
and symbolic presence of a man. It is both rejected (we don’t need a man
here) and used for that reason (my partner is bisexual/used to be with
men). The meaning of the dildo is consciously played with by one
informant and her partner. Most penetration reported by my informants
is executed with hands. I cannot say how much of this is motivated by
physical pleasure alone, and to what degree penetration played the role
of a signifier of desire. I suggest that penetration with hands can be
executed without symbolic meaning distinctly attached to the act, but
that this is less likely when penis-like dildos are involved. This picture
118 I do not discuss the erotic connotations that ‘the hand’ might have, which would
be apt. Both in psychoanalytical theory and in pornography, the lesbian hand
(fingers) might be seen as a signifier of desire. Hands are important also in my
interviews, but the analysis of this will have to wait to another occasion.
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might change with an analysis of ‘the hand’ in my interviews, that is; the
hand understood as a signifier of desire.
I will address the subversive potential of lesbianism in Chapter 8:
Lesbian specificity, but will nevertheless give a brief comment on it in
connection with penetration. It is ‘common sense’ within the field of
sexuality studies that penetration feminizes the penetrated. In my
material physically pleasurable penetration is executed both with and
without such meaning attached. The question is worth scrutiny: under
what conditions within a heterosexual context can this distinction be
made? (unlike Sheila Jeffreys and Andrea Dworkin I do not believe that
all penetration of women by men is oppressive, cf the ‘take’-chapter).
Another question is addressing the subversiveness of a women ‘taking
on the phallus’ in the very literal way that seems to be assumed when a
woman takes on a dildo. Colleen Lamos is very optimistic in her opinion
about the potential of lesbian dildo use. Lamos argues that the dildo:
‘undermines the authority of the penis, demystifying the latter’s
phallisism through its simulation of the penis’ (Lamos 1995,
p102).
This is to attach great subversive importance to lesbian dildo use, one
that I hardly can subscribe to without contextualizing.119 Based on my
investigation of the lesbian exchange, I would say that it is not often that
this undermining takes place. Merely rejecting the dildo, as some of my
informants chose to do, is of course interesting. It shows that elements of
phallic sex can be recognized, considered and dismissed. One could ask,
though, what the price is in terms of limiting the potential for sexual
pleasure. To accept it only because the woman’s female partner is used
to sex with a man, represents no reworking, but more a simple repetition
and reiteration. As I understand my interviews, the subversiveness lies in
the switching and in the play on the dildo’s economy, that is; when it is
detached from the anatomical man and has become the lesbian phallus
with its ‘plasticity, transferability, and expropriability’ (Butler 1993a,
p61). Except for IKL it does not seem as though the potential of the dildo
is utilized among my informants. This will be further discussed in the
119 Lamos’ research material is lesbian pornography and sex manuals. Her material is
meant to arouse. The dildo’s potential is great in this respect, as this fake penis plays
directly on a hegemonic sexual culture where the phallus still is the main signifier of
sexual desire. My material is the stories of living women. I think the difference in the
degree of optimism between Lamos and me mainly reflects a difference between
fiction meant for erotic stimulation and narratives of ‘everyday sex’.
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next chapter, where I come back to the theoretical consequences of
women replacing men.
Final remarks
I started out with an exploratory approach, and have related not only to
the specific feminist critique of heterosexual discourse in the realm of
orgasm. I have discussed power issues and made my summary about
sexual service and reciprocity in more general terms, and in the last
paragraphs explored penetration. I will now return to the three points of
criticism toward heterosexual discourse, regarding women, men and
orgasm, that I referred in the beginning: men should be more
considerate, women should know their bodies better and not give the
responsibility to their partners, coitus should have a less dominant
position. How can lesbian practice be seen as reworking of these power
issues?
The first criticism: men should be more considerate. As I said in the
outset, I have found no reason to present one of the women involved in
lesbian sex as more the man than the other. There are women who are
experienced like men in a sexual sense, as we saw in chapter 6 about
prostitution, where OP with one client was supposed to be on her back,
‘totally girl’. I have demonstrated that some lesbians use a dildo to
replace the man in a sexual sense. However, in this text I do not read
masculinity as ‘being a man’. I have found it far more proliferate to read
it in terms of the potential to eroticize. If we nevertheless say that there
are some lesbians who look and behave more like men than others, the
equality debate is turned upside down related to the heterosexual
concern: the masculine one is the one to risk subordination in a sexual
sense. She, not the more feminine partner, has the higher risk of sliding
into a servicing position regarding orgasms. I discussed this issue in a
group of lesbian friends, and one of them said that feminine lesbians
could be extraordinary egoistic in bed. And, she said, she should know
since she was one herself! (For further reading about femme agency, see
the anthology about femmes, edited by Harris and Crocker, 1997). I do
not know how widespread this is in a heterosexual context (outside the
s&m-scene), that the man should be in a (subordinate) servicing position
and the orgasm first of all should be for the woman. I guess there are
some, and it is tempting to say as I have said about my slightly
masculine and servicing lesbians: most of them will probably handle it.
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The second criticism: women should know their bodies better and not
give the responsibility to their partners. Here one could say that lesbians
have a natural advantage: the knowledge about the female body is lived
experience on both side of the exchange. The production in a technical
sense is apparently not an issue. We have seen some examples where it
takes a while to learn how to make love to a woman, and also to learn
how to receive from a woman, and the women seem to have taken it
slowly when they considered they needed to learn. And they concentrate
on the task of producing an orgasm. I suppose this illustrates what
statistics from sexological surveys have been telling us: lesbians seem to
be successful with orgasms in sexual encounters (Hite 1980, Kinsey
1948, Masters and Johnson 1966). This seems to be the case also
between young persons in their first sexual meeting with another person
(Thomposon 1990). Could this be because lesbians more than other
women hold on to an androcentric view on sexuality: sexual arousal
must in any case be released? The service orientation I have
demonstrated here could be read as an indication of that, and after all,
lesbianism is defined by sexual desire. Perhaps heterosexual women
have other expectations and other goals than orgasm to achieve from
sex? For instance, could femininity or the identity as a woman be at
stake if she is not sexually responding positively, even when the
response does not lead to her orgasm? And what about the importance of
romance, being close to one another, feeling loved? Is having sex a way
to obtain romance in heterosexual relations, while it is sought for by
other means in lesbian relations? An argument in favor of this is that
compared to gay male couples and heterosexual couples, lesbians are the
ones who less frequently have sex (Blumstein and Schwartz 1983). Is
orgasm not that important after all for heterosexual women? Here are
several questions that are beyond the scope of my project. I will sum up
my discussion as follows: lesbians seem to be successful in producing
orgasms when having sex. A double internal knowledge about the female
body and seriousness in producing them might be part of the
explanation.
The third issue: the coitus imperative of heterosexual discourse. Coitus
has a remarkable significance. The sexual debut is defined as the first
time of penile penetration. Coitus tends to be judged as real sex, other
things we do are commonly spoken of as foreplay, introduction,
warming up etc. before actually having sex. From feminists and from
sexologists we hear that since coitus is not a common route for women to
climax, the centrality of it should be toned down. My informants
negotiate the coitus imperative actively. I have argued that penetration
often can be seen as detached from its hegemonic symbolic meaning,
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and that the conversation about the dildo poignantly puts the issue on the
agenda. My perception of the lesbian negotiation of the dildo is that it is
varied; some relate by rejecting, some by repeating, and some by playing
on its economy, and probably all of it at the same time to a greater extent
than I am able to picture here. I am discussing the position coitus has
related to the female orgasm, and the conclusion I will draw on the issue
is that in the lesbian reworking, the institution of coitus does not stand in
the way of both partners achieved orgasm. In sex between women, the
question of orgasm is separated from the coitus imperative and from
penetration in general.
Biology and the possible reproductive effects cannot explain this. After
all, in Western societies most sexual activity is not supposed to result in
pregnancy. I understand this as a cultural phenomenon first of all.
However, since a biological penis is usually present in heterosexual
intercourse, and usually not in lesbian encounters, I think I should make
a brief comment on biology.120 In lesbian sex, penetration is executed
with non-orgasmic objects. That penetration should be the most direct
route to climax for the penetrator, as intercourse is for most men, is less
likely to be the motivation for penetration in lesbian sex. I would believe
that this aspect of biological difference between men and women makes
it more likely that the counselors speak more directly to two women than
to a man and a woman on this particular issue. McPhillips, Braun and
Gavey (2001) ask: ‘How imperative is the «coital imperative»?’ Their
answer is in short ‘Very important’. However, they also find that there
are tensions and fissures in the dominant heterosexual discourse, that
might indicate changes. In her in-depth study of 400 teenage girls’
sexual initiation experiences, Sharon Thompson finds that one small
group of young women are well prepared for sexual encounters with
young men. These are young women who have practiced masturbation
and had conversations with friends and mothers about sexual desire and
pleasure. This group, she says, will ‘look for lovers with slower hands,
more exploratory tongues, wiser cocks’ (Thompson 1990, p357). The
effects of biological difference on the coitus imperative cannot be
understood unless we read them in the light of the cultural and sexed
meaning of penetration. Perceived like this, there will probably be
120 Some claim status as ‘woman’ even when they posses a penis, and some claim
status as man even without one (transsexuality). There are not many such cases, but
it would of course evoke new perspectives on the debate about women, men and the
coitus imperative. The ‘from woman to man’ transsexual in my interview material
has no penis. He uses his tongue and his hands to bring women to orgasm. He and his
female (heterosexual) partners will obviously have to deal with the coitus imperative
in specific ways.
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changes in the coitus imperative, like McPhillips, Braun, Gavey and
Thompson indicate through their studies.
The results in this chapter will be taken further in a delimitation of
‘lesbian specificity’ in the next chapter. The aspect of service orientation
and mutuality will be given special attention in the discussion of the
sociality of lesbian sex. Regarding the more theoretical elements of
‘specificity’, I ask whether we, any longer, can speak about ‘women’
when they replace men in an anatomic and symbolic sense.
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CHAPTER 8: LESBIAN SPECIFICITY
‘Is it not possible that lesbian sexuality is a process that reinscribes
the power domains that it resists, that it is constituted in part from
the very heterosexual matrix that it seeks to displace, and that its
specificity is to be established, not outside or beyond that
reinscription or reiteration, but in the very modality and effects of
that reinscription?’ (Butler 1993b, p310).
I decided early in the project that this passage in Judith Butler’s article
Imitation and Gender Insubordination (1993b) should be somewhat
over-determining for my analytical approach. To analyze lesbian
sexuality as a reworking of heterosexual power domains has been a
guiding principle, but not a clear-cut analytical process. For instance in
chapter 7 about orgasm, I found that a more explorative approach was
apt. Three topics are the most crucial to Butler’s suggestion of searching:
to search for (1) ‘lesbian specificity’ in the (2) ‘modalities and effects’
of (3)‘reinscription or reiteration of power domains’. What I have done
in the four analytical chapters is to examine lesbian desire as the
reworking of power elements that are identified in feminist critique of
heterosexuality (‘modalities’ of ‘reinscription or reiteration’). It will be
the main aim of this chapter to try to extract the analysis in the previous
chapters (delimit a ‘lesbian specificity’) and suggest some ‘effects’ on
the hegemonic sexual culture.121 I will elaborate on this.
I make a synthesis of the results of the investigation of lesbian sexual
exchange by developing a notion of ‘lesbian specificity’. In the closing
of each of the four foregoing chapters it is indicated how the results of
the discussions will contribute to the content of this term. The notion of
lesbian specificity is thus based on the main points from each of the
previous analytical chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7. I said in the introductory
chapter that the aim for the project is to contribute to a debate about
power and sexual desire. The development of the term ‘lesbian
specificity’, and first of all a discussion of what it might mean to the
main culture, will be my contribution. What does it mean to recognize
121 One other aspect of ‘effect’ is connected to the construction of lesbian identity
and lesbian subcultures, which means that ‘effects’ are not to be perceived as
something that can be measured as a result of lesbian practice. Indeed, ‘effects’ are
in this sense part of ‘becoming’ a lesbian. The reflections about these aspects of
effects are not my focus here. It is the possible effects on mainstream sexual culture
that is addressed.
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the existence of something called ‘lesbian specificity’? What effects
could that have on the society? Will the presence of lesbian erotic
practice in our culture and the visualization of it as in this text, mean
anything at all to stimulate to changes in dominant and normative
heterosexual practices and fantasies?
The reason for utilizing the term ‘lesbian specificity’ will probably need
an explanation, since the associations might go to an understanding of
homosexuality as unchangeable, inflexible and innate. I have opened up
and deconstructed discursive fields and binaries, like ‘masculinity’,
‘femininity’, ‘romance’, ‘sexual service’ and ‘homo-hetero’ etc. Why
would I close the very same fields by operating with a term like
‘specificity’? Does that not imply that there is an essential difference
between homosexuality and heterosexuality, between homosexual
women and heterosexual women, and confirm the impression of
permanence and stability? And besides, the empirical analysis has
demonstrated a variety of ways in which lesbians negotiate power. Why
is not ‘variation’ the key word for the synthesizing?
As I see it, to destabilize cultural phenomena that are taken for granted
and considered to be pure nature, and make the ground shaky is a good
thing. I do not believe that social science always has to cater to the
concrete needs of policy-makers. Having said this, I want the results of
the analysis to be structured in such a way that they can represent
concrete input in a public debate. One motivation for this project is to
make love between women a more visible part of the debates, research
and practices of sexuality. I cannot see how we can do this without
theorizing lesbian desire and practice as something that is possible to
delimit, describe and name in a continuous process of deconstruction,
construction and struggle over the politics of theory and practice.
The category ‘homosexual’ was inaugurated as a means of social
expulsion. Yet another objection could be made: what mission can the
term ‘lesbian specificity’ have if not just to oppress us further? Linda
Alcoff suggests an answer to a similar dilemma regarding the phrase
‘women of color’. Alcoff heard an attack on the phrase by a dark-
skinned woman, who argued that the phrase reinforced skin-color as
being of social significance. Alcoff agreed with her to a large extent, and
was also critical:
‘we must develop the means to address the wrongs done to us
without reinvoking the basis of those wrongs. Likewise women
who have been eternally construed must seek a means of
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articulating a feminism that does not continue construing us in any
set way. At the same time, I believe we must avoid buying into the
neuter, universal, «generic human» thesis that covers the West’s
racism and androcentrism with a blindfold’ (Alcoff 1988, p436).
There is a classic poststructural dilemma here: a name and position are
construed in the same movement as life is given to oppression. How do
we address the name and the positions without confirming the
subordination? My ambition is to elaborate on the term ‘lesbian
specificity’ while understanding the term as a position from where
critique and resistance against heteronormativity may occur.122 It simply
means to enable the formulation of potentials for change. As I see it, I
have to take the risk of essentialism, and Teresa de Lauretis claims that
she takes that risk seriously.
The risk of essentialism
In an article from 1989, Teresa de Lauretis tries to put straight those who
accuse other feminist theoreticians of being essentialists. She is tired of
the term that she and others initially used as a ‘serious critical concept’
(p3), but now ‘time and time again repeated with its reductive ring, its
self-righteous tone of superiority, its contempt for «them» – those guilty
of it’ (p3).123 She presents a notion of ‘essential difference’ that to her, is
what feminism is about:
‘ ... feminist theory is all about an essential difference, an
irreducible difference, though not the difference between woman
122 I am not here only referring to critique and resistance in terms of formulated or
organized political activity, but resistance also in terms of possible subversive effects
of lesbian erotic practices upon dominant practices.
123 The international, or perhaps more precisely the Anglo-American debate on
essentialism and feminism, will sometimes seem strange in a Norwegian context.
Some would even say that we have imported a conflict without roots in Norwegian
feminist theorizing. I would say that the debate is inspired and informed by the
international debate, but we obviously do have a national debate based on works
executed by Norwegian/Nordic scholars (see for example Annfelt 2000, Bjerrum-
Nielsen 2000, Eng and Markusen 2000, Prieur and Moseng 2000, Solheim and
Søndergaard 1996). The fulcrum of the Norwegian debate is often the value of
poststructural approaches to empirical research. The similarities and differences
between the Norwegian and the international debate is outside the focus for my
project, and I await the publications of a project that specifically examines the
historical development of Norwegian feminist thinking (Beatrice Halsaa,
forthcoming).
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and man, nor a difference inherent in «woman’s nature» (in
woman as nature), but a difference in the feminist conception of
woman, women, and the world’ (de Lauretis 1989, p3).
She proceeds by emphasizing this essential difference between feminist
and non-feminist thinking as being a difference in understanding of the
subject in relation to institutions; difference in knowledges, discourses
and practices of cultural forms; difference in historical consciousness
etc. And she says:
‘That difference is essential in that it is constitutive of feminist
thinking and thus of feminism; it is what makes the thinking
feminist, and what constitutes certain ways of thinking, certain
practices of writing, reading, imaging, relating, acting, etc. into the
historically diverse and culturally heterogeneous social movement
which, qualifiers and distinctions notwithstanding (e.g. Delmar),
we continue with good reasons to call feminism’ (de Lauretis
1989, p4).
She considers it a good idea to examine the term ‘essentialism’ itself,
and reflects upon different interpretations of the word ‘essence’, from
which ‘essentialism’ is derived:
1. ‘Absolute being, substance in the metaphysical sense; the
reality underlying phenomena.
2. That which constitutes the being of a thing: that ‘by which it is
what it is’. In two different applications (distinguished by
Locke as nominal essence and real essence respectively):
a) of a conceptual entity: The totality of the properties, constituent
elements, etc., without which it would cease to be the same thing;
the indispensable and necessary attributes of a thing as opposed to
those which may have it or not ...
b) of a real entity: Objective character, intrinsic nature as a ‘thing-
in-itself’; that internal constitution, on which all the sensible
properties depend’ (de Lauretis 1989, p5).
Teresa de Lauretis asks which of these essences are ascribed in a
negative way (imputed) to ‘essentialists’ by their critics and states that it
is 1) and 2b). That is; the debate goes as if a disquieting portion of
feminists are essentialist in a metaphysical or real sense. This, de
Lauretis continues, may be the case for a ‘few, truly fundamentalist
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thinkers’ (p5). She argues that most contemporary feminists are
essentialists in the nominal sense of the word.124
She also states that the critique of feminist essentialism has ceased to
serve the purpose of ‘effective criticism in the ongoing elaboration of
feminist theory ... ’ (de Lauretis 1989, p4). de Lauretis wants to shift the
focus from ‘feminist essentialism’ as a category by which to classify
feminists or feminisms, to the ‘the historical specificity, the essential
difference of feminist theory itself’ (p6). This is not to say that there are
no differences within feminism, or that the difference between a feminist
conceptualization and a non-feminist conceptualization of woman,
women and the world is carved in stone. There are internal struggles
concerning theory, political aims and strategies, sexuality, etc. These
struggles and these relations are part of what makes ‘feminism’ a still
meaningful notion. I think it might be worth the effort to make a similar
reasoning in the case of lesbianism.
I want to pay attention, not to the category ‘lesbian’ and what there is
that could possibly characterize women who carry the proper signs of
being one, but to the essential difference between lesbianism on the one
hand, and socio-erotic arrangements that are part of hegemonic
heterosexual discourse on the other. I do this, not because I find it
productive to focus upon an inner truth of lesbianism, or because this is a
difference carved in stone. I do so because I find it academically and
politically productive to visualize a lesbian positioning within a culture
that is heterosexually compulsory. This entails breaking away from the
forms of essentialism that historically are part of research and debate
about homosexuality; there are essential physical reasons for
homosexuality (hormones, genes), there is an essential homosexual self
(I am born like this, I have discovered my true self), essentialism in the
sense that homo and hetero represents different worlds (to such an extent
that homosexuals for instance cannot be priests in the Church of
Norway).
There is no such thing as ‘lesbian specificity’. The way we (have to)
speak a phenomenon into existence creates what Dorte Marie
Søndergaard calls ‘discursive essentialism’ (1999, p4). We have to make
boundaries, she says, and by that we name a core and a periphery, and
exclude meanings that also could have been articulated. Instead of
attempting to canonize one’s own essentialism, one could, as
Søndergaard suggests, define the essential as ‘constructed and situated
124 Similar argumentation is also to be found in Bjerrum-Nielsen, 2000.
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statements undergoing constant change’ (p4). I conceive of ‘lesbian
specificity’ as essential in this sense. I search for it, and will find it in a
lesbian reworking of hegemonic heterosexual discourse, which means
that lesbian specificity is not constant; it undergoes transformation, it has
a history. Lesbian specificity conceived in this way, as different from
heterosexuality and at the same time interwoven, will potentially be
disturbing to heteronormativity and even challenging to the position of
heterosexuality as a norm. To speak into existence a lesbian specificity is
thus potentially subversive because it means recognizing a lesbian
existence, which sounds self-evident, but is not. I will return to that. To
name and establish lesbianism by the notion of specificity, represents the
summary and synthesis of my analysis, and the outset for a final
discussion about social change and changes in the theoretical intake to
sexuality.
In a comment to a draft of this chapter, a colleague asked me whether
lesbian specificity should be understood as a discourse, a counter-
discourse or a practice? If I must choose I would prefer that the term be
understood as a practice, as it is developed in this text based on an
analysis of practices. And if I should be even more specific, I would say
practice in terms of an erotic dynamic. I know that I sometimes, and
rather arbitrarily, connect it to discourse in my writing, but this is not
elaborated on in this project. It would require an analysis of a variety of
lesbian discourses, and a further discussion of the existence of a lesbian
subcultural normativity and the debate over, for instance, the features of
a Norwegian hegemonic lesbian discourse.
Lesbian specificity – modalities of reworking
It is possible to divide the stories I have told into two kinds on the basis
of their relation to the socio-erotic. I have decided to make a distinction
where two of the analytical themes lean to the social side and two lean
more to the erotic side, the latter understood as symbolic representations
for the erotic. Such a distinction is not absolute in any sense, since the
connection between the social and the erotic is in every case obvious. It
might nevertheless prove to be a reasonable organizing of the text. I will
start in the symbolic realm.
Representations of the erotic
Some of my informants use the term ‘to take’ to describe what they do
sexually. I have argued that the erotic charge that the term carries within
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a heterosexual context is retained, even when the concrete activity is not
what one would expect. When my informants ‘take’ they rather ‘give’
since it is the partner’s body that is focused upon and genitally
stimulated, and the orgasm of the partner that is produced. This is
interpreted as an example of reworking of heterosexual discourse: one
verbal expression of power inequality within a hegemonic heterosexual
discourse serves as a premise, however, is reshaped when used and
practiced in a lesbian erotic exchange. This analytical case could have
contributed to a notion of specificity also in its sociality. That the
‘taking’ is giving, might have been exploited as an argument in the
discussion about the masculinity and sexual service.
The second analytical issue that I will put under this heading is the
analysis of signs of masculinity in erotic play between women. In this
chapter I argue that the hegemonic signifier of active sexual desire,
masculinity (or phallus), is central also in the lesbian dynamics. I have
utilized Teresa de Lauretis’ rewriting of the theory of fetishism within
psychoanalysis, to argue that this is desire mediated via phallus, but
without the paternal power. An essential aspect of the lesbian play is the
flexibility: the women can have the (non-paternal) phallus in terms of
signs of masculinity, by turns (Butler, the lesbian phallus). In both those
analytical cases (the ‘take-’ and the ‘masculinity-case’), it is possible to
understand hetero- and homosexuality as interwoven in the sense that
lesbians rework heterosexual discourse. One other way of formulating
this is to say that ‘having the phallus’ is fetishized, deprived from its
paternal privileges, and exploited erotically by lesbians. I have
underlined that signs of masculinity (using the term ‘to take’ may also be
conceived as an appropriation of such a sign) do not constitute the only
lesbian fetish. The female body itself can also be seen as a signifier of
desire for a woman, what a woman desires in another woman. I perceive
masculinity as the most prominent signifier in our culture. I will return to
this in the epilogue, where the focus will be on symbolically thinking
beyond the fetishist and phallic.
Sociality
The third phenomenon for investigation is commercial sexual exchange
between women, in the light of feminist research and critique of
heterosexual prostitution. On a structural level it seems as though the
institutions or the organizations for paid sexual service are unwilling or
unable to absorb female customers. If developed, the market would be
outside the heterosexual market. About the symbolic field, the
conclusion is drawn above, that lesbians cannot escape (even if they
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wanted to) the dominant phallic symbolization of sexual desire. The
mediation of eroticism through the distinction between the masculine
and the feminine is dominant. An objectivization of the feminine, of
women, is fundamental to it. Can this also be part of the reason why
women are not wanted or feel uncomfortable on the conventional sex
market? When the most prominent sexual difference is played out as
erotic, there is no room for the female subject. The hunter will also be
the hooker, which will be too disturbing for all parts. I conclude the
chapter by saying the female homosexuality that marks the transaction,
takes the edges off the feminist critique. I cannot conceive of OP as
deprived of sexual subjectivity, even when she sells sexual services to
other women. That the female clients are sexual subjects should be less
contested, since they pay for orgasmic service. In the case of women
buying sexual services from other women one can therefore see two
women who’s sexual capacities are actively detached from the romantic
discourse. This I see as promising when we examine the question of
subversion of the hegemonic heterosexual discourse.
How does the analysis of prostitution fit into the perspective of
reworking heterosexual discourse? About the power dynamics between
the parts, I conclude that the edges of the power problems are smoothed
down; that is, the reworking means delimiting the control the customer
has. The problems, in terms of subordination of the provider, remain, but
apparently are socially unfolded with a more ‘democratic’ result. On the
structural level, woman-to-woman trade seems not to fit the modus
operandi of the institutions that are designed for the service of male
customers. The market is separate, and seems to work by other rules. It is
my view that the female homosexual trade represents a discursive break
with the heterosexual. Not only is there female sexual subjectivity on
both sides of the transaction, but also there is the women’s detachment
from romantic discourse. All in all, the lesbian reworking of prostitution
gives a more fair outcome in terms of control to the provider of services.
It also represents a fundamental break with the sexual expectations to
which women are supposed to confirm.
The analysis of the social aspects of the production of an orgasm is also
illustrative of the point of ‘democratization’ of hegemonic discourse, as
was the prostitution case. I use an explorative approach in this chapter.
The conclusion is that the production of orgasms is taken seriously, and
that they usually are produced, either one after the other, or as a one-
sided arrangement with a certain permanence. The service orientation is
conspicuous, and for the most part, service is provided as a mutually
pleasurable project. This is similar to the ‘take’-chapter, where the
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‘taker’ was the provider of orgasms. Here the most masculine part is the
provider in the cases where one-sidedness has more of a permanence to
it. In the production of orgasm, a display of masculine control seems to
increase the risk of becoming the subordinate, in terms of becoming the
provider of sexual service.
It is as if the power issue that feminism links to heterosexuality is turned
upside down. A closer investigation of the reworking of the particular
power issues in the field of orgasm reveals a more varied picture. I have
included three aspects of feminist critique within the topic: 1) men
should in general be more considerate and think less of their own
orgasm, 2) women have to learn to know their own bodies and not rely
on their partners to produce orgasms for them, 3) it could be productive
in terms of the female orgasm if heterosexuals focus less on coitus.
Firstly, as mentioned already; masculinity (not men, for reasons argued
earlier) tends to be too considerate. It seems to be the ‘most masculine’
women who tend to be too service-oriented. Secondly, there is
knowledge about the female body on both sides of the exchange. This,
taken together with regarding orgasm seriously, is considered to result in
more orgasmic sex when women are with women than when women are
with men. This is to dismiss, I would suggest, this particular feminist
critique. (It does not mean that lesbians know enough about the sexual
and erotic female body). Thirdly, lesbians relate actively to the coitus
imperative, and the reworking takes a variety of forms; rejection,
repetition, and a having fun with phallic economy. What is important in
connection with the production of an orgasm, though, is that a focus on
penetration does not hinder the female orgasm. Orgasms are produced
unrelated to the coital imperative, and penetration in general. As with the
prostitution case, I will conclude that the outcome of the power
negotiations seems to be more fair in the lesbian case, than in the
heterosexual case, if the feminist (and sexological) advises are
representative of dominant heterosexual practice.
Summed up, the modalities for how lesbians in a western society rework
heterosexual power domains would be:
1. What is understood as erotic, as desirable in lesbian exchange is often
closely connected to the symbolic value of masculinity and the erotic
charge of the difference between femininity and masculinity. This is
not simply copying the heterosexual, but putting the main signifier of
sexual desire into productive play between women.
2. The dynamic of lesbian erotic exchange is marked with a higher
degree of commonsense social justice than is a dominant heterosexual
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erotic exchange. The practical result of negotiations of erotic power
issues is fairer.
3. A short description could be that lesbian erotic specificity is marked
by a flexible power exchange.
Symbolically the power is here seen as asymmetric and transferable.
However, in a social sense the result has a high degree of symmetry. A
comment regarding generalization is needed. I base this apparently
universal conclusion on an analysis of qualitative research interviews,
usually not exploited for general conclusions. I said in chapters 4 and 5
that the analyses of ‘to take’ and ‘masculinity’ had their generalization
potential in the confirmation of theory. The theoretical perspectives I
have used in this text can be read from different angles in this respect.
Neither Teresa de Lauretis nor Judith Butler vindicates universal status
of their theories about the relation between lesbian desire and the
phallus. On the other hand; they may easily be read as though they did.
This is exactly how I want the first point in the conclusion to be read: as
confirmation of general theory about sexual desire and difference;
however, the theoretical perspectives must be read as a tool for
reflection. Regarding the second point; I used my own interview
material, other empirical investigations and lesbian erotic literature to
draw a conclusion based on what could be called ‘positivist standards’:
‘if you can demonstrate it in enough cases, it must be true’. And there is
indeed a lot of evidence, especially in the orgasm case, that certain
practices are widespread. That does not change my basic attitude to the
production of scientific truth, that it is in the end a story told by the
scientist, a suggestion as to how society can be seen and interpreted.
There are scientific arguments opposed to my conclusions, some of
which I have discussed already. One argument of a feminist political
character would be that it is counterproductive to focus, not to say draw
conclusions about the positive effects of power difference in the erotics
between women. One should see enough of it in mainstream culture. My
argument for doing so is theoretically based in psychoanalytical theory
reworked by de Lauretis and Butler. Jean Grimshaw has a more
experience-based way of putting it: How would it be possible to expect
and demand pleasure, to focus on the pleasure of the other, to give in to
the eroticity of the other, to let one’s senses be dominated, etc., if power
were not important? (Grimshaw 1997). The main point should be, I
think, that within a dominantly heterosexual culture, heterosexuality will
set major premises for how most people read erotic power, execute and
give in to it in encounters with others. I would suggest struggling with
that premise instead of struggling over the issue of power-free sexuality,
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as for instance some campaigners against pornography do.125 Can the
investigation of sexual desire between women perhaps accentuate such a
shift in focus of the debate?
The more determined and masculine looking woman in a lesbian couple
will repeatedly be asked: Are you the man in your relationship? The
simple answer is of course to say that there is no man present. And this
in turn prepares for the next question; “how do you do ‘it’ when there is
no man present?” Most lesbians I know do not answer the latter question.
Perhaps a productive answer to the first question is that in a lesbian
relationship there is no woman and no man, and a productive answer to
the second question is that here is no ‘it’. With the term ‘productive’ I
mean productive in giving the one who poses the question new tools for
understanding sexuality. New tools could be concepts allowing one to
understand different sexualities as shaped and reshaped in a continuous
interrelation. It could be to see homosexuality as that which can never be
the same as heterosexuality, but on the other hand never can be separated
either. New tools could be those that understand lesbian specificity as a
phenomenon that has an impact on heterosexual practices. In short; to
make visible and talk about a lesbian specificity might alter how
individuals of different desires think, talk and practice in the erotic field.
I will elaborate on this in the following section where the focus is on
possible effects of lesbian specificity.
Lesbian specificity - effects
‘Effects’ are here understood as subversive effects when facing
heterosexual discourse. Is lesbian practice seeping into practices between
women and men? Lesbians are reliable in production of orgasms for their
female partners. Will that help heterosexual males? Lesbians apparently
have a story to tell about equality issues. Is someone listening? Another
aspect of the term ‘effect’ is what we might call the queer, subversive or
ontological aspect. To be ascribed a specificity implies the possibility
and ‘reality’ of a lesbian existence or a lesbian presence. On many
historical occasions women’s desire for other women has not even been
recognized as a site of prohibition, like, for instance, when the
Norwegian parliament passed an act of criminalization of male
homosexuality in 1902. Female homosexuality was not prohibited
because the phenomenon was impossible (Friele 1997). Is there an
125 An approach Jefferey Weeks probably would call a ’radical pluralis approach’
(Weeks 1998, p315).
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ontological effect of visualizing the existence of lesbian desire through a
socio-erotic specification?126 Can it change the way culture produces
naturalized ideas about women, men, heterosexuality and
homosexuality? Is masculinity, the main symbol for the active sexual
desire, threatened? Does language prove its inadequacy?
Here again, I would like to organize the text with the help of a distinction
that actually is inadequate; an understanding of political effect as
something that quite directly changes social structures versus an
understanding of political effect as something that represents new tools,
positions and means for an understanding of the social.127
Effects in terms of changing social structures
What do people care about the socio-eroticity of lesbianism? Does a
different erotic sociality have some kind of direct impact on the main
culture?
In the period when I was finishing this text, I was on the main
Norwegian radio channel twice in the same week, and was interviewed
by a newspaper journalist once. Some weeks later, I was directing a one
day workshop for employees and clients for a unit within the Norwegian
public health service, which I also had done some months earlier. In
these events I thematized and set up heterosexuality for debate from a
lesbian perspective. Lesbianism, as mediated in this study, obviously
plays into a public concern about sexuality and equality, and there are
indeed people out there who want to hear what I have to say from this
position. That makes this project meaningful; that is what I wanted from
the start. However, the kind of changes this will inspire, is hard to say.
The previous Norwegian government took the position that homosexual
practices mean a lot. Social change implies, they say, that heterosexuals
learn from homosexuals (St.meld. nr.25, 2000-2001). And that is good,
because the heterosexual society has some important things to learn from
homosexuals. One is to break away from traditional sex roles, another is
to give priority to friendship as a form of social organization. Gays and
126 The term ’lesbian existence’ is from Adrienne Rich’s famous essay ’Compulsory
Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence’: ’Lesbian existence suggests both the fact of
the historical presence of lesbians and our continuing creation of the meaning of that
existence’ (Rich 1983, p192). If nothing else is said, I use lesbian ‘specificity’ and
‘existence’ synonymously.
127 Adrienne Rich’s distinction would be between being accepted as an alternative
lifestyle versus constituting a resistance against compulsory heterosexuality (1983).
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lesbians are also given credit for, due to the specific experience of
homosexuality, a certain advantage in understanding other people’s life
crises (p6). In the light of an increasingly complex society, a society
more open than ever for personal choices when it comes to sex roles,
cohabitation and sexuality, it is suggested that ‘homosexuals have been
pioneers in establishing ways of living that are becoming more and more
common also among heterosexual couples’ (p10, my translation).128
The government demonstrates good-will here, but is probably a bit too
optimistic. The report does not demonstrate how the structural changes
came about. How did homosexual practices in a concrete sense make a
difference? Was it the political efforts to achieve citizen rights, was it the
mere existence of homosexuals and their increased visibility in the
media? Perhaps overlapping phenomena worked together? What about
the effects of feminism on the very same issues? These are the kinds of
questions I am also facing in this project, when I want to comment on the
impact of lesbian practice on the main culture. As will be obvious from
the kind of empirical analysis that is accomplished here, nothing can
actually be said on the basis of it. I can only speculate. What I will
suggest, based on the contact I have had already with the press and
possible audiences, is that on the concrete level the impact will be in line
with the works of sexologists. The results from this study raise questions
about what people do when they are sexually together. These will be
questions about the anatomical technical aspects of sex (how are
orgasms produced in women?), and also the social technology of sex
(can ‘sexual service’ be compatible with feminism?). Hopefully, some
will begin to critically examine their own practices and reflect upon
changes where they consider these are needed.
One of the questions that has not been asked so far by any of the
journalists, is about female sexuality and the detachment from romance.
The reason might be that the question probably can be seen as less
‘sexological’ and more linked to the aspect of effects that will be
addressed below; subversiveness to heteronormativity.
Detaching sex from romance is not a new idea. In the history of sexuality
in Western culture we have seen several phases where sex is singled out
128 It is interesting that a status as deliverers of positive impulses on the matters of
gender, sexuality and relationships is assigned to homosexuals. And it is something
of an irony given that until 1972 homosexuality was illegal, until 1978, an illness,
and that homosexuals are still not enjoying equal rights in the Church of Norway,
doomed for failing on exactly the same matters of conformity.
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and where also female sexuality is recognized. We have, however, until
now not seen one phase in which women were in control of what the
‘liberation’ of women’s sexuality actually might imply. Women were not
in control of the ‘sexual liberation’ in the 1960’s and 1970’s (Hawkes
1996, Segal 1994). As I have shown, the 1980’s and 1990’s is not as
woman-friendly in terms of fulfilling women’s sexual expectations, as
one might suggest on the basis of the Western equality discourse. I have
already argued that the ‘pure relationships’ (Giddens 1992) so far make
up no more than a surface trend. Will we ever get a liberal (or sex
positive) sexual discourse where women’s sexual needs seem to be met
according to a feminist scrutiny? Some believe that this is possible
Wendy Hollway, Lynn Segal, Stevi Jackson are heterosexual and
feminist social scientist working in the UK, and they have all been
engaged in this discussion for many years. They seem to have few
illusions about the imbalance of gendered power in heterosexuality, and
have few illusions about where and what the 1970’s, 80’s and 90’s have
brought us in terms of sexual pleasure for women. They do not agree on
all topics, but are nevertheless clear that it is possible to change the
dominant discourse of sexuality in favor of women (Hollway 1995,
Jackson 1996, 1999, Segal 1994). In Norway we have had no debate in
the realm of sexuality where feminism set the agenda since we
recaptured the right to orgasm and the knowledge about it in the
1970’s.129 It is too early to say what the impact will be of the writings
and the activities in the wake of Fittstim and Råtekst, the books of young
women taking up the heritage (Solheim and Vaagland 1999, Skugge et al
1999). So far, my position is that a considerable proportion of
Norwegian society conflates changes in the morality of sexuality with an
idea of sexual equality between boys and girls, men and women. As I see
it, the changes in sexual morality might very well detach sex from
romance, also for women. Contemporary sexology and social science do
not convince me that this has happened yet. It is probably correct to say
that women in this century more than in the previous centuries, enjoy
sex. Yet, too frequently the change in morality that entails, for the girl,
the right to say ‘yes’, means sexual disappointment or unfulfillment, and
too often it ends disastrously in the courts. Or, more often, women
experience what Flemmen calls ‘experiences in between’ (1999).
What more and what else do I want in terms of the female detachment of
sex from romance, and what can studying lesbians contribute to
129 I do not count the pornography battle in the 1980’s. Resistance against male
fantasy was on the agenda, rather than female pleasure.
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achieving this? Is the self-evidence of female orgasm in lesbian relations
contributing to change? Are more extended sexual services changing
anything? Can the term ‘sexual service’ ever be correct from a feminist
perspective? What kind of feminism would that be? Does the existence
of women in the sex market as clients for sexual services from other
women contribute to a step in the right direction? These could be topics
to discuss.
The goodwill in the report from the government mentioned above, goes
like this: ‘The basis for the government is respecting the homophile and
accepting the homosexual life’ (St.meld. 25, p13, my translation). A
question of fundamental political and theoretical importance is whether
this goodwill has an influence upon heteronormativity. Increased respect
and acceptance is not necessarily the same as changing the norm;
someone is still in the position of having the power to accept or reject
someone else. Let me illustrate this point briefly with an example.
In the recent years we have in Norway seen girl-girl kissing in different
kinds of media, ambiguously related to the hetero-homo distinction. I
often hear this phenomenon presented as an instance that demonstrates
postmodern tolerance and acceptance towards homosexuals. It might of
course be interpreted in that manner. However, I have not yet seen one
media-representation, without the firm statement from the women that
they sexually prefer men (see for instance Aftenposten, October 5,
1999). This may be seen as an example of increased tolerance for the
sight of a woman kissing another woman, and at the same time a signal
of rejection of the desire it might have represented. The government is
probably right that we have an increased level of respect and acceptance,
but one could ask if the culturally conceived normality of heterosexuality
is not still intact. I understand the subversion of heteronormativity is a
different matter.
Effects in terms of subversion – lesbian desire as queer
The discussion I take in this paragraph is more theoretical than practical.
What does it mean to say that to develop a notion of lesbian specificity
has an ontological effect, a queer effect, a subversive effect? What I
choose to do here is to focus on the ways lesbian specificity may be
understood as being a practice that is between or beyond hegemonic
discourses. I am addressing here an aspect of ‘effect’ that is of a different
quality from being tolerated, respected and accepted of the larger
society. To illustrate this difference I will cite two of the prominent
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figures within the Norwegian gay and lesbian movement when the right
for homosexuals to legally ‘get married’ was discussed.
‘I support the right for homosexuals to get married, because I
believe that homosexuals should have the same right as
heterosexuals to do something as stupid as that’ (Gerd
Brantenberg, my translation).130
‘The problem is that Løvetann131 surpasses the authorities in
reproducing existing ideology. There are no limits as to how
normal, responsible and powerful we have become. And I used to
believe that some of the point in being a homosexual was to
undermine power, disquiet, challenge, break out in revolt (...) I for
one feel more comfortable on the fringe, in the periphery and the
perversion, and choose to fight for a space in the margin, in
infectiousness, in the absent, in the thoughts of end, -as weed, as
heretic’ (Dag Strand Nielesen quoted in Halvorsen 1999, p12, my
translation).
Strand Nielsen absolutely does not want to be associated with the center
of power, with normalcy and adjustment. Brantenberg acknowledges the
absurdity of gay and lesbian marriage. These are political statements that
relate to the hegemonic discourse by rejecting the legitimacy and
normalcy it would mean. Strand Nielsen is explicit on this.
I do not know the opinions of my informants about identity politics and
civil right issues. It simply was not part of the conversation, or also I
have not searched my material for intakes to the matter. What follows is
not about political attitudes and positions. It is about an aspect of what I
call ‘effects of lesbian specificity’ that has the theoretical potential to
alter some common understandings of sexuality. This aspect of the
discussion could more apt be called effects of the recognition of lesbian
existence, because it is more about the culture’s recognition of
‘something lesbian’ than the specificity of this ‘something’. I will do a
twist in the analytical approach here, by not anchoring the discussion in a
reworking of heterosexual discourse, but rather in ways of seeing lesbian
practice as outside and beyond heterosexual discourse. This is pure
130 Brantenberg did not write this statement when the gay and lesbian movement
debated the legal right to domestic partnership. She gave interviews and participated
in meetings about the issue. Brantenberg gave me permission to refer to her position
like the citation above. Permission given in a conversation, April, 2001.
131 A Norwegian journal for gays and lesbians (Dandelion)
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pragmatism from my side, since I do not believe that there is a practice
or existence to be found outside of heterosexual discourse in an absolute
sense. This will be further discussed in the epilogue. For now I exploit
this as an analytical approach, pragmatic as it is. Now, what have I said
about lesbian specificity? In the context of an ontological discussion I
will point to the following:
1. it is to put masculinity into play between women
2. it is for a woman not (only) to desire men
3. it often means that a woman penetrates another woman
4. it often means sexual service from one woman to another
5. in some cases a woman replaces a man, symbolically as well as
anatomically
6. it means to be a female subject of sexual desire
7. it means that sexual desire itself might be a directing force in a
woman’s life
I have not mentioned it earlier, but in this context I will list as an eighth
point that lesbian sexual desire is not reproductive; sex is not about
multiplying but rather, about pleasure only. The above-mentioned points
represent a positioning outside important discourses in the field of
sexuality. It is to be outside the romantic discourse where women in a
heteronormative society are expected to represent the one who is into sex
as a component part of her loving emotions. How could a woman who
will receive sexual service from other women, and also give sexual
service to other women, how could she be trustworthy as a representative
for a romantic discourse related to sex? She will let sexual desire be
determining for her choices at major crossroads. How could that fit with
the expectations towards women first of all to be concerned about
emotional aspects of relationships? This is not to say that lesbians are
less romantic than heterosexual women in the sense that they are not
looking for the ‘one and only’ or less often than heterosexual women
making candle-lit dinners. The point I make is about the lesbian who
practices as a sexual subject in a culture where women are made objects
for men’s active desire. This is to be between, beyond or to reject the
discourses of masculinity and femininity. For women to do that is not
new, of course. We often see it among all women, that the distinction
between masculinity and femininity is dismissed, blurred and balanced
in a variety of ways. This often implies to try to compensate in one
direction what you have lost in the other. Lesbians challenge the binary
at what is understood as the core of gender difference – sex in an
anatomical and symbolic sense. A woman replaces a man in all respects
(except for the reproduction capacity, which I do not consider being of
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particular importance in respect to eroticism). How is it possible to
compensate for this? And what does it do to the dichotomy homo-hetero
when women replace men at all scores? And what does it do to this
dichotomy that lesbians exploit the main erotic signifier of heterosexual
desire? A most closely associated conclusion to draw is that lesbians are
neither homosexual nor heterosexual.
It is tempting, as others have done before me, to say that lesbians are
neither women nor men. They are women and not men in a juridical
sense; they have vaginas in most cases and the ‘F’ in their passports.
They are what Dorte Marie Søndergaard calls ‘individuals with a female
sign on their body’ (1996, p426). If by the time of birth there was a
reason for doubt, the health authorities would have made the decision
about proper body engineering. If asked, my informants would identify
as women, except for the transsexual. I will here go a bit further on the
theory of sex as performativity, as outlined in chapter 3. With reference
to Michel Foucault and Judith Butler, I have argued that sex and
sexuality are produced in the process of exploiting the phenomenon
‘sexuality’ as a means by which to control individuals. Sex and
sexuality, read as sex according to the norms of heterosexuality, are the
effect of power with the right to discipline people, and the efforts
individuals make to be readable as men and women. This is not to deny
that there are anatomical, genital differences, but it does question the
power involved in producing this and making it an essential difference.
Thus the categories ‘man’ and ‘woman’ are not seen as original or
natural. It is the continuous reiteration that makes them appear as such;
sex is performative, and as I read Butler (cf Chapter 3: Sexuality – where
inner and outer worlds meet’), so is gender. There is no intrinsic truth
about man and woman, masculinity and femininity that just makes its
way and gets manifested as proper men and women. ‘Heterosexuality is
an impossible imitation of itself’ (Butler 1993b, p314). There is no
original for lesbians to imitate. Understood like this, the lesbian is not a
funny imitation or a bad copy of something original and natural, but
rather; the lesbian exposes a frantic repetition of sex and gender norms
that might be called the ‘heterosexual pathos’. Or as Butler puts it,
heterosexuality is exposed as: ‘incessant and panicked imitation of its
own naturalized idealization’ (Butler 1993b, p314).
It is my point that lesbians cannot properly, convincingly do sex. ‘Man’
and ‘woman’ are culturally understood as natural categories embedded in
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a heterosexual norm.132 How can lesbians possibly be understood as
natural women? How can one be without a man sexually, use masculine
strategies for picking up women and have sex with them, perform sex in
a way that never would entail the possibility of motherhood, be sexually
serviced by women, penetrate women, even say that one has ‘taken’
another woman and perhaps paid for sex offered by a woman, and still
be culturally understood as a woman? How can this society count on
such womanhood for womanhood to prevail? Or as the French
philosopher Monique Wittig argues:
‘ ... it would be incorrect to say that lesbians associate, make love,
live with women, for ‘woman’ has meaning only in heterosexual
systems of thought and heterosexual economic systems. Lesbians
are not women’ (Wittig 1996, p148).
Lesbians cannot be trustworthy as belonging to the category ‘women’,
unless the category is fundamentally changed. I cannot find any evidence
that it has. If you are not tied up in a conviction that lesbians are sick,
criminal or not human, you will have to say that they are as normal and
natural as are other human beings. If that is the case, not being either a
woman or a man as argued here regarding the lesbian, is normal and
natural; it is normal and natural to be outside what defines the human. I
understand this aspect of lesbian specificity as a positive politically
subversive aspect that has the potential to alter categories and make new
phenomena and creatures come into being (recognized). This I call an
ontological aspect with the potential to make someone think and theorize
sexuality and eroticism within other frameworks than the one marked by
the self-evident naturalness of the eroticity of the sexual difference
between women and men. Sexuality and eroticity is in any case
imagined, repeated and practiced into existence – as in this text. What is
required to make it seem as self-evident and natural as heterosexuality,
that an eroticized sexual difference could be anywhere where humans
are? The recognition of lesbian existence by its erotic specification has
the potential to alter how we think and experience sex as a binary. To
give the lesbian desire ontological status might penetrate the symbolic
and augur future changes in the symbolic realm itself. This is obviously
not a simple process. Judith Butler puts it like this:
‘ ... the entrance of homosexuality into the symbolic will alter very
little if the symbolic itself is not radically altered in the course of
132
’..compulsory heterosexual identities, those ontologically consolidated phantasms
of »man» and »woman»..’ (Butler 1993b, p313)
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that admission. Indeed, the legitimation of homosexuality will
have to resist the force of normalization for a queer resignification
of the symbolic to expand and alter the normativity of its terms’
(Butler 1993a, p111).
We are talking about fundamental changes, and are very clearly not there
yet. However, as contemporary members of this culture, we still have
some choices. Sue-Ellen Case, professor in English from the US, says
that there is a difference between ‘playing on’ the phallic economy and
‘playing to’ it (Case 1993, p300). The former could mean to exploit the
erotic potential of the phallic culture we live in, and do it our own way. I
have argued that this is part of lesbian specificity. The idea of ‘sexual
structuring’ is outlined in Chapter 3: Sexuality, where inner and outer
worlds meet. The term implies a potential for changes in identities and
practices. In this case it would mean that to play on the phallic economy
should be possible for anyone, regardless of object choice. It is not a
natural law that the heterosexual ‘man-woman-repetition’ must go on for
eternity.
I said that in 1902 when Norway enacted a law against male
homosexuality, lesbianism was unthinkable. In Judith Butler’s terms,
lesbians were not even thinkable within the binary opposition of ‘proper
vs improper’ women. Lesbians were so ‘unameable and unclassifiable’
(Meijer and Prins 1998, p284), ‘improper to the improper’, that a
paragraph against them could not be formulated. In this connection a
question comes to mind: has something happened that ascribed
ontological status to lesbians? What happened that at least made room
for ‘the lesbian’ as an improper woman, a masculine woman, a loose
woman, a sick woman, a criminal woman, a nymphomaniac, a threat?
Can we even ask what happened that made ‘the lesbian’ proper, decent,
healthy, law-obedient, naturally desiring and a pillar of society?
Someone should write the Norwegian genealogy of ‘the lesbian’.
I am still not sure that ‘the lesbian’ has ontological status as a woman,
that she actually could be conceived of as a woman ‘as such’. I want to
end the discussion about lesbian specificity and possible potential for
societal change, with a quotation from Joan Nestle.
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‘After J. leaves, the sadness descends’
After J. leaves, the sadness descends. I read the papers every day
in this hiding-away place. I mourn for D., have nightmares of
screaming at her, I wonder what worth I am to my students.
Perhaps all the fucking, all the nuances are hopeless. Governments
with their pale men in suits kill and flaunt and designate despair.
Where could such a shifting exchange between two women, one
twenty years older than the other, have meaning other than among
the clouds of a village at the edge of sea?’ (Nestle 1998, p149).
In her writing Joan Nestle usually sees the subversive political potential
in homosexual desire and practices. In the quote above however, she is
more doubtful, wondering whether it perhaps was most important to the
lovers involved. One should of course not be naive about social change
and underestimate ‘the realities of oppression and the gains to be made
by organized campaigns for rights and justice’, as Tamsin Spargo notes
as something that queer theory sometimes is accused of (Spargo 1999,
p66). On the other hand, texts about erotic practices, about the dynamics
between lovers, might also be politics; people read texts, journalists,
parents, artists, and teachers mediate the ideas. It is no coincidence that
dictators burn books of all kinds. However, when the night is blue, the
question about one’s own tiny contribution creeps in. With Nestle, as
with me.
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EPILOGUE
If I were to investigate the practices of lesbian desire again, I might have
tried harder to work outside of the conceptual framework within which
the research about sexuality usually is carried out. I might have been
more daring in challenging the binary between masculinity and
femininity, a difference that is erotically signified by the phallus, and
which needs major rethinking to be seen differently. I do not say that the
project would have been better, it might even have turned out to be an
impossible challenge for me to handle empirically. It might have resulted
in an academic fantasy instead of something people can relate to in their
own lives. However, before I terminate the project, I want to reconsider
routes I did not take.
I want to reflect upon alternatives while possessing the theoretical and
analytical experience the project provided, and not only as part of an
ongoing research process. I have at several occasions during this project,
had inspiring discussions about alternative symbology in the realm of the
erotic. It has become too tempting to suggest a further debate with an
outset in social science, also on this issue.
I first refer ideas that could have become alternative foundations in a
symbolic sense, by using works of Judith Roof, Paula Bennett, Elspeth
Probyn and Elizabeth Grosz. Thereafter, I discuss how these works
might have become useful in my project, by using an analytical topic as
an example, namely what two of my informants say about the female
body.
The crocus and other flowers
Judith Roof’s starting-point for the suggestion of a representation of
lesbian desire is a quotation from Virginia Woolf’s novel Mrs. Dalloway
(Roof 1989). In this quotation the narrator makes three attempts to
describe Clarissa Dalloway’s feelings for women: as an ‘illumination’, ‘a
match burning in a crocus’, and as ‘an inner meaning almost expressed’
(Woolf in Roof 1989, p100). Roof explains the first and the second (the
illumination and the burning match) as representations of lesbian
sexuality that reproduce heterosexuality (a masquerade of masculine
behavior). The third, however, ‘the almost expressed’, demonstrates the
‘failure of language’ that makes lesbianism unaccountable, impossible to
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represent (p100).133 Roof does not suggest a solution to this dilemma.
She states that authors who attempt to represent lesbian sexuality as
‘something outside’, still have to be ‘filtered through the ponderous
machinery of symmetry’ (the complementariness of having or not having
the phallus, my comment) (Roof 1998, p115). The only way to escape
from the phallus is to play on it. In the breaks and paradoxes resulting
from this play lies the opportunity. The opportunity for an alternative
signification lies, that is, in what cannot be expressed. Paula Bennett
criticizes Roof for refusing ‘to speak at all’ (Bennett 1993, p253).
As an alternative to the phallic language Bennett advocates the
‘Language of Flowers’. The ‘Language of Flowers’ is the name for the
sexual imagery in women’s (and also some men’s) writing in the
nineteenth century. It is a language of clitoral symbols, symbols of
‘small but precious objects’ (p237). Bennett does not perceive the
‘clitocentric’ representation of female sexuality as the only alternative to
the phallocentric. It is one among many. However, she is of the opinion
that this representation should be of special importance. Of all human
organs, the clitoris is ‘uniquely adapted to a sexual mission’,
proportionally better supplied with nerve endings than any other organ,
male or female (Bennett 1993, p238). Bennett argues that until Freud,
clitoris was recognized as the prime seat of female erotic sensibility, but
since then erased from literature and scholarship. Also feminists keep
silent, which they cannot afford, she asserts, since clitoridectomy,
whether it is performed on women’s bodies or in language, is the place
‘where theory and politics come together’ (p239). Not to theorize clitoris
implies to accept symbolic castration of women, according to Bennett.
She is therefore not pleased with Roof above, who ‘describes clitorally
based sexuality’, but ‘never identifies it as such’ (p251). If Roof did not
avoid to name the clitoris, she would be able to represent female
sexuality as something other than the ‘mystified and mystifying «other-
than-phallus»’ that cannot be named.
Bennett suggests talking about female sexuality in the language of the
flowers, with the clitoris as the equivalent to the phallus. Elspeth Probyn,
on the other hand, makes an attempt to theorize desire where desire has
no object whatsoever. The question of a connection between a subject
and an object of desire therefore needs no sign in Probyn’s thinking. In a
contribution to the development of queer theory where horses are central,
133 Teresa de Lauretis understands the quotation from Woolf as a description of
Clarissa’s lack of desire, it being of the hetero- or the homosexual kind, and not as
Woolf’s lack of other-than-phallic terms for lesbian desire (1994a)
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horses are thus not to be understood in terms of a phallic presence, but of
motion, movement.
Women on women on horses
In my text, desire is linked to an object that is desired for. Lesbian desire
is a woman’s desire for another woman. Here is both a subject that
desires and an object of desire (who, at the same time can be a subject, I
have argued). Elspeth Probyn wants to theorize desire as that which
misses an object, as ‘a point of departure and a guide’, as a ‘method
within queer theory’ (Probyn 1995, p4). To link desire to an object, to
differentiate bodies on account of their locations, she says, ‘tends to slow
the body down’ (p5). Probyn will hold in check ‘the desire to fix desire’
(p7), which she sees as symptomatic for the lack of precision of point of
departure for queer theorizing. We excitedly leave our ‘home discipline’
(sociology for instance) to do interdisciplinary queer studies that is
‘about’ sexuality, without really considering how to get there. Her point
is that it is desire that takes us there. We have to follow desire, which
also changes desire as the object of study, since we now follow what we
study, and are producing it at the same time. Desire is method, desire is
motion, and desire is also images. But, not any kinds of images: queer
images that render their relation to bodies strange and not ‘quite
graspable’ (Probyn 1995, p9, quoting Foucault). These are images not
like the fantasies that are produced when we see desire as lack.
From here Probyn asks her readers to follow her images, her desire, back
to the first memories of desiring: ‘an image of girlfriends and me melded
together by hot horse flesh’ (p10). She continues with other cultural
manifestations of women on women and horses, and sums up that the
images have no essence and no fixed reference, that they cannot be
‘allowed to condense into categorized notions of being’ (p11). However,
they do throw us forward ‘into other relations of becoming and
belonging’ (p12). Probyn asks:
‘(…) how can we use desire so as to analyse it as a specific queer
form of movement and mediation between individuals’ (Probyn
1995, p14).
She will not look for this queerness as something that is possible to be
founded or condensed in a lesbian body, a lesbian being, a lesbian
experience or aesthetic:
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‘Recognizing at any moment that the movement between us is
queer cannot be reduced to two individual elements: me as lesbian
and possibly you’ (Probyn 1995, p14).
She admits that the identification of and as a lesbian is important, but the
movement does not stop there. Desire does not point us to a person but to
the movement of different body parts, she continues. She refers to the
performance artist Suzanne Westenhoefer to make her point about the
movement of body parts. Westehoefer has a desire for the international
lesbian icon Martina Navratalova, the tennis-player. However, the desire
is not for the individual Martina, but for the movement and image of
different body parts. To watch Martina Navratalova play evokes in
Westenhoefer the ‘overwhelming longing to lick the coursing vain that
pops out on the inside of Martina’s forearm’ (Probyn 1995, p14). This
image may connect with others: her butchness, her skill, her success,
Probyn continues. These images conjoin to the body we call ‘Martina’.
Probyn understands in fact individuals as being an ensemble of images,
which means that images are having a ‘certain existence situated halfway
between the thing and the representation’ (p14). (She here refers to
Bergson and Deleuze). Desire can be seen as it spins lines between the
thing and the representation, and desire is the force that connects or
disconnects images and things.
Elspeth Probyn owes much to Elisabeth Grosz in her reasoning above.
Grosz has given up on psychoanalysis’ interpretation of desire as lack
and the phallic signification of desire (see for instance Grosz 1994, and
Grosz 1995a esp. p173-187).
Producing sensations
In her article Animal Sex. Libido as desire and death (1995) Grosz builds
on the thinking of the French sociologist Roger Caillois and the
American philosopher Alphonso Lingis. To Grosz, desire is turbulent
and restless, and defies coding into ‘signs, signification, meanings’
(p286). It is often hard to tell what entices and allures. Desire does not
have an object, ‘only a series of intensities’ (p287). The intensification
induces excitation of bodily regions or zones. The connections between
the sensitive body parts cannot be understood in terms of ‘domination,
penetration, control or mastery’ (p288). It is jealousy that best describes
the connection; jealousy from one body part to the other because of the
intensity and excitations felt in one, however draining excitement from
the surrounding regions. There are no privileged erotogenic zones which
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‘remembers’ how good and stimulating it used to be; there are body
surfaces coming together, producing, renewing, transforming libidinal
zones. These are thoughts of desire that considers desire as something
very alive, continuously in creation and present now; not as in
psychoanalysis where most happened already in childhood. To be
effective as sites of orgasmic intensity, these body surfaces must
continually be ‘invested through activity, use’ (p289). It is by this given
that Grosz objects to the limitation of desire to being that of genital and
orgasmic pleasure. To her, desire is not rise and fall, waxing and waning,
which is a central part of how I talk about sex with my informants in the
present study. Desire culminates in ‘the production of sensations never
felt, alignments never thought, energies never tapped, regions never
known’ (p295).
How could Roof, Bennett, Probyn and Grosz have informed my work
directly in an analytical sense? This is discussed in the next paragraph,
where I take two quotations from my interviews as a starting point.
An alternative analysis
I have chosen two quotations where another woman’s body is in focus.
WR went to bed with another woman, both understanding themselves as
heterosexual; ‘We had sex. Digital sex, oral sex, the full package’ (p4).
WR was enthusiastic about the sexual experience. This was not
specifically about her relation to the other woman, with whom she was
not in love. She thought; ‘This, WR, is right for you’.
GG has a similar experience. The first time she got engaged in a sexual
relationship with a girl, GG already knew that she probably would prefer
women. She felt: ‘Wowh! This is absolutely right, but it is not the right
person.’ (p5). GG also says that she believes that she was attracted to her
because she knew the other girl was lesbian.
The body is finally right; a female body is in an erotic sense right for WR
and GG. When I ask my informants what it is about having sex with
women that makes it different from having sex with men, they say that it
is the curves, the roundness, and the softness of the female body
compared to the harder bodies of men.
Now, if I were to analyze this the same way as I have approached my
interviews previously in this text, I would have called this topic: ‘the
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female body’. I would have made a distinction between the social and
the symbolic, as I did in the previous chapter. In a social sense, I would
have at least three issues to discuss. First, who the woman is, is not
important; it is the sex of the body that is important. This has to be an
experience different from heterosexual women’s experiences, since in
the first meeting with a boy or a man, most women will not be surprised
or in awe over the aptness of the male body as fit for having a sexual
relationship with. Whether a male body is right or not is in most cases a
question not asked. I would also have taken a discussion of lesbianism
related to the romantic versus the technical aspects of sex. It seems as
though this (that it is the body, not the person) can strengthen the point
made in the previous chapter that lesbian desire is a directing force in the
lives of lesbians. Secondly, the moment is magic for WR and GG; now is
when they realize their lesbian desire. I would have discussed the Danish
ethnologist Karen Lützen’s term ‘magic moment’, as a name for the
important moment in a woman’s life that makes her ‘open her eyes for
other women’ (1998, p166). And, what does it mean that GG says that
the presence of the lesbian made a difference? Is there a lesbian body?
The third issue I would have discussed connected to the quotations above
is the possibility of becoming ‘cheap’. Under what conditions is a
‘cheap’ lesbian produced? I am not sure what the conclusion would be of
this analysis, or how in general it would fit with the rest of this text. This
is more of a mental experiment, just to indicate what kind of issues I
would have focused.
A similar analysis as in previous chapters of the symbolic aspect, would
again have been based on Teresa de Lauretis’ rewriting of
psychoanalysis. What is it with the female body that makes it right for
these women? This is not only a question about esthetics or art - the
female body is by some seen as prettier or more exciting - this is a
question about what there is that ascribes eroticity to the female body for
another woman. WR and GG want to have female sexual partners. (I do
not know the process of their sexual structuring). As most other
contemporary Norwegians, they do not want anyone, but a person to fall
in love with and share their days with. This particular preference of
sexual object (women’s preference for women) needs to be mediated
symbolically, I have stated, or at least to be imagined by the desiring
subject. How could WR and GG otherwise know that she desired another
woman? As masculinity signified desire for women in Chapter 5:
Masculinity in erotic play between women, the female body here takes
the place of the signifier, the lesbian fetish.
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Roof and Bennett could be used as alternatives to de Lauretis in terms of
the symbolic, since they actually relate to signification of desire (which
Probyn and Grosz attempt not to). Roof does not really try, but I can see
that Bennett has a point with her flower language. It is really remarkable
that clitoris, so important for female sexual pleasure, and so often
represented in nineteen century literature that it got its own language, is
not part of the way contemporary feminists symbolize desire. My
problem is that I cannot trace the clitoris, the buds or the flowers in the
way my informants speak about the female body. It seems to be the
image of a female body as such, not with reference to clitoris and
represented by a bud, that signifies desire. And the distance between the
signifier (the female body) and what it signifies (the desire for a woman)
seems to be very short in this case: the sexual practice of WR’s and
GG’s bodies together with other women’s bodies evokes the general
image of desire. These two quotations were the closest I could come to
something in my material that I consider proper for a discussion of
signification, except for the even more obvious masculinity, already
discussed. This does not mean that I give up on Bennett. I will not
preclude that another kind of empirical material may open up for her
suggestion.
My research interviews are rather traditional in the sense that the
informants responded to my questions and encouraging remarks. They
are also concrete and practical since I was concerned about making them
tell stories about actual events. I like my interviews, but they are not
poetic. They are not rich on images, fantasies, or symbols. With a
different academic background, let us say I was trained in the analysis of
literature, I might have been able to read more out of it on a symbolic
level. The one ‘poetic’ contribution to the material, the short story one of
the informants sent me, does really not help on this matter. In a practical
sense the story is about clitoral pleasures (oral sex), however, the
symbolism in it is clear; it is revolving around the eroticity of the
difference between masculinity and femininity (the muscular one versus
the one with red toe-nails, the one who is watching versus the one who is
being watched, the one who is taking the initiative versus the one who is
blushing). So, if I were to do another fieldwork and Bennett’s flowers
still seemed appealing, I would have had to try harder to make it more
poetic. (I am not sure what that would have meant). Flowers - appealing
as they might be as a fantasy - I cannot see how they could have
fertilized the analysis this time.
Teresa de Lauretis has considered the clitoris as signifier, and concludes
that the clitoris and the symbolization of it through a flower language
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can signify lesbian or female desire. Of course it can, she says, since the
signifier of desire is contextual and ‘contingent upon each singular
sociohistorical subjectivity (de Lauretis 1994a, p234). That is the reason
why she calls it a fetish. But, what she cannot do, is to theorize the
clitoris, as such, ‘as the primary or unique signifier of female desire’
(p234). This would be to put the clitoris together with the penis in the
psychoanalytic imaginary ‘that we all find so inadequate’ (p234). Her
argument against it makes sense; both the penis and the clitoris are
anatomical entities, thus their capacity to signify desire depends on their
representation. In the poems Bennett refers to in her article, the clitoris is
imaged erect (‘the bud, or little seed, is a spear; it is sheathed; it
possesses a hood; it trembles and pulses; (…) thrusting upward (…)
potential for evil as well as for good’, Bennett 1993, p246). Seen as an
erect anatomical entity it cannot but be smaller than the penis; the little
penis of the woman, according to Freud, who again is offensing to
women. And is it not phallocentrism that ascribes eroticism to the clitoris
in Bennett’s analysis, one could ask? de Lauretis wants neither the penis
nor the clitoris to signify lesbian desire, and suggests, as already
discussed in previous chapters, the fetish as a more general term. I must
admit that I still find Teresa de Lauretis’ reasoning most appealing; is
any progress made if one erect body-part is replaced with another?
Probyn and Grosz refuse to signify desire, refuse to say that something
rather stable and namable represents the object of desire. If I were to
work along their lines of argumentation, I simply would not thematize
masculinity, the female body or what there is that is attractive about
another person. The other person as such is in fact not interesting, since
it is the pleasure that it is possible to produce on the body surfaces
involved that is interesting (Grosz), or what kind of queer configurations
of conjoined images that are made (Probyn). It would be meaningless to
use their ideas in the search for a signifier of desire.
I have to ask, however: how did the coursing vain of Martina
Navratalova come to inspire the ‘overwhelming longing’ to lick it? Why
the coursing vain, supplying Martina’s muscular arm? What is it with
Martina’s arm that connects it to other images (butchness, skills,
success) and to desire? What is this, which ascribes eroticism to the vain
on Martina’s forearm, which after all is just a vain on a forearm? I could
go on, and it is embarrassing to realize how much I miss the (stable)
symbol, (preferably something else than the phallus), to give erotic
significance to all the longing and belonging so poetically described by
Probyn. Probyn refuses to offer it, because she will not ascribe lack to
desire. It is very tempting to say what Bennett just said about Roof:
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Probyn refuses to speak! I will not say that, because I consider it
important that some feminists try to go fundamentally new ways to avoid
a phallic signification of desire.
But, this means that Grosz and Probyn probably is of more interest when
body surfaces come together; they must be of use when a woman’s body
meets another woman’s body in a concrete sense, as in the interviews
above. Again, I have a big problem: there is nothing prosaic about desire
in Probyn’s and Grosz’s texts. In the quotations above, GG and WR are
‘having sex’; they do things that is able to name, like digital sex, oral
sex, they are in love or not in love. That is, they use a language, also
because the interviewer did, that is already well known for being used in
a conversation about sex. My interviews were about power issues,
difference in interests, tastes and distastes, former experiences, and
social status. The informants told me stories about being able to capture
heaven, but also about the handling of failure and disappointment. They
were women who wanted to talk about what was good and what was not.
In Probyn’s and Grosz’s writing there is no power aspect, no social
difference between individuals. Here are body parts, body surfaces,
motions, images, excitement, intensity, sensations. It seems that I cannot
use the ideas of Probyn and Grosz that fascinate me so immensely, for
other than perhaps one situation among the interviews. That is the
situation where ATI meets C for the first time, described in chapter 7.
ATI says that she had ‘chemical releases that were absolutely complete’,
but I would need an interview that was ‘thicker’ in the description of this
particular event to be able to go further analytically. Probyn and Grosz
seem to be speaking of, if not once-in-a-lifetime experiences, so the very
rare events when one’s own body and images dissolves, and it does not
matter any more where one body surface ends and the other starts. I
guess it is kind of symptomatic for this that Grosz cannot give what she
calls a ‘real life illustration’ (refiguring, p183), but cites instead from
poetic writing.
I can use Probyn and Grosz, but not in analyzing, as in this project,
rather prosaic research interviews. I can first of all use them as a means
to put words to some rare sexual experiences where my history, my
shame, my doubts, anything that can be a hindrance for joy, evaporated
in the extraordinary intense meeting of bodies and minds. That is, I
consider Probyn’s and Grosz’z language as being poetic and personal,
perhaps even private. In order to be able to use it in a scientific
sociological context, I would need to know more about the production of
poetry and how I could make ‘ordinary people’ talk about ‘ordinary sex’
in poetic terms. This, I would think, is a challenge for social scientist in
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the field of sexuality studies. Perhaps we should let scholars from other
disciplines handle such a challenge. For, as Elizabeth Grosz puts it:
‘I am not suggesting that all feminists should turn to these rather
obscure and abstract reflections on the broad conditions of being
and its complications through becoming: clearly this is a project
far removed from direct application and from concrete project
aimed at transforming lives’ (Grosz 2001, p17).
It is indeed a project far removed from direct application. The question
is: does Grosz represent an attempt to speak from a place beyond any
discourse? If so, is this the direction where we should try to advance,
even if we consider it impossible? It would be a variant of the
revolutionary saying: it is impossible and we shall not give in. Or, is the
best we can do to do like Roof: to deny the possibility of anything else
than the phallic economy at all, and look for the opportunities in the
paradoxes? Or, as Butler, usually more optimistic than Roof regarding
the possibilities of making changes in the symbolic: we could work
sexuality against identity, and even against gender, and let that ‘which
cannot fully appear in any performance persist in its own disruptive
promise’ (Butler 1993b, p318). Whatever the strategy will be, it is my
hope that more social scientists will participate in the debate, till now
dominated by philosophers and literature critics. The British sociologist
Simon Hardy states that the erotic representation of gender is
‘contentious’ (Hardy 2000, p87). In a recent article, he strikes the right
note when he asks whether women’s seeking for subject-status within
pornography will ‘transform the nature of erotic meaning’ (Hardy 2001,
p451). These are the kind of empirical questions where social science
has a contribution to make.
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